Learning and Corporate Strategy: The Dynamic Evolution of the North American Pulp and Paper Industry, 1860-1960 by Toivanen, Hannes
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Learning and Corporate Strategy: The
Dynamic Evolution of the North
American Pulp and Paper Industry,
1860-1960
Hannes Toivanen
Georgia Institute of Technology
28. April 2004
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16415/
MPRA Paper No. 16415, posted 23. July 2009 06:05 UTC
 
 
 
LEARNING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: THE DYNAMIC 
EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN PULP AND PAPER 
INDUSTRY, 1860-1960 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to  
The Academic Faculty 
 
By 
 
Hannes Toivanen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in History and Sociology of Technology and Science 
 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
April, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Hannes Toivanen 2004 
 
 
 
LEARNING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: THE DYNAMIC 
EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN PULP AND PAPER 
INDUSTRY, 1860-1960 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
 
Steven Usselman, Chair 
 
 
 
August Giebelhaus 
 
 
 
John Krige 
 
 
 
William Winders 
 
 
 
Stuart Graham 
 
 
 
Date Approved: 16 April, 2004  
  
 iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
This work has benefited from the help, encouragement, and advice of many people 
over a period of more than five years. Their count is too great to be exhausted here, and I 
apologize for those omitted from here. Kalle Michelsen helped me to secure a Fulbright 
Fellowship that enabled me to begin graduate studies at the Georgia Tech in 2000. His 
encouragement and example have prompted me to develop my understanding of history and 
technology, and his continued support and friendship have been important. Steve Usselman 
and Gus Giebelhaus offered me a great opportunity to participate in their research project 
on the historical evolution of the North American pulp and paper industry. I remain 
indebted for them for advice, help, financial support, and friendship. 
Steve was a good advisor. He helped me when writing and studying was difficult, 
and demonstrated with his own example how to think harder. The other members of my 
dissertation committee, Gus Giebelhaus, John Krige, Bill Winders, and Stuart Graham, 
clarified my own thinking and provided guidance for future writing. I thank Ken Knoespel 
and Steve Vallas for advice and encouragement, too. When I presented my very first ideas 
at the Business History Conference, Richard Rosenbloom and David Hounshell provided 
kind and helpful comments. Other parts of the thesis have been presented at the annual 
meetings of the Society for the History of Technology, History of Science Society, and the 
Fall Technical Conference of Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry.  
 iv 
I have also benefitted from discussions with many of my fellow graduate students at 
Tech, and, more importantly, from their friendship. It was wonderful to think and relax with 
Leslie Sharp, Raul Necochea, Ben Shackleford, Prakash Kumar, Tim Stoneman, Haven 
Hawley, and many others. My fellow Finn at Tech, Lauri Lehtonen, shared generously his 
knowledge of forestry and papermaking. Karen Smith’s help at the library of the Institute of 
Paper Science and Technology at Georgia Tech was important. I also wish to thank the staff 
at the archives of Cornell University, Wisconsin State Historical Society, and University of 
Maine at Bangor. 
The Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies provided financial support. 
Moreover, it was a place where I could learn about the industry, and I thank Tom 
McDonough, Jim McNutt, and Pat McCarthy. I thank for financial support also the ASLA-
Fulbright Fellowship, American Scandinavian Foundation, Helsingin Sanomat Centennial 
Foundation, Finnish Cultural Foundation, and the Printing Industry Center at the Rochester 
Institute of Technology. 
 
 v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES  vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES   ix 
 
SUMMARY    x 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION    1 
 
CHAPTER 2. TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING IN THE GROUNDWOOD  
AND SULPHITE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, 1860-1920   11 
Early Development of Wood Pulp Technologies   13 
Decline in the Availability of Technological Alternatives   23 
Process of Monopolization   27 
Horizontal Combination and Innovation   36 
Relocation of Newsprint to Canada and Product Diversification  
in the U.S Paper Industry   45 
Conclusions   47 
 
CHAPTER 3. SPECIALIZATION, INNOVATION, AND CARTELS   50 
Dynamics of Cartelization in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights   52 
Role of Patents for the Evolution from Specialty Production  
into Mass Production   62 
Conclusions   74 
 
CHAPTER 4. CO-EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING AND 
ORGANIZATION IN THE PAPER CONTAINER INDUSTRY, 1870-1960   76 
Dynamics of Innovation in the Early U.S. Corrugated Paper Industry   77 
Standardized Innovation: The Creation of Markets   82 
Technology Cartels, Antitrust, and Innovation   90 
Emergence of Strategies of Scale and Scope   96 
Product Innovation and Evolution of Technological Learning 106 
Conclusions 119 
 
CHAPTER 5. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION AND THE EVOLUTION  
OF THE SULPHATE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, 1850-1960 121 
Early Development of Sulphate Wood Pulp Technology 124  
Regional Learning in the Kraft Process, 1910-1927 137 
 vi 
Emergence of Southern Mass Production and Industrial   
Relocation, 1925-1931 153 
Technology of Coordination: Standardization of Kraft Paper, 1929-1935 178 
Standardization and Diffusion of the Chemical Recovery  
Technology, 1934-1940 188 
Technology and Strategies of Growth in the Sulphate Pulp and  
Paper Industry, 1940-1960 198 
Conclusions 213 
 
CHAPTER 6. VERTICAL LINKAGES OF LEARNING: THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF MACHINE COATED PAPER, 1930-1960 216 
Technological Relationships between the Printing, Publishing,  
and Allied Industries 220 
Promise of Revolutionary Printing Technology: Need for New Paper 228 
Innovation in the Magazine Business: Demand for New Printing  
and Paper Technology 238 
Controlling Innovation in the Magazine and Catalogue Paper Industry 252 
Reluctant Vertical Integration: User-Supplier Relationships during  
the Great Depression 267 
Innovation in the War Economy, 1942-1947 272 
Demise of Patent Control: Expansion and Segmentation of the  
Machine Coated Paper Industry, 1945-1960 287 
Conclusions 301 
 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 303 
Early Evolution of the Sulphite Pulp and Paper Industry 305 
Technology and Cartels 309 
Evolution of the Paper Container Industry 311 
Evolution of the Sulphate Pulp and Paper industry 313 
Evolution of the Magazine and Machine Coated Paper Industries 317 
The Dynamic Evolution of the North American Pulp and Paper Industry 320 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 322 
 
 
 vii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 2-1 Table 1. Production of Selected Paper Grades in the U.S.,1899-1909.  
(Tons of 2,000 lbs.).    12 
 
Table 2-2 Table 2. Number of Sulphite Mills, Digester and Annual Production  
of Sulphite Pulp in the United States, 1897-1907 (Tons of 2,000 lbs.)   34 
 
Table 2-3 Table 3. Wood Pulp Made for Sale or For Use in Establishment Other  
Than Those in Which Produced in the United States (Tons of 2,000 lbs.)   35 
 
Table 2-4 Table 4 Wood Pulp Produced Including That Used in Mills Which 
Manufactured in the United States (Tons of 2,000 lbs.)   35 
 
Table 2-5 Table 5. Year End Quoted Bid/Asked U.S. prices For Sulphite Pulp 
 in U.S. Cents, 1889-1909   39 
 
Table 3-1 Table 6. Production of Board by Grade in the U.S., 1899-1919  
(Tons of 2,000 lbs.)    57 
 
Table 5-1 Table 7. Wood Pulp Production in the United States by Grade,  
1909-1959 (Thousand tons of 2,000 lbs.) 122 
 
Table 5-2 Table 8. Number of Sulphate Digesters, Average Digester Capacity,  
and Total Digester Capacity (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) in the United States,  
1919-1954 145 
 
Table 5-3 Table 9. Production of Kraft Wrapping Paper in the United States,  
1909-1931 (Tons of 2000 lbs.) 155 
 
Table 5-4 Per Cent of Major Manufacturing Regions From the Total U.S.  
Kraft  Paper Production, and Total National Capacity Utilization,  
1926-1931 (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) 168 
 
Table 5-5 Table 11. Standard Qualities and Prices of Jute, Cylinder Kraft,  
and Fourdrinier Kraft Paperboard in 1929 179 
 
Table 5-6 Table 12. Production of Bleached Sulphate Pulp in the U.S.,  
1931-1958 (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) 201 
 
Table 5-7 Table 13. U.S. Production of Sulphate Pulp by Grade in 1958 and  
Total Production of Wood Pulp (Tons of 2,000 Lbs.) 203 
 
 viii 
Table 6-1 Table 14. U.S. Patents on Coating of Paper, 1930-1959 254 
 
Table 6-2 Table 15. Estimated Consumption of Book Paper by Magazines in the 
 United States, 1925-1944 (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) 274 
 
Table 6-3 Table 16. Annual Value and Production of Machine Coated  
Paper Production in the U.S., 1947-1963 (Thousands of dollars  
and tons of 2,000 lbs.) 300 
 
 ix 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Paperboard container production, 1916-1939   91 
 
Figure 4-2. Most of these Hinde and Dauch Paper Company corrugated  
paper products were patented. 111 
 
Figure 5-1. Technological structure of the sulphate pulping process cycle. 134 
 
Figure 5-2.  ver-capacity and the despair of industry leaders. 162 
 
Figure 5-3. Benefits of coordination and vertical integration.  163 
 
 
 x 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This study analyzes the long-term evolution of the North American pulp and paper 
industry, and offers a new synthesis of the dynamic forces that spearheaded the expansion 
and transformation of this large manufacturing industry. The evolution of the North 
American pulp and paper industry between 1860 and 1960 was driven by successive waves 
of technological learning that spawned structural change. Such waves transformed and 
expanded the sulphite and sulphate pulp, envelope, paper container, paper bag, magazine 
and printing paper, coated paper, board, and many other pulp and paper industries between 
1860 and 1960. These waves repeated a pattern of co-evolution of technology and industrial 
organization that enveloped dynamic forces of change, such as innovation, corporate 
strategies, industrial relocation, and policy. As distinct branches of the pulp and paper 
industry passed from the early nascent phase to full maturity, the sources of innovation, 
nature of technological change, strategy and structure of leading firms, and industrial 
organization underwent throughout transformation. As these waves of industrial change 
passed from a nascent phase to maturity, the reciprocal dynamics between organization, 
corporate strategy, policy, and technological learning co-evolved, and established the 
evolutionary path of the North American pulp and paper industry.  
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This study analyzes the long-term evolution of the North American pulp and 
paper industry, and offers a new synthesis of the dynamic forces that spearheaded the 
expansion and transformation of this large manufacturing industry. I argue that the 
dramatic growth of the industry between 1860 and 1960 was driven and punctuated by 
distinct, sustained, and successive spectacular waves of innovation. Radical technological 
departures enabled managers of specialized firms to create new markets and pursue 
aggressive strategies of corporate growth. As these waves of industrial change passed 
from a nascent phase to maturity, the reciprocal dynamics among organization, corporate 
strategy, policy, and technological learning co-evolved, and established the evolutionary 
path of the North American pulp and paper industry. 
Accurate historical understanding of the long-term evolution of a technology 
intensive industry sheds lights on the sources of economic growth, and this is what this 
study intends to accomplish. Innovation and firms are the major agents of industrial 
evolution, Joseph Schumpeter famously posited in his studies that still guide much of 
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economic and business literature.1 By employing the concept of organizational 
capabilities, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter proposed a framework to analyze the role 
of learning and organizational behavior for economic change. Their path-breaking study 
was premised on the central role of technical advancement for economic growth, and it 
urged scholars to reconsider how technological learning in practice influenced economic 
change.2 
An effort to understand where technological learning resides in an economy, and 
to identify its characteristic dynamics, has been central for subsequent scholarship. 
Individual talented people are, of course, the primary source of technological ingenuity, 
but the organizational context influences heavily the diffusion of innovation and its 
economic effects. Historians of American science, technology and business have in great 
detail chronicled how the nation evolved from adopting European technology to being the 
leading source of technological innovations.3 
In his study of the emergence of American system of manufacturing, David 
Hounshell demonstrated how individual, skilled mechanics moved from one industry to 
another during the late nineteenth century, and importantly contributed to nation-wide 
                                                 
1 Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
1934; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: 1950: Harper.  
2 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press 1982; Another important contribution was the analytic framework advanced in 
Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box. Technology and Economics. New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1982.  
3 Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis. A History of the American Genius for Invention. New York: 
Penguin Books 1989.  
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technological learning.4 American innovation in iron and steel reflected leading firms’ 
ability to respond flexibly to the changing needs of their customers, and this user-
producer interaction propelled the rise of the modern U.S. steel industry, Thomas Misa 
has concluded.5 David Noble and Thomas Hughes have demonstrated how increasing 
innovation by American firms created a demand for technologically advanced work 
force, and prompted the transformation of the American university system.6 In the early 
twentieth century, the most important change in the organization of technological 
learning occurred when the large American firms divorced technological innovation from 
manufacturing operations, and established specialized research and development 
departments.7 
                                                 
4 David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press 1984; See also: Nathan Rosenberg, “Technological Change in the Machine Tool 
Industry,“ Journal of Economic History, 23: 414-443. 
5 Thomas J. Misa, A Nation of Steel. The Making of Modern America, 1865-1920. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press 1995. For theoretical formulation of the role of user-producer for innovation in 
firms and industries, see: Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press 
1988.  
6 It should be noted that Noble’s study was highly critical of the effect of large corporations on American 
institutions of science and technology. David F. Noble, America By Design. Science, Technology, and the 
Rise of Industrial Capitalism. New York: Knopf 1977; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power. 
Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1940. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1983; See also: 
David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth. New York: 
Cambridge University Press 1989, 21-97. 
7 The best overview of American research and development is: David A. Hounshell, “The Evolution of 
Industrial Research in the United States,” in Richard S. Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer (eds), Engines 
of innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era. Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1996, 
13-85. Another useful overview is David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation : 
Technological Change in 20th Century America. New York: Cambridge University Press 1998. Detailed 
studies of the origins of research and development at major U.S. firms are: Leonard R. Reich: The Making 
of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE and Bell, 1876-1926. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985; Ronald R. Klein, Steinmetz: Engineer and Socialist. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1992. David Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr, Science and Corporate Strategy: 
DuPont R&D, 1902-1980 . New York: Cambridge University Press 1988; Ross Knox Bassett, To The 
Digital Age. Research Labs, Start-Up Companies, and The Rise of MOS Technology. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press 2002.  
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Economic historian Gavin Wright has argued that technological learning in firms, 
industries, and regions in the nineteenth century America was a network phenomenon. 8 In 
the early 1990’s, economists introduced the notion of national systems of innovations as a 
systematic framework to analyze, and to enhance nation-wide technological learning. 9 
These studies provide a substantial body of evidence that the organizational context 
importantly shapes the direction, character, speed, and impact of technological learning. 
This is also foundational for the way I apply the concept throughout this study. 10 
                                                 
8 Gavin Wright, “Can A Nation Learn? American Technology As A Network Phenomenon,” in Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1999, 295-320. For similar analysis of the twentieth century U.S. 
economy, see: Richard R. Nelson and Gavin Wright, “The Rise and Fall of American Technological 
Leadership: The Postwar Era In Historical Perspective,“ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 30 (Dec. 
1992): 1931-1964. For the notion of technological spillovers, see: Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and 
Rebecca Henderson, “Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,“ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 577-598. Similar dynamics are also analyzed at regional level: 
AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1994. 
9 Richard R. Nelson (ed), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis.  New York: Oxford 
University Press 1993; Bengt-Åke Lundvall (ed), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning. London : Pinter Publishers 1992; These volumes offer a model of 
systems of innovation in late-twentieth century industrialized countries that strikingly resembles the classic 
schumpeterian interpretation of economic history in David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: 
Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe From 1750 to the Present. London: 
Cambridge University Press 1969. 
10 There are several attempts to define specific forms of technological learning. Broad literature on social 
construction of technology avoids using the notion of learning, but important elements of its theoretical 
premises are borrowed from Nelson and Winter. Best introduction to this literature is: Wiebe E. Bijker, 
Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1987; For the notion 
of technological momentum, see: Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power, 140-174; An influential effort to 
apply the notion of “scientific paradigms” proposed in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 2nd Ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1970 (1962), is Giovanni Dosi, 
“Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories,“ Research Policy 11 (1982): 147-162. On path-
dependency of technology, see: Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,“ American 
Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-336. On learning by using, see: Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box, 
16, 120-140; This view is also advanced in Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They 
Know It: Analytical Studies From Aeronautical History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1990. 
Interesting investigation of the epistemological and sociological foundations of engineering knowledge is: 
Louis L. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1994. For technological learning 
in firms, see especially essays in Lamoraux, Raff, and Temin, Learning by Doing; For a review of 
institutional incentive structures and learning, see: Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press 1990, 73-82. 
 5 
For the purposes of the study, it is also appropriate to define what I mean by 
corporate strategy. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., argued in his influential study, Strategy and 
Structure, that managerial considerations of efficiency and competitiveness determined 
the organizational structure of leading American enterprises in the early twentieth 
century. 11 Michael E. Porter has argued in his influential textbook on corporate strategy 
that corporate managers direct and organize their enterprises based on what they have 
reason to believe to produce competitive comparative advantage over their competitors.12 
Such a process of strategic decision making by firms determines organizational change at 
the industry level. 13 
In order to reduce the effects of market competition and be able to better predict 
future developments, corporate managers also attempt to gain control of the competitive 
environment.14 Chandler has argued that the large-scale vertically integrated structure of 
firms enabled corporate managers to improve the efficiency of production and 
distribution through centralized coordination. 15 As Steven Usselman has shown in his 
study of the railroads, the administrative control of technological innovation was a central 
                                                 
11 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial 
Enterprise.  Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1962. 
12 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: 
Free Press 1985. 
13 For a industry study that demonstrates this point: David G. McKendrick, Richard F. Doner, and Stephan 
Haggard, From Silicon Valley to Singapore. Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Drive 
Industry. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2000. See also: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Visible Hand. The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 1977; Alfred D. Chandler, 
Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1994; 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff (eds), Coordination and Information. Historical Perspectives 
on the Organization of Enterprise. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1995. 
14 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt define this as a “control of risks in markets and in the political system” 
in The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth. Unites States Business and Public Policy in the 20th Century. 
New York: Basic Books 1988, 28-36. 
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element in the coordination mechanisms deployed by managers in order to manage the 
forces of economic change.16 In particular, intellectual property rights enabled firms to 
coordinate technological change.17 In a more polemic way, “New Left” historians have 
argued that corporate interest importantly shaped the early twentieth century reforms of 
American political economy. 18 Thomas McCraw has pointed out, however, that the 
impact of American regulation of business on different industries has depended largely 
on their distinct underlying structure, and described the leading regulators as much more 
independent of corporate interest.19 Thus managers are forced to consider a complex, ever 
changing mix of economic, technological, and political factors when they craft corporate 
strategies.20 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Chandler, Visible Hand. 
16 Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation. Business, Technology and Politics in America, 
1840-1920. New York: Cambridge University Press 2002. 
17 Steven W. Usselman, “Patents, Engineering Professionals, and the Pipelines of Innovation: 
Internalization of Technical Discovery by Nineteenth-Century American Railroads,“ in Lamoreaux, Raff, 
and Temin, Learning by Doing, 61-91.For rather clear analysis of the intentions of the Patent System, see: 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 2003;  
18 See in particular: Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism; A Re-Interpretation of American 
History, 1900-1916. New York:Free Press 1963; Noble, America By Design; Martin J. Sklar, The 
Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism 1890-1916. The Market, The Law, and Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press 1988. 
19 Thomas K McCraw, Prophets of Regulation. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 1984. Analysis of the 
influence of public policies on corporate science and technology is: David M. Hart, Forged Consensus. 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1998; A good discussion of the conflicts between American antitrust policies and the 
Patent System during the twentieth century is: David M. Hart, “Antitrust and Technological Innovation in 
the US: Ideas, Institutions, Decisions, and Impacts, 1890-2000,“ Research Policy 30 (2001): 932-936. 
20 A persuasive effort to provide analytic framework for the long-term evolution of American business is: 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a 
New Synthesis of American Business History,“ The American Historical Review 108 (April 2003): 404-
432. 
 7 
This study is primarily an effort to provide a historical analysis of the long-term 
evolution of the North American pulp and paper indsutry, but theoretical literature on 
industrial leadership and competitiveness has influenced my interpretation of historical 
evidence. Michael E. Porter’s theory of competitiveness emphasized the micro-economic 
foundations of industry evolution, and has encompassed much of subsequent 
scholarship.21 In 1989, the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity employed a 
similar framework to analyze the lagging performance of American manufacturing 
industries.22 In their review of sources of leadership in seven different industries, David 
Mowery and Richard Nelson noted that although elements of different central theories of 
industry dynamics corresponded with virtually any of the case studies, no single pattern 
fit all of the cases. Industries evolve over different evolutionary paths, and we have no 
general theoretical framework to explain industrial change. Yet, these studies have in 
common an emphasis on the co-evolution of organizational structures and technological 
learning. 23 
I began this introduction by arguing that this study offers a new synthesis of the 
long-term evolution of the pulp and paper industry, one that emphasizes radical 
technological departures and sustained waves of technological learning. Most historians 
of the industry emphasize the absence of radical technological departures, and 
characterize technological change in the industry as a slow, incremental, and 
accumulative process. This may be because historians of the North American pulp and 
                                                 
21 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: The Free Press 1990.  
22 Michael. E. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, Robert M. Solow, Made in America. Regaining the Productive 
Edge. New York: HarperPerennial 1989. 
 8 
paper industry have primarily examined the mature phases of capital intensive segments 
of the industry. In so doing they have ignored how individual segments of the industry 
have evolved from the nascent phase to full maturity over a long period of time.24 A 
typical characterization of innovation in pulp and paper is provided Gary Magee in his 
comparative analysis of the British and American industries between 1860 and 1914: 
”[Pulp and paper industry is]…dominated by a capital- intensive flow production 
technology and a process of innovation characterized by gradual technological 
accumulation rather than major leaps.”25 In a similar vein, claiming to have listed all the 
major process innovations in the pulp and paper making in the U.S. between 1915 and 
1940, Avi Cohen concluded that “Yet none of these innovations were major departures 
from existing technology.”26 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 David C. Mowery and Richard R. Nelson (ed), Sources of Industrial Leadership. Studies of Seven 
Industries. New York: Cambridge University Press 1999, 11. 
24 The best overview of the history of pulp and paper industry in the North America is: David C. Smith, 
History of Papermaking in the United States (1691-1969). New York: Lockwood Publishing Company 
1970; Very detailed history for developments before 1916 is: Lyman Horace Weeks, A History of Paper-
manufacturing in the United States, 1690-1916. New York: B. Franklin 1969 (1916); Classic case study of 
technological change in a nineteenth century paper town is: Judith A. McGaw, Most Wonderful Machine. 
Mechanization and Social Change in Berkshire Paper Making, 1801-1885. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1987. An account of the early horizontal combinations that relates to theory of firm is: Naomi R. 
Lamoraux, The Great Merger Movement In American Business 1895-1904. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1985. Other major studies by historians include: Thomas Heinrich, “Product 
Diversification in the U.S. Pulp and Paper Industry: The Case of International Paper, 1898-1941,” Business 
History Review 75 (Autumn 2001): 467-505; Gary B. Magee, Productivity and Performance in the Paper 
Industry: Labour, Capital, and Technology in Britain and America, 1860-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press 1997; Barry E. C. Boothman, “High Finance/Low Strategy: Corporate 
Collapse in the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry, 1919 – 1932,” Business History Review 74 (2000):4, 
611-656; Avi J. Cohen, “Technological Change as Historical Process: The Case of the U.S. Pulp and Paper 
Industry, 1915-1940,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLLIV (Sept. 1984): 775-799; Trevor O. Dick: 
“Canadian Newsprint, 1913-1930,” Journal of Economic History, XLII (Sept. 1982), 659-87. There are 
hardly any historical studies devoted solely to the pulp industry. Instructive on the developments in the 
wood pulp is: Royal S. Kellogg, Pulpwood and Wood Pulp in North America. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1923.  
25 Magee, Productivity and Performance in the Paper Industry, 2. 
26 Avi J. Cohen, “Technological Change as Historical Process., 785. 
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The following chapters detail a very different kind of dynamics of innovation in 
pulp and paper. Each of the chapters analyzes in detail the historical development of 
distinct waves of industrial growth that coalesced around specific bodies of technological 
knowledge. The second chapter examines the nascent sulphite pulp and paper industry, as 
it leaped from non-existent to be the largest sector, and the driver of substantial industry 
wide expansion during the last decades of nineteenth century. Patent monopoly on 
revolutionary sulphite pulp technology enabled managers to coordinate this rapid and 
dramatic period of industrial growth. The third chapter examines the role of intellectual 
property rights for cartels in other nascent segments of the pulp and paper industry. 
Chapter four offers detailed analysis of the long-term evolution of the American paper 
container industry, which propelled paperboard into most consumed line of paper in the 
U.S. 
Radical technological departures, intellectual property rights, and product 
standardization punctuated the development of the paper container industry. The fifth 
chapter details how the sulphate pulp industry emerged from obscurity to become the 
dominating sector of the pulp and paper industry between 1920 and 1950, and facilitated 
important industry-wide expansion. The last chapter offers a history of the invention of 
machine coated paper, and it’s development from a non-existent product in 1930 to the 
basis of an industry with over half a billion dollar in annual sales volume in 1960. 
The dynamic development of these different industry segments repeated a 
common pattern of co-evolution of technological learning and industrial organization. At 
the nascent phase of the industry, a narrow group of firms gained control of revolutionary 
manufacturing technology through intellectual property rights, which facilitated the 
 10 
creation of monopoly and oligopoly in specialized paper markets. Over time, imitation, 
innovation, standardization, expiration of patents, diffusion of technology or public 
policy have undermined such barriers of entry, and enabled competitors to learn the 
revolutionary technology. The leading specialized firms responded by adopting 
aggressive strategies of scale and scope, and drive down the unit cost. At this phase of 
industry development, an important shift in the locus of technological learning occurred 
The leading pulp and paper firms specialized in operating large-scale, vertically 
integrated production process of pulp and paper, and procured manufacturing technology 
increasingly from specialized equipment suppliers. At the macro level of the North 
American pulp and paper industry, this study documents an historical evolution whereby 
the primary locus of productivity improving technological learning shifted from the pulp 
and paper firms themselves to specialized equipment suppliers.27 
 
                                                 
27 This has been conceptualized as the divergence of operational and technological clusters in McKendrick, 
Doner, and Haggard, From Silicon Valley to Singapore, 42-46. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING IN THE GROUNDWOOD AND SULPHITE 
PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, 1860-1920 
 
 
 
A long sustained wave of learning in the wood pulp technologies culminated 
around 1900 in the dramatic restructuring of the North American pulp and paper industry. 
Within a few years the industry witnessed a merger mania, and the building of a number 
of vertically integrated, capital intensive record size pulp and paper mills that flooded the 
market with new, low cost ground wood-sulphite papers (see Table 2-1.). Ground wood 
was manufactured by mechanically grinding wood cords in small chips, which were then 
digested under pressure into cellulose pulp without chemicals. Chemical wood pulps, 
soda and sulphite, were manufactured by digesting the small wood chips in chemical 
solution. These wood pulps processes differed substantially technologically, and enabled 
the production of very different kind of papers. 
The rapid diffusion of revolutionary technologies underpinned this transition into 
industrial capitalism and the new organization of the industry. A central element of this 
process was the eclipse in the number of available, alternative, sulphite process 
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technologies during the 1890’s, and the creation of a patent monopoly by the industry’s 
first large scale enterprise, the International Paper Company (henceforth IP).28 
 
Table 2-1. Production of Selected Paper Grades in the U.S., 1899-1909. (Tons 
of 2,000 lbs.).  
 
Paper Grade 1899 1904 1909 
Newspaper 569,000 913,000 1,176,000 
Wrapping paper 535,000 644,000 763,000 
Board 389,000 460,000 812,000 
Book paper 304,000 454,000 677,000 
Fine paper 119,000 147,000 198,000 
Total Production 2,168,000 na 4,217,000 
 
Source: Manufactures 1909. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1913, 758-9. 
 
The emergence of a sulphite patent monopoly contrasts sharply with the efforts to 
control ground wood and soda pulp processes with intellectual property rights, as such 
attempts were repeatedly frustrated by the immaturity of technology or competing 
innovations. Discovered in the 1860’s, the sulphite process was developed slowly and 
painstakingly into a commercially viable mass production technology during the 1890’s. 
The sulphite process was a strategic innovation, however, because it critically 
complemented other wood pulps. Application of sulphite pulp with ground wood pulp 
allowed firms to improve significantly the quality of paper, introduce a wide array of new 
products, and simultaneously dramatically reduce the unit cost.  
IP secured its sulphite monopoly through innovation, imitation, extensive 
litigation, pooling of technology, and horizontal combination. Yet, following a broad-
                                                 
28 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement, 86-117; Very good statistical overview of the great 
merger wave is: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movement in American Industry, 1895-1959. Princeton: 
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based effort to discover a superior wood pulp process, the subsequent patent monopoly 
remained vulnerable to challenges, and the managers of the company recognized 
extensive and inclusive licensing as a way to strengthen its basic patent. The 
administrative control of technological innovation was a central element in the 
coordination mechanisms deployed by IP in its attempts to manage the forces of 
economic change.29 This dual character of contracting of intellectual property rights had 
wide ranging implications for the competitiveness of the industry. 30 
By examining half a century of technological learning within the pulp and paper 
industry, this chapter seeks to illustrate how maturity and ownership of technology, 
together with the institutional framework in which firms are situated, affects the ability of 
firms and industries to acquire new organizational capabilities. 
 
Early Development of Wood Pulp Technologies  
A small and tight community of entrepreneurs and inventors, who maintained a 
sustained wave of technological learning, pioneered mass production and vertical 
integration in the North American pulp and paper industry. These people innovated 
always in a strictly proprietary context, and the ownership of the critical wood pulp 
technologies – ground wood, soda, and sulphite - allowed them to merge firms, and 
induce vertical integration across the industry. This group of entrepreneurs developed 
new chemical sulphite pulping processes, which by critically complementing the older 
                                                                                                                                                 
Princeton University Press 1959. 
29 See cases discussed throughout: Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation. 
 
30 Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies. 
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mechanical ground wood pulping process, allowed unprecedented economies of scale in 
quality newsprint, book, and writing paper when the pulping process was fully integrated 
in the paper making machine. 
As the frontier of technological knowledge on wood pulp technologies expanded 
and accelerated during the late nineteenth century, leading entrepreneurs consolidated 
critical intellectual property rights under their administrative control. This culminated in 
the pooling of intellectual property rights for the sulphite technology, an effort that 
eventually prompted the formation of the first large-scale pulp and paper enterprise, the 
IP, in 1898. Its managers controlled patents for the path-breaking sulphite digester 
through a special holding entity, the American Sulphite Company, and sold over 200 
tactically priced patent licenses by 1903. This arrangement allowed IP managers to 
coordinate the diffusion of new technology and structural change in the North American 
pulp and paper industry. Because International attempted to gain control through a 
decades long, broad based effort to innovate in the wood pulp processes, its monopoly 
claims were intensely contested.31 
In the nineteenth century, population growth, and institutional change that 
included urbanization, increased education, as well as the impact of Civil War, 
engendered an increased demand for paper that induced the discovery of new sources of 
cellulose. The maturing of wood pulp techniques depended critically on entrepreneurial 
strategies forged within small technological communities. Since the 1850’s, the supply of 
rags used for pulp had steadily fallen further behind the increasing demand and 
eventually, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the shortage culminated with the “American 
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Paper Panic.” The shortage of Southern cotton rags, and booming demand for newspapers 
prompted the opening of the two first ground wood mills in the United States. The 
pioneering wood grinding machine had been patented in 1841 by the German, Friedrich 
Gottlob Keller, and acquired in 1846 by another German, Heinrich Völter, who improved 
the machinery and commercialized it with relative success. The Germans Albrecht, 
Rudolph, and Albreto Pagenstecher applied the patents and machinery of Völter in 1866, 
when they opened the first commercially viable paper and ground wood pulp mill in the 
United States in Massachusetts. Warner Miller, who opened a vertically integrated mill in 
New York the next year, had also learned of the German technology during his travels in 
Europe. The early commercial success of the ground wood pulp technology was limited 
because it produced mainly very poor quality paper, and more importantly, because the 
difficulty and cost of separating pulp from the water frustrated attempts to scale up 
production. Miller and Albrecht Pagenstecher cooperated closely to improve the 
machinery and were eventually able to pioneer the mass production of ground wood pulp. 
The owner of the neighboring mill to the Pagenstecher establishment, Benjamin Franklin 
Barker, received in the early 1870’s four patents for wood grinders that further facilitated 
economies of scale in ground wood pulp. While the expiration of the Völter patent in 
1884 made the ground wood pulp process freely available, pulp and paper firms 
continued to depend upon suppliers of specialized and proprietary grinding and pulp 
treating machinery. 32 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 The license network is detailed in American Sulphite Pulp Company v. De Grasse Paper 193 F. 653 
(1912).  
32 Dard Hunter, Papermaking. The History and Technique of an Ancient Craft. 2nd Ed. New York: Dover 
Publications 1981(1947), 376-380; Warner Miller, “Introduction of Ground Wood Pulp in U.S,” Paper 
Trade Journal, 22 Feb. 1917, 44, 48, 62 (hereafter PTJ); PTJ 1 March 1917, 18; McGaw, Most Wonderful 
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The wood pulping processes had definitive technological requisites that 
determined their economic application and the geographical location of the industry. The 
mechanical grinding of wood into ground wood pulp took place under pressure, was very 
power intensive, and consumed a tremendous amount of timber. The sulphite process was 
an acid cooking process that consumed non-resinous wood in even larger quantities than 
the ground wood pulp process, but required relatively little energy. The demand for cheap 
power and a large supply of non-resinous wood, such as spruce, directed these processes 
towards the Northeast United States where hydropower and forests were ample in the 
vicinity of major markets. Yet the development and introduction of wood pulp 
technologies followed definitive entrepreneurial action that was prompted by the 
worsening shortage and booming price of the traditional dominant source of pulp fiber, 
cotton rags.33 
A small technological community believed that wood pulp could yield good 
quality paper if an appropriate chemical process - soda and sulphite - could be found. 
Hugh Burgess and Charles Watt secured an English patent for the production of pulp by 
boiling wood in caustic alkali at high temperature in 1851. The soda process, as it was 
named, did not become a commercial success in England, but the inventors secured an 
American patent in 1854, and opened a mill in Pennsylvania. Relying on the patent 
monopoly, they incorporated in 1863 the American Wood Paper Company and 
constructed a large-scale pulp and paper mill in Manayunk, Pennsylvania. Technological 
difficulties and high costs prevented the wide adoption of the soda process, but the early 
                                                                                                                                                 
Machine, 195-197; Magee, Productivity and Performance, 179-180; Smith, The History of Papermaking, 
128-139. 
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experiments with it provided impetus for the sulphite process. The inventor of the 
sulphite pulp process, Benjamin Tilghman, claimed that it was while visiting mills in 
Manayunk that he recognized the potential of his earlier experiments with fats in 
sulphurous acid, which he had conducted in Paris in 1857. Tilghman began 
experimenting by cooking wood chips in a solution of sulphurous acid under high 
pressure and temperature, and acquired British patents for the sulphite process in 1866-
67. The new process dissolved wood in a superior way and produced fine red-colored 
fiber pulp that was suitable for the manufacture of quality papers after bleaching.34 
The development of sulphite pulp marked a leap forward in the quality of wood 
pulp papers, and thus completed the transition away from rag pulp. The ground wood-
sulphite mix resulted in a strong white paper instead of the yellow and weak ground 
wood paper. The increased hardness of the ground wood-sulphite paper also made it a 
superior alternative for the demands of newspaper printing. Emphasis on this mass 
product market set the course for the subsequent developments of the technology. 
Besides improving the qualities of paper, the sulphite pulp induced economies of scale 
and speed. The right mix of ground wood and sulphite pulp formed such a strong web on 
the paper- forming felt of the paper machine that it enabled the transition into more 
efficient and larger paper making machinery. Thus, sulphite pulp was the critical 
complementary technology to the ground wood pulp, new power intensive techniques of 
wood grinding, and the faster and larger paper making machinery that typically are 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 David C. Smith, “Wood Pulp and Newspapers, 1867-1900,” Business History Review 38 (Autumn 1964): 
328-45. 
34 Hunter, Papermaking, 390-391. 
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proscribed as the causes of the structural change in the North American pulp and paper 
industry between 1880 and 1920. 
Ground wood pulp technology fell under exclusive patent rights when introduced 
in the United States, but these monopolies lapsed in the 1880’s. In the absence of 
significant improvements, the technology became freely available in principle. In 
practice, however, specialized machinery suppliers controlled and perfected the grinding, 
washing, beating, and screening technologies that were required for the mass production 
of ground wood pulp. Judith McGaw has detailed how the late nineteenth century paper 
firms rarely developed organizational capabilities in the machinery, but rather chose to 
rely on specialized shops such as the Black Clawson Company, the J.Horne and Sons 
Company, and many others. The existence of specialized machine shops and the relative 
simplicity and technological maturity of the ground wood pulping made it a reliable 
process and thus viable investment for many paper firms.35 
The sulphite pulping process was barely at experimental stage in 1867 and the 
need of continued improvement placed it squarely under tight patent monopolies over the 
next four decades. Benjamin Tilghman attempted to cash in with his invention only to be 
frustrated and accumulate burgeoning debt. After months of efforts to cook sulphite pulp 
in digesters he was forced to give up because leaks and cracks in the digester shell 
continued to damage the pulp batch. The sulphite process consisted of cooking wood 
chips in a solution of bisulphite of lime under high heat and pressure as long as was 
needed for the dissolution of the chips and to bleach the pulp –often more than 7 hours. 
The acidic chemical reactions damaged the metal digester shell, triggering undesired 
                                                 
35 McGaw, Most Wonderful Machine, 108-116, 158-173. 
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chemical reactions that disturbed the batch. Tilghman had successfully described the 
sulphite cooking process as the application of bisulphate of calcium to sulphurous acid, 
but was unable to build an acid resisting interior lining of the digester shell and incurred 
$20,000 in debts instead of reaping the bonanza of his invention. Other inventor-
entrepreneurs learned from his failure a valuable lesson, and a community of inventors 
continued to pursue what they believed might give birth to a new industry. 36 
The hope of a breakthrough in sulphite technology fueled the efforts of a few 
experimenters whose work was widely circulated in the trade journals. Europeans 
especially took up with the new technology and commenced where Tilghman had 
stopped. The Swede Carl D. Ekman and Englishman George Fry developed a magnesium 
sulphite process and established a pulp and paper mill in England in 1874. Since the pulp 
was not fully bleached, the paper retained a yellow color and poor quality. German 
Alexander Mitscherlich experimented with calcium sulphite and identified the practical 
success of the process with the structure and composition of the digester shell and its 
interior lining. His work between 1883 and 1886 resulted in patents that described, in 
addition to the sulphite process, an improved digester lining. Mitscherlich called for 
continuous lining of cement that he applied directly upon the hard metal shell, a layer of 
thin sheets of lead embedded in and upon the lining of cement, and next to these either 
one or two courses of vitrified brick laid in cement. The patented inventions of Ekman 
and Mitscherlich definitively improved the sulphite process but did not establish it as an 
economically viable technology. Charles S. Wheelwright attempted to employ the 
Ekman-Fry process in the early 1880’s at his mill at Providence, Rhode Island, but 
                                                 
36 “Obiturary: Benjamin Tilghmann,” PTJ 4 July 1901, 37, 48. For detailed descriptions of the Tilghman 
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without commercial success. August Thilmany purchased the American rights to the 
Mitscherlich patents in 1887 and commercialized them through the International Paper 
and Fiber Company, which opened a sulphite pulp and paper mill in Michigan. Despite 
these advances, the commercial success of the new sulphite process continued to be 
frustrated by technological problems.37 
By the early 1880’s, other inventors had identified the interior lining of the 
sulphite digester as the critical problem they must solve in order to stabilize the process 
and decrease the cooking time. The potential economic bonanza fueled a feverish 
international race for the complete patent. The French Pierredon patents from 1883 
described a heavy continuous lining of Portland cement mortar that was directly applied 
upon the metal surface of the digester shells. A patent by Austrian Wilhem Wenzel 
described a mortar that was composed of Portland cement and quartz sand mixed with a 
solution of silicate of soda, and applied on the digester shell. Additional patented 
constructions included the Austrian Ritter-Kellner process and the British Partington 
process.38 
Although Europeans advanced the sulphite technology, quite a few inventors and 
entrepreneurs realized that the potential of the sulphite process could be released through 
the utilization of the vast spruce stands of the North East United States and Canada. The 
newspaper, printing, and publishing industries of the United States established the 
world’s largest markets for newsprint and book paper, the primary products made from 
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37 Hunter, Papermaking, 393. 
38 H.W. Stebbins, “The Sulphite Process,” PTJ 6 Feb. 1908, 75-89; F. Fittica, “The Invention of Sulphite,” 
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sulphite pulp. Therefore it is of little surprise that William Chisholm, a lumber 
manufacturer from Halifax, Nova Scotia, acted upon learning of the success of the 
Partington sulphite process by contracting the firm for digesters and skilled men in 1885. 
With his partners, Chisholm incorporated the Halifax Wood Fibre Company, which had 
large timber tracts and an advantageous seaboard location to ship sulphite pulp to the 
newsprint mills of the United States. Chisholm’s sulphite pulp mill on the East River in 
Sheet Harbour, Canada, attracted wide attention among North American pulp and paper 
makers. William A. Russell, a member of an established pulp and paper family of 
entrepreneurs from Lawrence, Massachusetts, sent one his employees to learn the craft of 
lead-burning from the Englishman who managed the digester lining in Sheet Harbour. 
William Russell had established one of the first ground wood pulp mills in the United 
States in Bellows Falls, Vermont, in 1869 and pioneered its large scale use in the 
newsprint. He incorporated with politically influential partners the American Sulphite 
Pulp Company for the purpose of acquiring and holding the Partington sulphite patent 
rights in the United States. Having secured the rights in 1887, Russell installed the 
Partington digesters at the mills of his family company, the Russell Paper Company. 39 
The introduction of sulphite-ground wood pulp changed dramatically the 
economics of newsprint mills and created immediate incentives for firms and 
entrepreneurs to construct fully integrated pulp and paper mills. Alfred D. Remington had 
pioneered large-scale paper production in Watertown, New York, in the late nineteenth 
century, and upon learning of the sulphite pulp traveled to Sweden and Germany in the 
1880’s. Remington began to import sulphite to his mills that used a pulp mix that 
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combined a one-part sulphite and three parts of ground wood pulp to produce newsprint. 
In 1890 he completed the construction of a sulphite mill and perfected a modern fully 
integrated newsprint mill. The technological learning incurred over a decade constituted 
the platform for his expansion plans, and he established the St. Regis Paper Company that 
specialized in newsprint in 1900.40 
Realizing the potential of the new technology, William A. Russell aspired to gain 
control of the rapidly expanding newsprint industry by establishing a virtual monopoly on 
the sulphite process in the United States. However, none of the existing patents in the late 
1880’s described a commercially viable technology. The International Sulphite Fibre and 
Paper Company, which controlled the North American rights to the Mitscherlich patents, 
was bankrupted in the mid-1890’s because the process did not work properly. The tactic 
of William Russell was to secure the proprietary rights of promising new technology and 
simultaneously organize a continued effort for improvement. The pinnacle of this effort, 
obviously, was to obtain a patent for a superior sulphite process. William Russell acted 
then as a manager, and delegated the scientific and techno logical work to his brother 
George Fred Russell, who was in charge of experimental work on sulphite digesters at the 
family mills. 
Attempting to gain economies of scale, George Russell focused his efforts on the 
digester lining and decreasing the cooking time. He began experimental work with the 
lead-lined Partington digesters but within a few years moved toward lead-free solutions. 
Around 1889 Russell traveled to Europe to learn the latest technology and art of sulphite 
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cooking. As a result, he filed in 1890 a patent application that described continuous 
interior lining of a sulphite digester with Portland cement, silicate soda, and sand instead 
of the established constructions that relied on Portland cement alone or lead sheets. The 
new structure drastically improved the acid resistant character of the digester, was fully 
continuous inside the digester, and reduced the cooking time per batch volume. Most 
importantly, the claims of the lead-free Russell patent were so general and 
technologically advanced that over the next two decades any manufacturer hoping to 
make a profit from sulphite cooking had to take them into account. 41 
 
Decline in the Availability of Technological Alternatives 
The broad claims of the Russell patent were an effort to bring the widely diffused 
sulphite technology under the administrative control of William Russell. The eventual 
significance of the patent resulted from conscious work by the managers of the American 
Sulphite Company and the IP to marginalize competing technologies, rather than from its 
inherent technological novelty. In the 1880’s and 1890’s the Russell patent defined only 
one competing sulphite digester construction, but by 1900 all alternative technologies had 
declined in importance. 
The flourishing number of alternative sulphite digesters in late nineteenth century 
North America is readily evident from the pulp and paper entrepreneurs who emigrated 
from Europe. In the hands of these inventors the lead digester had short- lived moments of 
success in the North America. William Luke, a descendant from a long line of Scottish 
papermakers, organized an attempt to improve the lead-burning digesters in Piedmont, 
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West Virginia. With the help of his son David, a chemistry graduate from the University 
of Pennsylvania, and brother John, William Luke raised $250,000 to produce 10 tons of 
sulphite pulp daily for the production of book paper. The Lukes incorporated the West 
Virginia Pulp and Paper Company in 1888, which quickly became one of the leading 
book paper firms in the United States. This success was based on the original version of 
the lead-sulphite digester, but within a few years from the incorporation the company 
obtained a license to the lead-free Russell sulphite digester.42 
William Luke basically emulated in book paper what others did in newsprint, that 
is, he employed his knowledge of the sulphite technology to introduce low-priced wood 
pulp product innovations that replaced or captured market share from the rag-content 
papers. This opportunity induced Moritz Behrend, an innovative pulp and paper 
entrepreneur from Prussia, to immigrate with his family to the United States, in an 
attempt to profit from his knowledge of the wood and sulphite pulping. Behrend had 
scored an important victory in Germany by successfully challenging the Mitscherlich 
sulphite patent, arguing that the British patent Benjamin Tilghman had received in 1867 
covered the same discovery. Invalidation of the Mitscherlich patent allowed Behrend to 
establish a thriving sulphite mill in Prussia with influential partners who included the 
Reichskanzler Otto von Bismarck. The entrepreneur- innovator immigrated to the United 
States in 1897 to supervise the construction of a new sulphite mill in Nekoosa, 
Wisconsin. Encouraged by the factor endowments available for the new pulp technology 
and American demand, he raised with his brother one million dollars in capital to 
construct a fully integrated sulphite bond paper mill. Established in 1898 in the city of 
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Erie, the new Hammermill Paper Company featured two Fourdrinier paper machines and 
six rotary sulphite digesters at the great lake with advantageous transportation 
connections in 1899.43 
Hammermill based its business strategy on the pioneering knowledge of the 
sulphite technology that allowed its managers to coordinate change in the structure of 
demand for fine papers. Over the years of experimentation, the Behrend brothers had 
learned to build and run sulphite digesters economically. They focused on efforts to 
replace the high priced quality rag-content papers with a new product innovation, sulphite 
bond paper. Their lower pricing slowly captured market share from rag-content papers. 
When Ernst and Otto Behrend made an additional innovation in the watermarking 
technology, the business improved. Quality papers typically carried a visually impressive 
watermark imprint that required traditional batch production done in a craft mode. The 
Behrend brothers experimented with a rubber roll process to mechanize watermarking of 
quality bond papers and perfect mass production. In 1902 they secured a patent for a 
process that allowed the imprinting of a watermark without disturbing economies of scale 
in a fully integrated pulp and paper mill. Mastering over sixty different watermarks while 
running long runs of production, the company aggressively expanded by capturing 
markets from the rag-content bond papers.44 
Though lead-based sulphite digesters posed a viable, economical alternative in 
specialty papers, perhaps into the late 1880’s, they entered a terminal decline in 
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importance during the 1890’s. Alexander Mitscherlich, despite having his patents 
invalidated in Europe, managed a messy licensing policy in the United States. In addition 
to the license granted to Thilmany, Mitscherlich granted licenses, probably for others of 
his numerous patents, to competing companies. His inventions attracted the attention of 
Don M. Dickinson, the Postmaster General of the cabinet of President Grover Cleveland, 
president’s secretary Daniel Lamont, and Secretary of Navy William C. Whitney, who all 
partnered to establish the Manufacturing Investment Company to exploit the Mitscherlich 
patent. The company experimented with the process at the Fletcher Paper Company mill 
at Alpena, Michigan, and then built a newsprint mill of its own in Madison, Maine, in 
1888 with Whitney as its manager, and another one in Appleton, Wisconsin. The new 
sulphite paper received a first medal at the Columbia Exhibition in Chicago in 1893, but 
problems with the process and an inability to enter the high quality paper markets forced 
the company into bankruptcy in early 1899.45 
Use of lead-based sulphite digesters translated to business success only if the 
company deployed the new technology specialized to replace high quality and high 
priced rag-content papers, such as book paper or fine bond papers. In the more 
competitive low grade paper markets the only viable competitor to the Russell digester 
lining was patented in 1894 by Eugene Meurer, whose digester was commercialized by 
the Non-Antem Sulphite Digester Company and its president Albrecht Pagenstecher.46 
Non-Antem digester lining was an improvement in the lead lining invented by 
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Mitscherlich, though contemporaries judged it economically and technologically inferior 
to Russell lining.47 The New York and Pennsylvania Paper Company, a leading firm 
specializing in book and fine paper, contracted in 1896 for the Non-Antem digesters that 
cost almost nine thousand dollars a piece, but Pagenstecher failed to convince newsprint 
manufacturers of the applicability of his lead-based digester.48 There did exist competing 
digester technologies and suppliers in the 1890’s, but by 1900 William. A. Russell had 
completed extensive legal maneuvers and pooling of competing patents that created a 
virtual monopoly in the sulphite digesters.  
 
Process of Monopolization 
The lead-free digester lining discovered by George Russell perfected mass 
production of sulphite pulp, but its economic viability came to depend critically on 
managerial coordination of technology. Through his control of innovation William 
Russell looked to trigger and coordinate rapid structural change within the pulp and paper 
industry. The George Russell patent made such wide claims that it established potentially 
a sulphite monopoly, and thus it was destined to be upheld or abolished by the courts. 
Competitors challenged the patent by arguing that the Russell digester lining only 
modified the prior, broadly diffused knowledge of sulphite prices, and had a particular 
antecedent in the patent of Wenzel. The first case to test the validity of the Russell patent, 
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American Sulphite Pulp Company v. Howland Falls Pulp Company, declared the patent 
invalid in 1895.49 
The court examined in detail to what degree George Russell was familiar with the 
similar approach developed by Wilhem Wenzel in 1889 in Austria, and its international 
diffusion. Finally the District Court of Maine was persuaded by the defendant’s argument 
that Russell had effectively only modified the prior art discovered by Wenzel, and 
interpreted narrowly. American Sulphite Pulp Company appealed the case, bringing 
forward new evidence, most importantly detailed correspondence between the Russell 
brothers and personal notes of George Russell in order to prove novelty and originality of 
the digester lining. In effect, the plaintiffs argued that Russell had laid down his digester 
lining construction in Cologne in 1889 before he received the information of the similar, 
but prior, solution invented by Wilhem Wenzel. Persuaded by these arguments, the 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the earlier decree in 1897 and granted the American 
Sulphite Pulp Company patent monopoly on sulphite technology in the Unites States. The 
court ruling was a severe shock to the nascent newsprint industry whose rapid expansion 
depended on the availability of the new technology. The Paper Trade Journal reported in 
the early 1899:50 
 
The manufacturers affected were banded together to resist any attempt on the part 
of the American Sulphite Pulp Company which owned the Russell patent, to 
collect royalties or, to exact the damages for infringement, which the court gave it 
                                                 
49 American Sulphite Pulp Company v. Howland Falls Pulp Company, 70 F. 986 (1895). 
50 American Sulphite Pulp Company v. Howland Falls Pulp Company, 80 F. 395 (1897). 
 29 
the right to do. Subsequently a truce was declared pending the outcome of 
negotiations making to merge the principal news mills into combination. It was 
said that the Russell interest were given assurance they would be ‘taken care of’ 
in case the combination went through.51 
 
Instead, William Russell took care of his interests himself in 1898  by 
incorporating the “band” of New England mills into the first large-scale pulp and paper 
firm, the IP. As the president of the new company, Russell’s first action was to 
consolidate and organize the sulphite monopoly he aspired to control. In November 1898 
the IP used a secret agent to purchase the patent rights to the Mitscherlich process at the 
public auction organized by the receivers of the bankrupt International Sulphite Fiber and 
Paper Company. By including the mills of the president of the Non-Antem Sulphite 
Digester Company, Albrecht Pagenstecher, in the merger and appointing him a director 
of the IP in 1898, Russell further extended his control over sulphite technology through 
personal networks.52  
When William A. Russell suddenly died before the completion of these 
arrangements, the new president of IP, Hugh C. Chisholm, claimed that the company 
should receive the Russell patents with his other interests from the American Sulphite 
Pulp Company. After a short controversy, International purchased the patent rights for 
$20,000 and announced publicly in February 1899 that it had obtained a controlling 
interest in the Russell digester lining patent. The company had now secured control of the 
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new sulphite technology and could enjoy its advantages free while charging competitors a 
license fee.53 
The corporate strategy of IP rested on the sulphite monopoly. Having conquered 
the newsprint industry through its dominant size and patent monopoly, the company 
began to exert its influence on the industrial organization of other high volume segments 
of the pulp and paper industry. The Russell patents were again destined for litigation. In 
1900 the American Sulphite Pulp Company found the validity of its digester lining 
patents challenged when it sued the Burgess Sulphite Fibre Company, the world’s largest 
producer of sulphite pulp, and three other firms for patent infringement. As the judicial 
process commenced during summer 1900, the parties eventually reached a settlement that 
sealed the validity of Russell patents. According to the Paper Trade Journal the other 
twenty infringing mills only wasted money on legal battles and were best off in the new 
situation by simply paying licenses and damages. An editorial of the Journal summarized 
the situation:  
 
The regulation of the sulphite market is now practically in the hands of the 
International Paper Company. Thy [sic] this is meant that that company being the 
principal owner of the Russell patent, has the power to refuse licenses for new 
plants, and can also prevent additional digesters from being put in the mills now 
in existence… One thing is now put down as a certainty of the future by sellers of 
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sulphite, and that is that the price to be paid for licenses will have its effect on the 
price of sulphite, making that article dearer than at present.54 
 
Naturally competitors did everything they could to frustrate the ambitions of 
Russell and the International Paper. The most noted case involved the resignation of 
Garret Schenck, the manager of insurance and taxes, from the newly formed International 
Paper Company. Schenck had obtained patents on process for reclaiming liquids from the 
pulp digesters, and commercialized it in cooperation with the National Sulphite Boiler 
and Fibre Company in the 1880’s. Schenck was generally recognized as a successful pulp 
and paper engineer and manager, and had created in 1897 the Great Northern 
Development Company to produce newsprint in the neighborhood of Bangor, Maine. The 
emerging Russell sulphite monopoly threatened to frustrate this, and Schenck focused his 
efforts to circumvent the patent.55 
In July 1898 the Development Company changed its name to the Great Northern 
Paper Company, with over four millions dollars of capital. Under the leadership of 
Schenck, its managers reviewed the newly formed newsprint cartel, and argued that the 
IP was not sustainable competitively because most of its mills were not fully integrated. 
Indeed, many of the sulphite mills absorbed by the International were only in the vicinity 
of its paper machines, not fully integrated. The managers of the Great Northern proposed 
to build a fully integrated sulphite newsprint mill in Millinocket at a favorable location 
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along the mighty Penobscot River, surrounded by vast spruce stands, and with a railway 
connection. The Great Northern managers believed that these factors, together with 
license free sulphite technology, would enable it to produce newsprint at lower prices that 
any other firm.56 
Central to the strategy of the Great Northern was Schenck’s belief that he could 
circumvent the Russell sulphite monopoly. His old friend Fred W. Ayer from Bangor had 
obtained patent for lead-free cement lining of a sulphite digester, and was eager to assign 
the patent to the Great Northern. Schenck explained the advantages and potential 
problems of the Ayer patent to his managers:57 
 
The only parties, I may say, that would raise a question, are the International 
Paper Co. and the American Sulphite Pulp Co, controlling the so-called Russell 
patents. If we can safely use the lining, without infringing, it makes a saving of a 
great many thousand dollars to the Great Northern Paper Company, and it is 
equally as good or better than the lining that we contemplate using, at a very large 
expense.58 
 
The Great Northern Paper Company was forced to either contract a costly license 
for the Non-Anthem lead digester from Albrecht Pagenstecher, or the lead-free Ayer 
digesters. Schenck’s lawyers argued that the Ayer patent did not infringe the Russell 
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patent if followed strictly, and enabled him to circumvent the IP monopoly. The Great 
Northern managers contracted the patents, and proceeded with the construction of the 
Millinocket mill, which, when completed in 1900, was arguably the world’s largest. The 
strategy of the Great Northern Paper Company was based on its ability to circumvent the 
Russell sulphite cartel. Although the case reiterates how dramatic an effect the control of 
innovation had on corporate strategy and structure in the pulp and paper industry in the 
1890’s, it remained of marginal importance for the unfolding structural change of the 
pulp and paper industry. 59 
The success by which IP maintained managerial control over sulphite technology 
effectively limited the potential of any viable alternatives, such as the Ayer patent. Legal 
tactics attached revolutionary advantages only to the Russell sulphite technology, and the 
managerial coordination of the International and American Sulphite Company recast 
corporate strategies of the leading newsprint and book paper firms. In a sweeping change 
around 1900, these companies adopted or intensified a vertically integrated corporate 
structure and embraced economies of scale. The Champion Coated Paper Company of 
Ohio, for instance, abandoned its old book paper mill and opened the world’s largest 
coated paper mill in Hamilton in 1901. During the following decade the company tripled 
the size of it’s only paper mill and pioneered the relocation into the South by acquiring 
large timber tracts and constructing a 200 ton capacity sulphite mill in North Carolina to 
supply Ohio operations. Through these actions it wanted to cease dependence on the 
supply of sulphite pulp by the West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company, and establish an 
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independent vertically integrated production. 60 All the leading newsprint and book paper 
firms followed the suit, including the St. Regis Pulp and Paper Company, the Kimberly & 
Clark Company, the West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company, the Great Northern 
Company and many others.61 
 
Table 2-2. Number of Sulphite Mills, Digester and Annual Production of Sulphite 
Pulp in the United States, 1897-1907 (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Year Mills Digesters Reported Production 
1897 49 205 432,140 
1900 71 265 643,250 
1907 86 320 1,128,720 
 
Source: H.W. Stebbins, The Sulphite Process. Economic and Other Developments 
Affecting it Since 1897. PTJ February 6, 1908, p.75-89. 
 
Control of the sulphite patents enabled IP to facilitate vertical integration in the 
pulp and paper industry. Between 1897 and 1907, the production of sulphite sky rocketed 
and achieved enormous scale economies (Table 2-2). Over a three-year period from 1897 
the number of the sulphite digesters increased by almost one third. More stunning is the 
fact that between 1900 and 1907 the capacity of individual digesters grew by almost fifty 
per cent. Indeed, the entire sulphite production in the U.S. increased 82 per cent between 
1899 and 1904 and accounted for 40 per cent of the all wood pulp production (Table 2-3 
and 2-4). The production of sulphite at vertically integrated pulp and paper mills 
increased about 162 per cent while the production of all other sulphite pulp grew only 
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about 40 per cent. As a consequence, the vertically integrated mills’ relative share of total 
sulphite pulp production increased. Whereas in 1900 one third of all sulphite pulp was 
produced in fully integrated mills, the share increased to half by 1905, and to over 56 per 
cent by 1909. These statistics do not reveal the full extent of vertical integration in the 
pulp and paper industry, because they count as vertically integrated only pulp and paper 
mills located within the same county and owned by the same company. The South 
Carolina pulp mill and the Ohio paper mill of the Champion Coated Paper Company, for 
instance, are accounted for as disintegrated mills. 
 
Table 2-3. Wood Pulp Made for Sale or For Use in Establishment Other Than Those 
in Which Produced in the United States (tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Pulp 1899 1904 1909 
Ground 280,052 273,400 310,747 
Soda 99,014 130,366 155,844 
Sulphite 271,585 376,940 444,255 
Combined  650,651 780,706 910,846 
 
Table 2-4 Wood Pulp Produced Including That Used in Mills Which Manufactured 
in the United States (tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Pulp 1899 1904 1909 
Ground 586,374 968,976 1,179,266 
Soda 177,114 196,770 298,626 
Sulphite 416,037 756,022 1,017,631 
Combined 1,179,525 1,921,768 2,495,523 
 
Sources for both tables: Manufactures 1909. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office 1913, 759. 
 
In many cases the vertically integrated structure of pulp and paper firms followed 
from the licensing policy of IP, which abhorred the emergence of an independent and 
large sulphite pulp market, and reluctantly licensed disintegrated sulphite firms. The 
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company favored firms that produced sulphite pulp mostly for their own consumption 
and produced product other than newsprint, or supplied regions where International was 
inactive. The control of sulphite technology also allowed IP to single out an exceptional 
corporate strategy to reap the advantages of rapid technological change occurring in all 
pulp and paper machinery. While other pulp and paper firms invested evenly in ground 
wood pulp, sulphite pulp and paper machinery, IP focused exclusively on the sulphite 
technology. 
 
Horizontal Combination and Innovation 
Immediately upon its formation, IP was labeled as a newsprint cartel by critics 
who focused on its dominance of the North American newsprint capacity. During its first 
five years the firm did not install a single new paper machine. Instead of increasing its 
output, the company trimmed internal efficiencies and attempted to shift paper production 
capacity from newsprint into more specialized grades, such as bible, book and bag paper. 
Most importantly, International increased daily production capacity of sulphite pulp from 
490 tons in 1898 to 858 tons in 1900, and achieved the capacity of about 1,000 tons 1909 
where it remained until 1919.62  
Upon its formation in 1898 IP hired an experienced constructor of digester 
interior linings, superintendent George A. Hall, to manage an extensive program of 
cutting out old digester interior linings and installing new ones, as well as building new 
digesters. The work was completed at IP sulphite mills at Fort Edward, Piercefield, 
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Watertown, Niagara Falls, South Gardiner, Rumford Falls, Berlin, Bellows Falls and 
Palmers Falls, New York.63 In addition to improving all of its existing sulphite mills, the 
company built additional daily capacity of 110 tons at three new locations.64 
While IP invested massively in the sulphite technology and the acquisition of pulp 
wood stands, it did nothing about its existing paper machines. Apart from pulp-treating 
machinery, such as beaters, washers and screens, the sulphite technology represented the 
only investments in technology the IP made during its early years. Its daily ground wood 
pulp capacity remained unchanged at 2,390 tons for years after the incorporation, and it 
took a decade to increase it to about 3,000, where it remained through 1919. The failure 
of the IP to install a single new paper machine during its first five years and its success in 
reducing its newsprint production were interpreted by the U.S. Attorney General as 
symptoms of cartel, but they also revealed extent to which the company managers relied 
on the economic and competitive advantages of the Russell patent.65 
The central role of sulphite technology in IP strategy as well as the structure of 
the North American pulp and paper industry begs the question as to what extent patent 
rights enabled the firm to control markets? The answer is that the company had built an 
extensive licensing network through which it was able to rig the price of paper. By March 
1903, the American Sulphite Pulp Company had sold over 200 licenses for the Russell 
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digesters, and charged a license fee per cubic feet of the digester, “measured on the inside 
of the vessel to which the lining was to be applied.”66  
Despite of IP’s denials, the courts established that the pricing of licenses varied a 
great deal between different licensees. Most firms paid between 86 cents and $1.35 per 
cubic foot per digester inside volume, but two other classes of licensees existed too. 
Some firms paid a fixed fee, and the leading U.S. book paper producer West Virginia 
Pulp and Paper Company paid a one-time fee of $10,000, an amount that IP’s Hugh 
Chisholm later argued was “accidentally small.” Firms that were members of the IP 
“family” paid as low as 15 cents per cubic feet. The cost of the license certainly increased 
the price of sulphite pulp, but it is extremely difficult to estimate precisely how much. 
The court cited in the American Sulphite v. Howland Falls case of 1897 a digester with 
the volume of roughly 10,000 cubic feet, for which the license fee could have been 
anything between $1,600 and $14,000.67 The only uniform rule of these license 
agreements was that they were signed through the expiration of the Russell patents in 
1909. The law that provided little or no restrictions on discriminating licensing practices 
now allowed the IP a substantial, yet far from complete, mechanism to coordinate the 
nascent sulphite pulp, newsprint and book paper industries.68 
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Table 2-5. Year End Quoted Bid/Asked U.S. prices For Sulphite Pulp in U.S. Cents, 
1889-1909 
 
Year Foreign Foreign U.S U.S  
 Bleached Unbleached  Bleached Unbleached 
1889 4.50/5.00 2.85/3.65 na na 
1899 3.25/3.75 2.20/2.50 na 2.25/2.50 
1900 3.25/3.75 2.30/2.50 2.75/3.00 2.10/2.50 
1904 3.35/3.45 2.25/2.40 2.50/3.25 1.85/2.10 
1905 3.10/3.25 2.25/2.40 2.50/2.80 1.85/2.10 
1909 2.60/2.70 1.75/2.20 2.60/2.80 2.00/2.15 
 
Sources: PTJ 28 Dec. 1889; PTJ 28 Dec. 1899; PTJ 27 Dec. 1900; PTJ 29 Dec. 1904; 
PTJ 28 Dec. 1905; PTJ 30 Dec. 1909. 
 
IP’s decision to charge a one-time fee per digester encouraged maximum 
throughput at the licensee mills. Ironically, this had the additional effect of undermining 
demand for European sulphite imports that constituted a challenge for the sulphite 
monopoly. The price difference between more expensive foreign and cheaper domestic 
sulphite pulp translated directly to the advantage of IP, as it facilitated greater 
consumption of American sulphite pulp. The weekly open market quotations of the Paper 
Trade Journal reveal that the price difference between the imported and domestic 
sulphite pulp was non-existent in the unbleached sulphite pulp, but significant in the 
bleached sulphite pulp (See Table 2-5.). Eventually after 1900 the price of imported and 
domestic bleached sulphite pulp converged at accelerated rate, and reached parity in 
1909. The scope and extent of the efforts of IP suggest that the sulphite monopoly did 
contribute to the relative price stability of the U.S. bleached sulphite pulp. In the absence 
of direct sources on the effect of licensing on the price of pulp, however, such judgment 
remains ultimately precarious. 
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My account of the beginnings of the IP has emphasized the dynamic forces of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, whereas the previous literature on the firm has 
traditionally cited over-capacity, low prices, and unsuccessful attempts of firms to 
combat these evils through cooperation as the causes of the merger.69 In respectively 
influential studies Naomi Lamoreaux and Neil Fligstein have cited independent mills’ 
fear of bankruptcy as having triggered the merger tha t enabled the IP to control newsprint 
prices through its dominant size.70 The interpretation does correctly identify that 
contractual agreements between firms helped to stabilize the newsprint price, and the 
critical role played by the IP, but does not recognize credibly the distinct mechanisms 
deployed by the firm to achieve these ends. 
To the extent the collusion argument focuses exclusively on consolidation of 
market share and does not integrate the critical role played by technology in achieving 
stability in prices and industrial organization, it remains an insufficient explanation for 
the timing and shape of horizontal combination. Only by considering the sulphite process 
patent monopoly can we explain why the individual firms that were mired in the 
structural problems of the pulp and paper industry in the 1890’s chose the structure of a 
tightly integrated large enterprise that became the IP. 
The centralized structure of IP was an exception among the newsprint firms that 
attempted to gain market control through cooperation and consolidation during the great 
merger movement. Although many other newsprint firms had identical integrated 
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structure with the IP, the dramatic difference was in the size of the firm. International 
simply dwarfed other newsprint manufacturers, and the difficulty of organizing in a large 
integrated firm was exposed when rival newsprint firms grouped together. Typically, 
newsprint firms attempted to gain market control through loose combinations and 
centralized sales agencies and rarely ventured to centralize the management or 
manufacturing operations. Under the competitive pressures brought by IP, nearly thirty 
Mid-West newsprint manufacturers established a common sales agency, the General 
Paper Company, in June 1900 and gave it exclusive sales rights for the next five years. 
The General Paper Company was the only firm that equaled IP in size, but its 
organizational structure turned out to be ill advised. Newspapers and federal antitrust 
authorities were quick to single out the new giant firm as an illegal sales pool and after 
years of investigations filed an antitrust suit in December 1904. Within 18 months the 
defendants accepted a consent decree that dissolved the General Paper Company. 71  
Following the guilty plea, the leading member of the General Paper Company, 
Kimberly & Clark Company, decided to tighten its structure and consolidated with its 
subsidiaries, the Atlas Paper Company and the Telulah Paper Company, into a new 
centralized structure as the Kimberly-Clark Company in 1907.72 The remaining other 
former members of the General Paper Company explored the possibility of emulating the 
structure of IP, too, but chose instead to organize under the Fibre and Manila Association. 
It was quickly charged with violation of the Sherman antitrust law and its members 
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pleaded guilty to price fixing in 1908.73 Many similar newsprint pools experienced a 
varying fate, such as the defensive consolidation of the Eastern mills left outside the IP in 
1900 that never bore fruit.74 These regional consolidation plans were typically attempts to 
re-vitalize the economic viability of an historical industrial district that had flourished 
during the epoch of proprietary capitalism.75 However the sweep of antitrust cases 
demonstrated to the pulp and paper managers that the degree of vertical centralization 
predicted how a merger would survive legal challenge.76 
If regional attempts to merge were often unsuccessful, national consolidation 
plans that did not involve contracting of critical technologies fared no better. In the 
second largest branch of the industry, book paper, the leading firms Virginia Pulp and 
Paper Company, New York and Pennsylvania Company, Ticonderoga Pulp and Paper 
Company, the Duncan Paper Company, the Morrison & Cass Paper Company, the Jessup 
& Moore Paper Company, and P.H. Glatfelter Company and others entertained a merger 
in December 1898 that never came to realization. 77 The intent to stabilize book paper 
market through the formation of a dominant national giant survived three years and 
increased significantly in size when Hugh Chisholm’s own Oxford Paper Company 
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joined the plan, but it never amounted to incorporation. 78 The sheer consolidation of 
market power, then, rarely if ever amounted to a winning strategy in the high volume 
pulp and paper industries. 
Technological learning and control of innovation were always part of the 
successful recipe of cartelization in all segments of the pulp and paper industry between 
1860 and 1909. This was the case in the coated book, bag, folding box, corrugated board, 
news board, envelope, drinking cup, sanitary, and tissue paper industries, in which firms 
successfully created smaller or larger cartels. In these industries, managers consolidated 
administrative control of technology by cross- licensing patents, merging firms, and 
litigation. The absence of such efforts characterized the failed trusts in the writing, wall, 
straw and basic board paper industries. This striking difference between the failed and 
successful cartels in the pulp and paper industry suggests that technology constituted a 
major mechanism to coordinate complex industrial organizations.79 
When IP faced the expiration of the Russell patent in 1909, increasing 
competition in its major lines of business, and antitrust scrutiny, it was forced to forge a 
new competitive strategy. The company’s experience with the sulphite technology, which 
consumed the most wood in relative and absolute terms of all the pulping processes, 
predictably geared the firm towards forestry, as its capital intensity pushed it to improve 
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the efficiency of production. Thus IP formulated a strategy that emphasized almost 
exclusively scale economies. 
In December 1905 the president of the company, Hugh C. Chisholm, announced 
an aggressive strategy of expansion that focused almost exclusively on economies of 
scale, and came to create a new technological core for the firm. While the company had 
installed during its eight years only one small cardboard machine, it now installed 10 new 
paper machines that replaced older machinery and increased the company’s production 
capacity. The move was accompanied by the development of new technological 
capabilities in machinery and forestry. IP reduced its dependency on outside machinery 
suppliers in 1908 by acquiring the plant of Turner Falls Machinery Company in 
Massachusetts that provided services to all of its mills. Most importantly the company 
increased its timberlands from 840 thousand acres in 1903 to 1,2 million in 1908, and 
respectively its timberland limits from 1,8 million to almost 3 million. As a first pulp and 
paper firm the company also announced a designated forestry policy that followed 
Gifford Pinchot’s “scientific forestry.” This was realized through extensive tree nurseries, 
employment of foresters, and introduction of new forest management techniques. 
International Paper’s new strategy of growth emphasized the competitive advantages of 
continuous improvement of capital efficiency, and paid little or no regard to strategic 
innovation. 80 
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Relocation of Newsprint to Canada and Product Diversification in the U.S Paper 
Industry 
IP specialized in economies of scale largely in response to the changing political 
economy. Tariff barriers up to 20 per cent duty had protected the U.S. sulphite newsprint 
industry since its origins, but in 1909 the government lowered these tariffs. Newspapers 
continued to cry for the total abolishment of tariffs on newsprint, and in 1913 this was 
done with the Underwood-Simmons tariff passed as a Woodrow Wilson reform. A rapid 
period of growth in the Canadian newsprint industry followed. The expansion of the 
Canadian pulp and paper industry accounted for the growth of imports of newsprint into 
the U.S. from 2,000 tons in 1904 to 220 in 1913, and eventually to 730,000 tons in 1920. 
Between 1913 and 1920, Canadian newsprint capacity grew from an annual 350,000 tons 
to about 880,000 tons. During this period of transition, technological routines in the 
Canadian pulp and paper industry were geared almost exclusively towards large-scale 
production of newsprint.81 
Much of the Canadian growth resulted from the massive investment of U.S. firms 
in new production capacity there. IP responded to the changed conditions by eventually 
relocating all of its newsprint capacity to Canada, and diversifying U.S. newsprint 
production into specialty paper grades. Philip Dodge, the president of the company had 
outlined this strategy in 1911, when he predicted that the removal of tariffs from 
                                                 
81 Barry E. C. Boothman, “High Financy/Low Strategy: Corporate Collapse in the Canadian Pulp and Paper 
Industry, 1919-1920,” Business History Review 74 (Winter 2000), 611-656; Trevor J. O. Dick, “Canadian 
Newsprint, 1913-1930. National Policies and the North American Economy,” Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (Sept. 1982), 659-687; Ellis, Print Paper Pendulum, Ch. 6; John A. Guthrie, The 
Newsprint Industry. An Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1941, 234; 
Heinrich, “Product Diversification”; Royal S. Kellogg, Pulpwood and Wood Pulp in North America. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1923, 24; Thomas R. Roach, Newsprint. Canadian Supply and 
American Demand. Durham: Forest History Society 1994, 1-8. 
 46 
Canadian newsprint would sound the death knell for smaller U.S mills. IP would respond 
with “a large physical expansion in Canada,”82 Dodge argued. A year later the company 
announced that it would shift 20 per cent of its U.S. production capacity from newsprint 
to specialty papers, such as tag and box papers. In addition the company deepened its 
vertical integration with the Continental Paper Bag Company, which converted paper into 
specialty paper bags.83 
The effects of the tariff revision on IP, and the whole U.S. paper industry, were 
amplified by intensified antitrust scrutiny. Government executed extens ive investigations 
on the price of newsprint and trade practices of the industry in the midst of the war effort. 
The Federal Trade Commission concluded its studies in 1917, and soon the book and 
newsprint industries were both indicted. The government dissolved many central industry 
associations, as well, and even regulated the price of newsprint for few years.84 
Combined, these regulatory pressures diminished the significance of newsprint in 
the strategy of U.S. paper firms, and its share of total paper production declined steadily. 
IP’s evolving structure exemplified the changed dynamics. IP’s Dodge reflected on the 
effects of political economy on the profit structure and future of his firm in 1919: 
 
It is notable that substantially one-half of the profits resulted from manufacture of 
special papers small in volume as compared with news print … Certain of the 
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U.S. mills can continue the production of news print paper on a competitive basis 
for many years. Some have been changed for the production of other and more 
profitable papers. As to others, changes are being made and will be made to put 
them on a profitable basis outside of the newsprint field…The world-wide 
dislocation of industry and commerce has confronted this business like all others 
with new conditions, which must be met with optimism and tempered by cold 
conservatism85  
 
Ten years later, statistics affirmed Dodge’s assessment. In 1910, IP had produced 
365,800 tons of newsprint at its mills in the U.S., but by 1932 the production had 
declined to 127,057 tons. Simultaneously, the company's production of other grades had 
increased from 64,438 tons to 527,008 tons. Twenty years after Americans had laid the 
technological foundation for the modern mass production of sulphite newsprint, the 
industry entered a gradual but terminal path of decline in the U.S. by relocating 
production capacity to other countries and retooling mills into other paper grades.86 
 
Conclusions  
Ironically, the long sustained wave of learning in the wood pulp technologies, put 
in motion in the early 1860’s, culminated in legal decrees and contracts around 1900 
instead of technological breakthroughs. The technological watershed was the 1889 
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discovery of the lead-free sulphite digester that enabled true economies of scale. The true 
peak of the wave was reached with the Appeals Court decree in 1897, and the license 
settlement between IP and Burgess Sulphite Fibre Company in 1900, which together 
completed the efforts of William A. Russell to transform the relatively freely available 
critical sulphite technology into a private monopoly. Having secured this, the managers 
of IP acquired in technology a central mechanism to coordinate the unfolding expansion 
and structural change in the pulp and paper industry. 
Trying to control competition in its major lines of business, IP chose to limit free 
trading of the sulphite pulp. The company executed this tactic through an extensive 
licensing network that facilitated vertical integration of the sulphite and paper mills, as 
well as vertical specialization of firms into newsprint, book, and other commodity paper 
grades. Like in any other industry, productivity improvements in the pulp and paper 
industry depended on the availability of new technology. Yet, the administrative control 
of sulphite technology enabled managers of IP significant power to construct the extent 
and scope of these efficiencies in the industry. 
The combination of rapid diffusion of innovation and patent monopoly 
undermined the incentives for all U.S. pulp and paper firms to innovate in sulphite 
technologies.87 Such effects were amplified by the public policies that affected the 
industry leader. Antitrust authorities prevented the formation of a competing national 
newsprint giant in 1905, and induced International to diversify production capacity from 
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newsprint into more specialized products. Policy makers also abolished protective tariffs 
at a time when the U.S. newsprint industry was particularly vulnerable for such a change, 
and did facilitate relocation of manufacturing operations to Canada. The changed 
incentives quickly dampened industry wide coordinated efforts to improve the basic 
sulphite pulping processes with radical technological departures that had characterized 
the industry for almost half a century. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SPECIALIZATION, INNOVATION, AND CARTELS 
 
 
 
Traditionally, specialization into exclusive markets had enabled proprietary firms 
to avoid competitive pressures typical in undifferentiated high volume paper markets, but 
as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the amounting technological change enabled 
mass production of almost all kinds of papers. The resulting competitive pressures forced 
the specialty production firms to opt for survival through consolidation or move into new 
products, and many firms mixed successfully both strategies. Failure to recognize the 
new technological fundamentals of specialty production was dangerous. A typical 
experience was the incorporation of the Holyoke writing paper firms into the American 
Writing Paper Company in 1899. The “writing paper trust” spiraled down from its 
beginnings and struggled at the brink of bankruptcy. The firm coordinated sales but left 
the twenty-seven participating mills to continue operations largely independently, and 
possessed no definitive strategy of competitive advantage besides dominant market share 
in specialized writing papers. While Holyoke´s writing paper firms had enjoyed some 
success back in the nineteenth century and turned towards consolidation only as a last 
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defense against deepening price decline, other pulp and paper segments had dealt with 
over-capacity for decades.88 
Mergers in the pulp and paper industry between 1895 and 1905 that did not 
involve contracting of technologies typically fell prey to competitive pressures embodied 
in price decline, over-capacity and ease of entry, as well as to the intensifying legal 
pressures that outlawed horizontal pooling. The problem for specialty production paper 
firms, such as the Holyoke proprietors, was that when confronted with the new mass 
production technologies they possessed little or no capabilities to erect barriers of entry 
into their businesses formerly protected by novel craft skills. Ironically, simultaneous 
with the erosion of the strategies of specialization in the paper making, a wave of 
innovation and novelty in paper converting industries, such as the folding box and 
envelope industries, took shape.89 
Specialty production afforded firms a central mechanism of erecting barriers of 
entry and controlling markets. Such dynamics were particularly evident in the paper 
converting industries, where firms bought ready sheets and rolls of paper, and converted 
them into specialized paper products, such as envelopes, boxes, and many other products. 
Strong specialty production strategies allowed converting firms potentially to prevent the 
forward integration of their paper suppliers. An analysis of the relationship between 
paper suppliers and paper converting firms demonstrates how intellectual property rights 
influenced greatly managers’ opinions of vertical integration. 
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These experiences of pulp and paper industry correspond with the detailed studies 
of Philip Scranton, in which he has demonstrated how different managerial strategies of 
specialty production continued to be economically viable despite of the rise of the large-
scale enterprises that focused on mass production. The history of important segments of 
the pulp and paper industry sheds additional light to the dynamic forces that determined 
the relative competitiveness of specialty and mass production strategies.90 
 
Dynamics of Cartelization in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights 
Organization of technological learning was a key determinant for the success of 
consolidation and cartels in the pulp and paper industry during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Intellectual property rights enabled managers to suspend 
competitive forces that facilitated over-capacity and price decline, but consolidation of 
market share alone rarely constituted a recipe for successful cartelization in the different 
segments of the pulp and paper industry. 91 
The experience of the wall paper industry highlights how the introduction of mass 
production eroded traditional strategies of specialty production, and facilitated 
cartelization of the industry. The wall paper firms coordinated efforts to combat declining 
prices for the first time in 1880, when they formed the American Wall Paper 
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Manufacturers’ Association to schedule prices and harmonize terms of credit. The 
association proved ineffective in its efforts, and it lost its members by 1888. A renewed 
attempt followed the economic downturn of 1893, when firms with over 65 per cent 
control of the U.S. market consolidated into the National Wall Paper Company. The giant 
continued to be beset with new entrants and spiraling prices, and as a last resort the 
majority of the industry incorporated a joint sales agency, the Continental Wall Paper 
Company. The president of the National Wall Paper Company, Henry Burn, explained to 
the Industrial Commission of the U.S. Congress in 1900 that the industry could remain 
profitable only through attaining economies of scale and coordinated sales operations. On 
the other hand he argued elsewhere that “It has also been demonstrated that the 
manufacture of wall paper involves elements of so peculiar nature that it cannot be as 
successfully conducted through the medium of a combination as it can through 
independent and isolated plants. Individual taste and the personality of the manufacturer 
play an important part, which, in a combination consisting of numerous plants, is but to 
be overlooked.”92 
His exclamation about competition was largely tactical rhetoric since the 
company itself admitted that it controlled over 98 per cent of all wallpaper manufactured 
and sold in the United States around 1900. The firms’ problem was that none of the 
alternatives entertained by Henry Burns -coordinated sales, economies of scale, and 
specialization- amounted to a winning strategy in the absence of proprietary technology. 
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The problems caused by this managerial ambivalence were amplified when the firm was 
confronted with the shifting legal interpretations of the Sherman antitrust laws.93 
In 1902 the Continental Wall Paper Company sued its client, Louis Voight and 
Sons Company, for not having paid in full wall paper deliveries. The defendant argued 
that it was forced to buy from the combine, but since it had no assurance it was paying as 
low rates as anyone else, it decided not to pay in full. Louis Voight and Sons Company 
argued that as an illegal combination the Continental Wall Paper Company had no 
standing in the court, and its contracts did not deserve the protection afforded by the 
law.94 The defense in Continental Wall Paper Company v. Louis Voight and Sons 
Company rested on a claim that potentially undermined the enforcement of legal 
contracts by any loose horizontal combination. In December 1906 the U.S. Circuit Court 
declared that “the Continental Wall Paper Company was the most complete and 
ingeniously organized trust that has come to the knowledge of the court,”95 and as an 
illegal entity did not have a standing in the court. After an U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
the case in 1909, the Continental Paper Company was dissolved. In the absence of 
effective legal mechanisms to stabilize prices, however, the wall paper industry continued 
pooling, and was repeatedly investigated and indicted by antitrust officials.96 
In the wall paper industry specialty producers appeared to respond more flexibly, 
or efficiently, to changes in the fragmented, ever evolving consumer demand than did 
mass production firms. Such corporate strategy presented managers with the challenge to 
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innovate continuously, because their firms, too, were vulnerable for rapid diffusion of 
innovation that enabled imitation and entry. These competitive forces caused over-
capacity and deteriorated profit margins in newsprint and book paper. The late nineteenth 
century paperboard industry suffered from these troubles, but over time industry 
managers came to assign innovation more weight in their stabilization plans than the wall 
paper managers did. In 1880, the majority of produced 2,700 tons of board was 
strawboard, whose cheap source of fiber was abundant straw. Broad patents allowed a 
handful of firms to monopolize the manufacture of paperboard during the 1830’s, and 
significant improvements in the process were patented during the 1850’s. These patent 
monopolies lapsed by 1880, and the basic process technology became freely available.97 
Factories converting board into paper boxes consumed almost the entire 
strawboard production. The introduction of paperboard into a wide array of new uses 
between 1880 and 1920 catapulted it from a niche segment to the most consumed line of 
paper in the U.S. As Susan Strasser has aptly described, much of the new board 
consumption resulted from the introduction of paper containers into a wide range of new 
uses in the American economy and the convergence of mass distribution and marketing 
in the paper package.98  
As specialty paper container firms purchased more and more standardized 
paperboard to be converted, the lack of mechanisms to coordinate board production 
established a familiar pattern of problems. Production capacity was repeatedly increased 
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in advance of demand and profit margins deteriorated. In 1888, these problems prompted 
the organization of the Union Straw Board Company, a selling agency that controlled the 
market for a time. Its dominant position was undermined by the opening of new natural 
gas fields in the West that induced the entry of strawboard mills. In addition to fuel to 
cook straw in high temperatures, natural gas provided a cheap and good adhesive, 
formaldehyde, which was required to manufacture solid board from straw fibers. 
Attracted by the ample supply of straw and natural gas in the West, the Akron 
industrialist O. C. Barber entered the manufacture of strawboard to supply his match 
business with paper boxes. Barber’s previous success had earned him the title of 
“America’s Match King,” and he looked to emulate his strategy of monopolization in the 
match business.99 During the 1880’s Barber acquired eventually all of the Western 
strawboard mills and organized them under the American Straw Board Company. Later 
he acquired the Union Straw Board Company, and thereby assuming control of the total 
U.S. manufacturing capacity. But after the opening of new natural gas fields fuelled entry 
in the industry and finally, in the aftermath of the depression of 1893, the American 
Straw Board Company definitively lost its dominant position. 100 
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Table 3-1. Production of Board by Grade in the U.S., 1899-1919 (Tons of 
2,000 lbs.)  
 
Year 1899 1904 1909 1914 1919 
Straw 157,534 167,278 171,789   175,424   228,248 
Pulp   44,187   60,863   71,036   116,419   179,747 
News   32,119   38,560   74,606   127,966     88,839 
Other 131,777 253,950 565,957   871,996   852,208 
Total 367,516 522,555 885,297 1,293,719 1,350,961 
 
Sources: Manufactures, 1905. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1908, 667-668; Manufactures, 1919. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1923, 561. 
 
Falling paperboard prices resulted not only from over-capacity in strawboard, but 
to a great extent from new paperboard grades, such as the bristol, leather, binder’s, chip 
board and many others. Most significant of these was the pulp board, where attempts to 
gain market control and set-off competition from other board grades induced the 
consolidation of the National Pulp Board Company. This move, interpreted as hostile by 
the strawboard manufactures, prompted the consolidation of the Standard Straw Board 
Company, which acquired the American Straw Board Company. These pulp- and 
strawboard giants dominated their respective industries but were short- lived. Attempts to 
stabilize the paperboard industry through consolidation proved fruitless because the basic 
manufacturing technology was freely available from specialized machinery suppliers. 
Nor did access to raw material or energy supplies present opportunities to erect barriers to 
entry. 101 
It took a radical innovation to carve out a business strategy in the paperboard 
industry that held the potential to maintain prices and control production. The cornerstone 
of this strategy was the patent rights received by the brothers Robert, Jessie and Richard 
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McEwan for their pioneering process to manufacture paperboard from recycled 
newspapers.102 Newsboard, which became its sales name, allowed the manufacture of 
board within close proximity of the majority of folding box companies, which were 
concentrated in metropolitan areas. The resulting savings in transportation costs gave it a 
definitive competitive advantage over Western strawboard producers. The McEwans 
created a patent monopoly through a series of litigation cases in the 1890’s, then turned 
their attention to designing a licensing system that eliminated over-capacity and 
guaranteed price stability.103 
The McEwan brothers who were practically able to shape the organization of the 
emerging newsboard industry, initially preferred to license the technology to independent 
board mills and abstained from entering large scale production themselves. They quickly 
realized that competition among their licensees and the relative ease by which a 
mushrooming number of mills infringed their patents deteriorated license returns to the 
McEwans Brothers Company. In order to secure license revenues, the brothers promoted 
the incorporation of the National Board and Paper Company, which merged all the legal 
newsboard mills. They assigned to this firm an exclusive right to license their technology, 
and charged it with the responsibility for collecting license revenue and maintaining an 
active infringement litigation policy in order to sustain the incentive for legal mills to 
continue paying. Predictably, the McEwans did not assume tight centralized control of 
the company, and an increasing number of participating mills refused to pay license fees. 
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In the face of mounting crisis the brothers were forced to withdraw their license from the 
National Board and Paper Company in April 1900.104 
The unfortunate patent strategy of the McEwan brothers not only weakened their 
license revenues. It also unleashed the very same competitive forces that kept profits at 
bay in segments of the pulp and paper industry without proprietary technologies. Within a 
short time competition in newsboard had picked up a momentum that was difficult to 
slow down, not to mention bring under centralized control. As the McEwans witnessed 
the disintegration of what had once been a potentially viable monopoly of annual value 
beyond $1 million, they resolved to take more drastic measures. In August 1900 Robert 
McEwan, who had assumed responsibility of the business, centralized patent rights under 
his tight control in the National News Board Company, intensified the policing of the 
patent, announced a dramatic price hike, and reduced the legal licensees to only eleven 
companies.105 These actions went without success and newsboard prices remained 
practically flat during the ensuing years, while the price of straw and pulp boards 
increased respectively 30 and 20 per cent – a phenomenon even more noteworthy 
because of the 40 per cent increase of pulp board production. 106 
The failure to devise an organizational structure that efficiently enforced legal 
contracts and coordinated manufacturing capabilities frustrated Robert McEwan’s 
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attempts to control a niche market, and pushed him towards a loose price fixing 
combination that covered the whole paperboard industry. McEwan’s aggressive style 
appeared only to aggravate his problems as licensees, clients, and rivals severed relations 
with him. He sued former licensees for infringement only in order to find that they had 
new leverage over the desperate monopolist. Instead of pursuing these cases to the point 
of indictment, Robert McEwan induced firms to participate in his consolidation plan by 
surrendering interest in his patent rights.107 He also continued efforts to enforce the patent 
monopoly through extensive litigation, only to keep the patent valid through extensive 
appeals processes and settlements.108 The varied success of infringement litigation and 
the troubles of maintaining prices eventually led McEwan promote consolidation of the 
whole paperboard industry in 1902. The formed United Box Board and Paper Company 
was re-capitalized at almost $30 million, and now produced over 90 per cent of all 
strawboard and 95 per cent of newsboard in the United States. The concentration of the 
board industry was deepened as some 30 mills outside Union formed a common sales 
agency, Paper Products Company, in 1903.109  
The two companies set out to follow an orthodox market control strategy, but 
soon realized its ineffectiveness. The first action of the new combines was to tighten the 
grip on clientele in the folding box industry. The United Box Board and Paper Company 
announced new harsh credit terms and increased prices of strawboard from $11 to $14 
                                                                                                                                                 
106 Manufactures, 1905. Washington: Government Printing Office 1908, 667-667; Census of Manufactures: 
1919. Washington: Government Printing Office 1923, 560.  
107 PTJ 27 Dec. 1900. Vol. XXXI, No. 26, 808. 
108 These cases included National News Board Company v. Elkhart Egg Case Company, McEwan v. 
Philadelphia Paper Manufacturing Co, National News Board Company v. Fort Orange Company. 
 61 
and newsboard by $10.110 Attempts to curtail production constituted the key tactic of both 
the United Box Board and Paper Company and the Paper Products Company strategies, 
but it was precisely difficulties arising from such plans that weakened and eventually 
disintegrated the combinations. In 1904, the management of Paper Products Company 
attempted to enforce production curtailments, and the members of the cartel responded by 
resigning. The more tightly integrated United Box Board and Paper Company 
experienced somewhat more success in enforcing curtailment plans, but was forced to 
sell a number of individual mills back to their original owners who disagreed with 
production cuts. Over the next few years the company steadily lost its market share in the 
face of competition by independent board mills and because of the increasing backward 
integration by the paper container industry. Innovation and specialty production enabled 
firms in the paper box industry to secure market control and enter the capital intensive 
paperboard manufacture. This was a decision that low capitalized paper converting 
factories without intellectual property assets could not afford. In turn, these powerful 
patent monopoly strategies frustrated attempts of the board manufacturers to integrate 
forward, too, as their only points of entry remained at the highly competitive manufacture 
of undifferentiated basic paper folding boxes.111 
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Role of Patents for the Evolution from Specialty Production into Mass Production 
In the late nineteenth century, a relatively consolidated paperboard industry had 
supplied a fragmented folding box industry, yet around 1900 the balance of bargaining 
power between them shifted. Paper folding box and bag firms had successfully erected 
barriers of entry for their particular market niches by patents. They had also developed 
new capabilities in marketing, manufacturing, and finance, which allowed them 
potentially to integrate backward into paperboard manufacture. As the organizational 
capabilities necessary for specialty production in the pulp and paper industry shifted from 
paper makers to paper converters within the few decades around 1900, a new force of 
vertical integration came into existence in the pulp and paper industry. 112 
Specialization and innovation in machinery characterized business strategies in 
the paper folding box industry, where firms attempted to protect small market niches 
from competition. This had been evident since Colonel Andrew Dennison pioneered the 
manufacture of paper boxes in the United States in 1844 by supplying the Boston jewelry 
industry. While the manufacture of folding paper boxes in the mid-nineteenth century 
typically involved only nominally mechanized operations and was chiefly executed 
through a series of labor intensive gluing, pasting, and cutting operations, from the 
1860’s onwards a number of specialized machines were patented that converted a single 
sheet of paperboard into a folding box. Technological change in paper containers began 
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to culminate around 1900 with the emergence of firms and pools with patent portfolios 
that monopolized specialized markets.113  
None of the new patents on paper folding box machinery resulted in a dominant 
patent, but individual patents were broad enough to monopolize important niche markets. 
By the 1890’s, accelerating technological change in the art caused almost every 
converting factory to operate under some patent. A typical strategy to carve out and 
dominate a niche market was that of Thomas Cornell and Edward Shelton, who had 
established a pioneering U.S. paper folding box factory in Birmingham, Massachusetts in 
1875. The factory specialized in pressing manilla paper into boxes with an impressive 
picture or text imprint. The manufacture of the box took place by the means of cutting 
and creasing rules that were locked in printers’ chase and pressed tight with printers’ 
blocks and furniture, requiring the labor intensive use of two machines. About fifteen per 
cent of the production was substandard quality, until Edward Shelton patented landmark 
folding box and printing machinery in 1876. The Cornell and Shelton box was well 
adopted by clients. The appealing print design enabled new marketing tactics, and the 
box itself was rather practical for end-users, such as retailers. It was delivered flat in 
bundles, and easy to “knock down” in an instant, once needed. Realizing the economic 
potential of specialized “knock down boxes”, Cornell and Shelton acquired related 
patents, and eventually organized a much larger firm, the National Folding Box & Paper 
Company. 114 
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After 1892, National Folding Box & Paper Company litigated relentlessly against 
patent infringers, instigated over thirty cases during the next decade. These tactics 
enabled the firm to control the relatively small but lucrative market of the “knock-down 
box” that comprised mostly stores selling women’s dresses. The box was the first of its 
kind in the U.S. markets, and court rulings frustrated the attempts of other leading paper 
box firms, such as the Robert Gair Company and Dayton Paper Novelty Company, to 
enter the market with imitations.115 
Specialty production alone was an insufficient business strategy in many niche 
markets of the pulp and paper industry, and managers repeatedly consolidated intellectual 
property assets to vitalize and enhance business models based on novelty. In the summer 
1898, the ten largest envelope manufacturers in the U.S. consolidated in the United States 
Envelope Company with headquarters in Springfield, Massachusetts. The combination 
controlled about 90 per cent of annual national production of about 19 million envelopes. 
The consolidation of patents that covered the converting of paper into envelopes was an 
important element of the plan. 116  
During the following decade, the U.S. Envelope Company was perhaps the most 
successful paper firm in the North America, outperforming in relative terms annually 
other pulp and paper firms. Its success resulted largely from its ability to control existing 
and expanding markets, while introducing new product innovations. It launched the 
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window envelope that critically improved mass mailing technology for large bureaucratic 
organizations, such as the national enterprises and government agencies. Samuel Slater, 
an employee of the U.S. Envelope Company, patented a machine that mechanized the 
manufacture of the window envelope, and the firm secured another monopoly of annual 
value of over half a million dollars.117 
With varying success, similar strategies of innovation and monopolization of new 
markets were emulated in almost every segment of the pulp and paper industry. When 
public sanitary concerns pushed for the removal of the traditional public drinking cup, 
specialized paper cup firms introduced patented disposable alternatives and tried to block 
competition from the rapid ly expanding market.118 In the towel and tissue paper industry 
firms formed the “tissue paper trust” during the 1890’s. In the absence of intellectual 
property assets it failed quickly, and firms were forced to devise alternative strategies of 
market control. Most tissue firms introduced patented paper dispensing machines that 
were incompatible with competitors’ standard sizes.119 
The effects of the cartelization of technology were most evident in the bag paper 
industry, where pooling of patents prompted the consolidation of the industry’s leading 
firms into the tightly centralized Union Bag and Paper Company in 1899. Innovation had 
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constituted the dynamic force of industrial change and market control ever since the first 
U.S. paper bag machine was installed in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in 1851, and patented 
by Francis Wolle the next year. The mechanical paper bag machine executed an elaborate 
series of folding and pasting operations on simple sheets of paper. By replacing the 
traditional hand mode of the manufacture, the machine dramatically reduced the unit cost 
of paper bags, and expanded tremendously its markets. In 1869, eight leading U.S. paper 
bag firms consolidated into the Union Paper Bag Machine Company that produced 
annually 371 million bags. The members divided regional markets, and agreed to 
collectively “buy and fight patents.”120 
The timing of this merger can in part be explained with developments in the paper 
bag converting machinery. Competing patents and product innovations diminished the 
value of aging patents on paper bag machinery, and fuelled a patent race for new type of 
standard grocery bags. Thus, the eight leading bag firms recognized the utility of 
consolidating their complementary intellectual property assets. A turning point in the race 
was the patenting of the so-called “satchel-bottom” paper bag by Daniel Appell in May 
1882, which was assigned to a member of the bag machinery patent pool, the Eastern 
Paper Bag Company of Connecticut. The Appell machine successfully improved 
machines that were common in the paper bag business, and competitors were compelled 
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to imitate it. The Eastern Paper Bag Company was forced to have courts enforce its 
patent or lose it.121 
Eastern Paper Bag and its allies successfully defended the “satchel-bottom bag” 
patent for the first time in 1887. The patent pool members also continued to acquire 
patents and introduce product innovations in order to gain dominant position in the 
rapidly expanding paper bag business.122 New bags particularly designed for the needs of 
grocery stores constituted a lucrative market for the paper industry. Additional 
development by the leading paper bag firms, including the the Eastern Paper Bag 
Company, Cleveland Paper Company, Standard Paper Bag Company, New York Paper 
Bag Machine Company, and the Union Paper Bag Machine Company, standardized the 
new paper bag as the so-called “self-opening” bag. Its utility was defined in 1887 by a 
judge when he upheld valid certain key patents of the Union Paper Bag Machine 
Company: 
 
The invention is an ingenious and very useful one. The bag can be folded into a 
flat piece of paper, and thus a large number can be included in a bundle, 
occupying but a small space, in a convenient form for transportation, and ready 
for immediate use; and the grocer has merely to grasp it at the upper side, and 
‘give it a flip through the air’ as he lifts it from the counter, and it at once 
becomes a square box, which will stand upon its bottom. 123 
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The “self-opening bag” firms erected barriers of entry by litigating patent 
infringers, and numerous cases facilitated the cartelization of the industry. 124 
Coordination of technology maintained prices in the “self-opening bag” business by 
controlling entry and manufacturing, whereas the lack of such coordination mechanisms 
hindered the standard paper bag business. The bag paper industry was split effectively 
into two very different markets along the lines of intellectual property assets until 1899, 
when 90 per cent of U.S. paper bag manufacturing capacity was consolidated into the 
Union Bag and Paper Company. The company was an attempt to centralize the 
coordination of two very different bag markets. It absorbed all the major standard bag 
manufacturers and owners of the “self-opening bag” technology. Its one million-dollar 
patent portfolio contained about 400 patents on paper bag machinery. 125 
The Union Paper and Bag Company was a large-scale, tightly centralized, and 
vertically integrated firm. It’s capitalization at twenty seven million dollars made it to one 
of the largest firms in the pulp and paper industry, and equaled half of the size of the 
International Paper Company. Upon its incorporation the company built unprecedented 
large and vertically integrated pulp, paper, and paper bag converting mill in Wisconsin 
that produced annually some 4 billion bags. Besides manufacturing operations, 
economies of scale were achieved in logistics. The new integrated Kaukauna mills 
manufactured finished products whereas the company had previously shipped paper from 
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its Wisconsin paper mills to a converting plant in Batavia, Illinois. The consolidation 
created a giant in the paper bag industry, and erected barriers of entry to others. Indeed, 
the consolidation was also a pre-emptive response to the threat of forward integration into 
bag converting by the International Paper Company. 126 
In 1899, the rumors that the International Paper Company was planning to enter 
the new paper bag segment materialized as the Continental Paper Bag Company was 
incorporated in Maine. The company acquired patents for the “self-opening bag” machine 
from Herman Elsas, a successful New York City paper converter, who also became its 
first president.127 The Continental self-opening paper bag machine produced 25,000 bags 
a day, and the company completed the experimental work to perfect the machine’s 
continuous operation during the spring 1900. By April, the Continental Paper Bag 
Company was already finishing the construction of a bag factory with 125 machines that 
equaled roughly one quarter of Union production capacity. The new mill was fully 
integrated with the “monster pulp and paper mill”, as the Paper Trade Journal described, 
the International Paper Company at Rumford Falls in Maine128 
The exact character of the relationship between the International Paper Company 
and the Continental Paper Company around 1900 remains unclear, but contemporary 
observers perceived the two to be intimately linked. Besides circulating rumors of formal 
merger and openly coordinated production, the managers of the International Paper 
Company frequented the board of directors of Continental. Eventually, after decades, the 
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two firms formally merged. In any case, in 1900, the Union Bag and Paper Company and 
Continental Paper Company towered over an industry that produced about twenty-five 
million paper bags every day. 129 
The Union Bag and Paper Company responded by launching a price war and 
famously withholding technology from the markets.130 The latter tactic dominated the 
defensive strategy of Union, and it attempted to halt the operations of Continental by 
asking courts to confirm its right to block technology in 1901. Litigation in the matter 
lasted almost a decade, and eventually defined importantly how large enterprises can use 
patent portfolios without violating the antitrust laws.131  
The case was peculiar, because the parties were fighting about outdated 
technology. The Continental Paper Bag Company machines at the Rumford Falls factory 
relied on a specific technological solution to fold paper bags flat that had been patented 
by Edward E. Claussen in 1898. Union argued that the Claussen patent was invalid, and 
infringed its patent on the “self-opening bag” that had been granted to William Liddell in 
1896. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of Union, and forced Continental to undertake an 
extensive program of retooling.132  
Continental decided to appeal the case, and shifted its legal tactics. It argued that 
Union did not deserve protection afforded by law, because it was an abusive patent 
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monopoly. Continental argued that Union had never installed a single Liddell machine or 
commercialized the technology, and for this reason the patent did not deserve protection. 
Union argued that it made better profit by using its existing Lorenz & Honiss and Stilwell 
paper bag machines than it had reason to expect after bearing the cost of installing the 
Liddell machines. Yet the company could not be obliged to make the cost saving Liddell 
technology available to its competitors. This argument landed the case at the Supreme 
Court in 1907, which used the case to examine the relationship between the antitrust laws 
and patent system. Justice McKenna defined the character of Union in his majority 
opinion in 1908: “We have no doubt that the complaint stands in the common class of 
manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their general 
industries and shutting out competitors.”133 
Such behavior alone, however, was not sufficient reason to deny protection for 
Union’s patent. McKenna pointed out that the case did not demonstrate decreased supply 
or increased prices, and therefore the antitrust laws did not apply. The Eastern Paper Bag 
Company, or more precisely Union Bag and Paper Company, could demonstrate credible 
competitive reasons why it did not apply the Liddell patent. As the case was presented to 
the Supreme Court it involved purely the question of the right of the patentee to withhold 
technology from public. Historians, economists, and lawyers have rightly interpreted 
Eastern v. Continental to have made patent portfolios an important part of corporate 
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strategy, but paid less attention how the ruling defined the relationship between the patent 
system and antitrust.134 
Eastern v. Continental was only one of many high-profile cases, in which the 
courts attempted to define whether large combines employed the patent system to 
circumvent the Sherman Act legally or not. The issue gained importance in early 
twentieth century American politics, when so many people complained that too often the 
patent system slowed down technological progress and allowed monopolistic behaviour. 
A demonstrative example is a manufacturer’s attempt to fix retail prices through patents 
deemed insignificant, which created a public outrage. W. K. Kellogg claimed famously 
that he could fix the price of corn flakes because it was distributed in a patented paper 
carton box. 135 In the Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Company v. Eureka Specialty 
Company in 1896 the courts held legal a practice to create monopoly in unpatented article 
through restrictive patent license contracts. Heaton-Peninsular sold a patented button-
fastener machine on the condition that the purchaser used only unpatented fasteners 
manufactured by the seller. The practice of creating a monopoly through licensing 
contracts continued to be tried in the courts. In 1902, the Supreme Court ruling Bement v. 
National Harrow Company held legal price fixing patent licenses imposed by National 
Harrow Company, a holding company owned by majority of spring-tooth harrow makers, 
on its customers.136 
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Eventually, a four to three Supreme Court decision Henry v. A.B. Dick Company 
legalized extensive tying practices with the sale of patented articles in 1912. A.B. Dick 
Company sold its patented stencil-duplicating machine, a rotary mimeograph, with 
license restriction that customers used only staples sold by the patentee. The decision 
triggered renewed outrage, and a political effort to resolve the conflict between the 
antitrust and patent system. 137 Responding to increasing public concern and congressional 
bills, President William H. Taft called for an investigation of the relationship between the 
antitrust and patent system. Taft cited the shelving of technology and the implications of 
the Henry v, A.B. Dick Company as critical issues to be revisited.138  
According to Susan Strasser, the manufacturers’ victory in the A.B. Dick case 
was short- lived. In 1913, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that prohibited 
manufacturers to fix the price of patented or trademark protected goods, and effectively 
outlawed tying practices.139 The political effort to reform the antitrust laws and patent 
system continued, though. Prolonged investigations in the nature of law and efficiency of 
the Patent Office were carried out. In 1914, these efforts culminated in the passage of the 
Clayton Act that concerned mostly antitrust, but contained sections that defined the 
relationship between antitrust and patents, too. No significant new legislation that related 
directly on the patent system was passed until the 1930’s.140 
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Conclusions  
The maturation of mass production technology during the late nineteenth century 
presented a tremendous challenge to many pioneering American pulp and paper firms. 
Leading firms in various segments of the pulp and paper industry responded by 
consolidating into large enterprises that towered over their competitors. When such 
strategies did not include the control of new mass production technology, they struggled 
or failed. Sheer consolidation of market power did not enable firms to survive a critical 
period of transition that spanned from the nineteenth century into twentieth, and was 
underpinned by innovation in manufacturing technologies. 
Firms with experience in specialty paper production were particularly apt to 
coordinate structural change by controlling key technologies. Specialty production 
dominated the paper converting industry that purchased ready sheets and rolls of standard 
paper. It is suggestive of the significance of the intellectual property rights that 
consolidation in the paper converting industry was often accompanied by backward 
integration. The only significant case of forward integration by a large manufacturer of 
standard papers into paper converting was that of International Paper Company. 
However, its forward integration into bag converting depended on strategic acquisition of 
intellectual property rights. 
The technological core of successful cartels is best explained by the fact that 
intellectual property rights enabled them to circumvent antitrust. However, this chapter 
suggests that institutional change significantly diminished this aspect of patents in the 
early twentieth century America. In response to allegations of patent misuse by cartels, 
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landmark court rulings and the Clayton Act established limits for firms’ ability to create 
monopolies through patents. This institutional change facilitated a shift in the locus and 
meaning of innovation in large-scale pulp and paper enterprises during the following 
decades. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CO-EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING AND 
ORGANIZATION IN THE PAPER CONTAINER INDUSTRY, 1870-1960 
 
 
 
Technological learning co-evolved with the organization of the paper container 
industry between 1870 and 1960. Industry managers emphasized the role of proprietary 
specialty products for competitive corporate strategies, and acknowledged that such 
tactics required firms to move continuously abreast of the technological frontier. 
Technological change, expiration of intellectual property rights, and public policy, under 
certain circumstances, too, weakened managers’ ability to control over long periods of 
time specific bodies of technological knowledge that constituted the foundation for 
specialty production. The maturation of specialty products into standard ones prompted 
firms to evolve into new products and technologies. The paper container industry’s 
organizational evolution between 1870 and 1960 was characterized by such cycles of 
maturation of technological knowledge, and punctuated by critical periods of transition, 
during which the most innovative firms emerged as the leaders of the industry. 
Such technological evo lution prompted managers to couple it intimately with 
consolidation, too. Mergers and acquisitions provided managers with another central 
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response to the difficulty of sustaining control over specialty products. Large scale 
vertically integrated national enterprises had several advantages over smaller rivals in 
markets for standardized paper containers because of their ability to coordinate mass 
production. In addition, consolidation arrested imitation by rivals. 
The industry concentrated steadily during the twentieth century, and it 
experienced massive merger waves during the 1920’s and 1950’s. The co-evolution of 
technological learning and industrial organization shaped firms’ ability to achieve 
competitive advantage through specialization, and converged the strategy and structure of 
the leading paper container enterprises by the 1950’s. Indeed, if the early paper container 
firms were highly distinctive and original, ninety years later no North American firm was 
able to follow a unique strategy of differentiation. Mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. 
created eventually a handful of firms with almost identical organizational capabilities. A 
long period of industrial evolution had come to end, and next many of these large 
specialized paper container firms were absorbed by even larger forests products 
corporations, and organized into one of many corporate divisions. 
 
Dynamics of Innovation in the Early U.S. Corrugated Paper Industry 
The modern paper container industry evolved relatively slowly from the invention 
of corrugated paper in the mid-nineteenth century. Strong intellectual property rights and 
cooperation of the leading manufacturers impeded innovation in the basic manufacturing 
processes and products until the 1890’s. The first patent on the manufacture of corrugated 
paper was given to Edward C. Healy and Edward E. Allen in 1856 in England. Their 
patent covered a fluted paper that was applied as a sweatband in hats. Corrugated paper 
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was introduced into the packaging of goods in the United States in 1871, when New 
Yorker Albert L. Jones obtained a pioneering American patent on “improvement in paper 
for packing” that defined a method to corrugate cardboard.141 Jones argued that the elastic 
“corrugated packing” was a novel way to protect glass bottles, and hoped to replace the 
practice of wrapping bottles in thick layers of paper. Jones obtained in 1873 a patent for 
an improved simple corrugated paper sheet, and argued that his unlined corrugated paper 
replaced sawdust and straw as cushioning materials in shipping containers. Henry D. 
Norris acquired both of Jones’ patents in order to enter their production in New York 
City. 142 
In 1874 another New Yorker, Oliver Long, obtained a patent for his improvement 
of the Jones method, and introduced the corrugated paper tha t was lined from one side. 
Long had perfected a reliable technique of fluting a continuous web of single and double-
faced corrugated paper. The flexible corrugated paper was then further converted into a 
number of specialized cushioning materials for bottles, china, glassware, and other fragile 
articles. Henry D. Norris purchased the Long patent too.143 
The Jones and Long patents covered broadly the methods to manufacture 
corrugated paper, and the organization of intellectual property rights had a great impact 
on the nascent industry. Norris had pioneered the production of corrugated material in 
New York, but learned that a major competitor to his factory was Robert H. Thompson 
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who produced a similar line of paper containers in the city. Thompson specialized in 
cork-lined corrugated paper that was used for the packing of beer bottles, glass and other 
articles. In 1875, Norris and Thompson decided to merge their operations into the 
Thompson & Norris Company that controlled very broad rights on the corrugated paper 
technology. Upon learning of the merger of Thompson and Norris, the impoverished 
Oliver Long claimed he had never received the agreed payment for his patent, and 
disputed the transfer of the patent rights. Long resold interest to his patent to Robert Gair, 
who looked to diversify his New York folding box firm into the corrugated paper 
business.144 
A lengthy legal dispute ensued between the Thomson & Norris and Gair about 
intellectual property rights, and they attempted to invalidate each other’s patents. The 
inventor of the revolutionary sulphite digester lining, George F. Russell, was sent to 
Europe to investigate the validity of the corrugated paper patents, and in the United 
Kingdom he unearthed evidence that questioned the priority of American corrugated 
patents. Russell’s findings prompted the parties to settle the issue in 1888. Robert Gair 
acknowledged the validity of the Long and Jones patents, and admitted that Thompson & 
Norris lawfully controlled them. In return he received an exclusive license to 
manufacture corrugated paper to fixed prices.145 
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The patent pool of Gair and Thompson & Norris on the manufacture of 
corrugated paperboard impeded production innovation and growth of the industry. This 
resulted particularly from the strategy devised by Thompson, who secured personal 
patents for improvements and acquired competing patents. Thompson & Norris and Gair 
focused on manufacturing corrugated paper in sheets that were sold mostly as a 
cushioning material, and paid little attention to product diversification. The expiration of 
the Long patent in 1897 induced a small wave of innovation in the corrugated paper 
products and machinery, and facilitated the divergence of respective trends of 
technological learning.146 
Although paper box firms continued to innovate in the corrugated machinery, 
specialized firms entered the field for the first time during the 1890’s. Jefferson T. Ferres 
of the Sefton Manufacturing Company developed in secrecy a machine that could 
produce either single-face or double-face corrugated board in 1895. The same year, 
Charles Langston built a corrugated board machine in Philadelphia. He had been master 
locomotive mechanic for the Baldwin Company, and had extensive machine-tool 
experience. Charles Langston’s son, Samuel, studied mechanical engineering at Cornell 
University, and established in 1901 a firm that specialized in corrugated paper 
machinery. 147 
The expiration of basic manufacturing patents and relatively rapid diffusion of 
new manufacturing equipment lowered barriers of entry, and prompted corrugated paper 
firms to focus on product innovation. Until 1890 corrugated paper had been used only as 
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bottle wraps, cushioning, dividers, and partition in wood boxes. The disintegration of the 
patent pool prompted firms to develop new corrugated paper products, and the single 
most important one was the corrugated paper box. Thompson & Norris manufactured the 
first corrugated paper box in 1894. The so-called “Cellular Board” boxes were intended 
for use in the express shipments of light goods, such as lamp chimneys, flowers, hats, or 
feathers. New York Wells Fargo & Company’s Express drivers repeatedly refused to 
accept the unfamiliar container, acquiescing only after the company’s managers required 
them to do so.148 
The Thompson & Norris Company and Gair Company introduced a great variety 
of patented specialized corrugated paper containers, but faced an increasing competition. 
Mass production of all kinds of consumer goods induced demand for mass production of 
paper containers, and a number of new entrants flocked to the business. One of these 
imitations was the Climax Bottle Wrapper, a corrugated paper tube that protected 
individual glass bottles. In 1898, J. J. Hinde and J. J. Dauch acquired the patent rights to 
the bottle wrapper, and began its production at their small strawboard mill in Sandusky, 
Ohio. Two years later, they incorporated the Hinde and Dauch Paper Company that 
adopted an aggressive strategy of growth. Jacob J. Hinde, in particular, recognized that 
the emerging mass distribution business presented a very potent opportunity for the little 
paper container firm.149 
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Within fifteen years of its incorporation, the Hinde and Dauch Company was the 
world’s largest manufacturer of corrugated paper specialties. Its growth reflected the 
tremendous expansion of the paperboard and paper converting industries in the United 
States during the early twentieth century. The single most important factor for the growth 
for these two segments of the North American pulp and paper industry was the 
establishment of the paper box as the standard shipping container between 1900 and 
1919. The paper box completed the emergence of American mass consumer markets and 
mass distribution infrastructure, and yet it took two decades to have it universally 
accepted. By the onset of the World War I, these early obstacles were overcome by 
entrepreneurs and the paper shipping container industry boomed.150 
 
Standardized Innovation: The Creation of Markets 
The best measure of the growth of the corrugated paper industry was the rapidly 
increasing production of paperboard in the U.S., as all corrugated paper was converted 
from it. Paperboard passed newsprint as the most consumed line of paper in U.S in the 
late teens, and its annual production increased from 357 thousand metric tons in 1899 to 
1,678 in 1919, and 5.392 in 1939.151 
The early dynamics of this structural change of the American pulp and paper 
industry was influenced heavily by regulation, which reduced competition in the nascent 
paper container industry. The growth of the paper container industry was based on its 
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ability to substitute prevalent shipping containers with low cost imitations, as an industry 
leader explained in 1920: 
 
There is one particularly outstanding feature of the box board enterprise which 
has unquestionably revolutionized the distributing of this product, and that is, 
through the consumption of the heavy tonnage created by the development of the 
fibre container business, which is a substitute for the lumber or wooden box, and 
where manufacturers of box board formerly depended almost solely for 
distribution of their product upon the set-up, folding, and corrugated box 
consumers, the fibre containers substituted the wooden box, has become 
successful accomplishment and is today the largest consuming feature of common 
box board and raw material that exists.152 
 
Thompson & Norris and Robert Gair had created new markets with innovative 
paper containers in large metropolitan cities, where customers were free to consider the 
relative costs and advantages of wooden, metal, glass, and paper containers. Around 
1900, the leading corrugated paper container firms, such as the Hinde and Dauch, 
regarded the railroads as the largest potential new market. In effect, they looked to 
capture the giant national shipping container markets from the prevalent wooden boxes. 
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To their surprise and frustration, the advocates of the “packaging revolution” 
encountered the resistance of the administration of a massive technological system that 
formed the American railroads. Railroads fell under the heavy-handed regulation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission that skewed how costs and efficiency were calculated, 
as Steven Usselman has demonstrated. Railroad regulation was situated in the center of 
much larger and intense contemporary American political debate on the character of big 
business. In 1910, these tensions peaked famously in the Advance Rate Case, when Louis 
Brandeis accused railroads of notorious inefficiency. Such heated political debate and 
detailed regulation slowed the diffusion of shipping container innovations in the 
railroads.153 
The corrugated paper box firms responded to these challenges by a coordinated 
effort to reform the shipping container regulations. The industry looked to demonstrate 
the reliability of paper box by standardizing it, and introducing it as a credible and 
certified railroad shipping container on parity with the wooden ones. The paper package 
was first introduced to railroads in the form of cereal boxes in 1903, when some 
Northeast cereal manufacturers succeeded in making an exception to railroads’ Official 
Freight Classification. The potential of the new market activated paper managers in 
standardization issues, and in 1905 the leading firms, including Thompson & Norris and 
Hinde and Dauch, formalized their cooperation by establishing the Progress Club that 
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began to advocate the new package innovations.154 Due to these efforts, the Official 
Classification Committee of the railroads authorized in 1906 the general use of specified 
corrugated paper boxes in most types of freight. Immediately, the member firms of the 
Progress Club introduced specialized paper containers that replaced glass in the shipping 
of starch, soda, baking powder, confectionery, grocery, drugs and dried fruits. In 
addition, specialized paper containers were introduced to hardware, stationary, rubber 
tires and other rubber goods, shoes and leather goods, soap, washing compounds and 
other heavier commodities.155 
Cooperation between the leading corrugated paper firms facilitated continued 
efforts to reform the regulation of the railroad shipping containers. The industry 
introduced testing protocols to standardize the quality control of paper boxes. In so doing, 
they borrowed ready sets of established scientific tests and specifications that had been 
created by German paper engineers in the late nineteenth century, and later importantly 
modified by Americans. In 1908, these efforts prompted the railroad authorities to 
prescribe the American “Mullen test” for determining the strength of boxes. The testing 
apparatus had been invented in 1887 by John W. Mullen for the testing of strength of any 
fibrous material. In 1910 the Official Classification ruling on fibre containers was 
expanded to cover a range of established test practices. Similarly to the first official paper 
quality standards, the late nineteenth century German Normalpapiere Klassen, it 
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formalized the testing procedures and certification process by requiring manufacturers to 
mark the quality of boxes with corresponding official stamps.156 
The paper package quickly gained market share in railroad freight, but the 
railroad rate setting mechanisms constituted another troubling barrier to market the 
expansion of paper package industry. Paper boxes reduced the dead weight of a car, but 
often paper boxes were subjected to a higher rate than wooden boxes. In 1909, only few 
specified articles in paper containers were charged the same rate as if shipped in wooden 
boxes, and all others more. Typically the shipping costs for paper containers averaged 10 
per cent penalty when compared with official wooden ones in the Western, Eastern, and 
Southern Official classifications. Within such arrangement, railroads absorbed the 
economic advantages of lighter packages instead of shippers or corrugated paper 
container firms.157 
In response to such rate setting mechanisms, the Southern Mail Order Liquor 
Association filed a petition to the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1911. The 
association’s members had begun in 1904 to shift from shipping liquor bottles in wooden 
boxes to paper cartons instead. As a consequence, they argued, the railroads began to 
charge on arbitrary weights instead of actual weight. The ICC argued that the paper 
package reduced over 20 per cent of the weight of liquor shipments, which totaled 
annually about 360 thousand tons nationally. The investigation established that all 
shipments in paper packages were to be charged at the actual weight. Yet the firms 
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continued to complain that the railroads and ICC regulations discriminated against paper 
containers, and prevented their increased usage.158 
The manufacturers of solid fibre boxes attempted to create new markets through 
almost identical and simultaneous efforts with the corrugated paper industry. Chicago 
paper folding box firms were frustrated by the definition of “boxed” by the railroad 
classification committees as “enclosed on all sides in wood.”159 E. W. Bonfield of the 
Illinois Fibre Company filed an official petition to have solid “fibre or pulp boxes” 
accepted on cost parity with wooden boxes as standard railroad shipping containers in 
1906. In response to his petition, the Western Classification Committee established the 
rule 14-B that defined the use of solid and some corrugated paper containers in the 
railroads, standard tests, and certification by official stamps. The Eastern and Southern 
Classification Committees followed soon, and modified respectively their classifications 
of solid paper containers.160 
Standardization was a highly strategic instrument for both wooden and paper box 
firms as they attempted to protect their markets. Official railroad classifications treated 
the two products very differently, and placed the burden of proof on paper manufacturers. 
Paper boxes were subjected to detailed quality standards, and wooden boxes to none. 
Managers in both industries deployed specifications to influence the rate of diffusion of 
paper boxes in the railroads, and predictably differed greatly in their assessments of it. 
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The manufacturers of wooden boxes argued that paper boxes had captured between 30 
and 40 per cent of railroad shipping container business by 1911. The paper box industry, 
on the other hand, acknowledged only 5 per cent market share. U.S Forest Service 
experts studied the organization of the paper container industry. They portrayed a highly 
concentrated industry that specialized in converting, and purchased about one third of all 
U.S. produced paperboard.161 
The efforts of the solid and corrugated paper container manufacturers to reform 
the railroad regulation and displaced wooden boxes were closely linked, and yet distinct 
in the sense that they were largely two different industrial organizations. Nevertheless, a 
landmark ICC ruling changed the regulatory regime for both paper container products, 
and established the paper box definitively as the standard freight package in the railroads. 
In the early teens, a Californian paper box manufacturer, R.W. Pridham, contested the 
legality of an exemption that allowed railroads to charge canned foods shipped in paper 
boxes up to 400 per cent more than those shipped wooden boxes on routes eastbound 
from California. The railroads continued to favor wooden boxes at the cost of paper 
boxes, because lumber created such a large freight volume, Pridham complained. Again, 
the controversy over shipping container regulations concentrated on quality standards. 
Lumber and wooden box industry associations argued in the case hearings that paper 
boxes were subjected to higher rate because of their inferior quality. Paper box 
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specifications were too complex to be applied or enforced by railroad employees, they 
argued, and therefore wooden boxes provided a much safer choice.162 
After brief examination, the ICC decided that paper containers were as good as 
wooden ones if constructed, packed, and sealed according to existing specifications of the 
Official Classification in 1914. The Pridham case removed the last significant obstacles 
of true market competition between paper and wooden packages. A telegram celebrating 
the decision circulated among the manufacturers of paper boxes as they prepared for a 
period of rapid growth and large profits.163 Immediately following the decision, the 
railroad witnessed rapid increase in vegetables and fruit cans shipped in paper boxes 
instead of wooden ones. In 1916, another change in the regulations admitted the shipment 
of cigarettes and cigars in paper boxes on parity with wooden boxes. Within a few years, 
regulations concerning the shipments of most commodity classes on both U.S and 
Canadian railroads were changed similarly. The consolidation of different railroad 
regulations into one in 1919 represented the concluding point for the paper firms’ efforts 
to reform the shipping container regulation. The new regulatory guidelines established 
broad and inclusive standards that enabled railroads and shippers to choose freely 
between a wide range of competing shipping containers.164 
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Technology Cartels, Antitrust, and Innovation 
The admittance of the corrugated paper box as an alternative standard railroad 
shipping container opened a potentially vast market for a product manufactured by a 
small number of firms. The leading corrugated paper products and machinery firms 
responded to the prospect of emerging markets by erecting barriers of entry. They pooled 
patents, divided regional markets, and followed other price-fixing practices. These efforts 
were in part frustrated by technological innovation, as some machinery suppliers refused 
to cooperate and willingly supplied any paper box manufacturers with imitations and 
innovations. In addition, antitrust policies gave a final blow to such tactics during the 
1910’s. 
Around 1900, a handful of firms controlled the basic patents on the manufacture 
of corrugated paper converting machinery, and these firms looked to prevent competition 
by pooling their patents. Following meetings organized to lobby the railroad 
classification committee in 1904 and 1905, the owners of central patents formed the 
Corrugated Paper Patents Company. The trust was briefly changed into the Progress 
Club, before organized again into the Corrugated Paper Patents Company in 1907. The 
individual members of the trust either sold or assigned all of their patents related to 
corrugated paper and machinery to the trust, and received in turn licenses that specified 
prices and required the reporting of production. 165 
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All the members of the patent trust were firms whose main business was the 
manufacture of corrugated paper containers, and who extensively built their own 
machinery. The Thompson & Norris Company was perhaps the largest member of the 
club, followed by the Hinde and Dauch, which had built its first corrugating machines 
independently in 1897 and 1898. Jacob Hinde himself was a renowned inventor, and he 
fostered machinery innovation at his firm and purchased competing patents. Another 
member, the McPike Paper Company from Alton, Illinois, was managed by J. H. McPike, 
who had invented a pioneering corrugating machine, too.166 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Paperboard Container Production between 1916 and 1939. Source: 
Wilbur F. Howell, A History of the Corrugated Shipping Container Industry in the 
United States. Camden: Samuel M. Langston Company 1940, 47.  
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The goal of the of Corrugated Paper Patents Company was to erect barriers of 
entry for the rapidly expanding industry. Corrugated paper captured the lion’s share of 
U.S. paper container markets, and the technology was controlled largely by the patent 
cartel. Within a few years after the establishment of the Corrugated Paper Patents 
Company, a similar arrangement was considered in the Fibre Box Association that 
covered solid paper containers. However, the effort never amounted to anything 
significant, probably because the manufacturing technology was not covered by a 
reasonably small number of fundamental patents.167 
Specialized corrugating machinery suppliers presented a challenge for the 
corrugated paper patent cartel. An important agent of such pressures was Tobias E. 
Raffel, who built several machines for firms outside the Corrugated Patents trust between 
1904 and 1906. He quickly earned a reputation as an ingenious engineer, not least 
because he belonged to a family of acclaimed converting machinery builders. The known 
inventor Samuel Samuels of the American Corrugated Paper Products Company was 
Raffel’s cousin. Upon his success Raffel established the Paper Working Machines 
Company, and focused exclusively on supplying firms outside the trust.168 
Around 1909 and 1910, antitrust policies presented a challenge to the Corrugated 
Paper Patents Company, too, and its members were forced to revisit the structure of the 
trust. In a legal analysis of the corrugated patent trust in early 1910, an attorney argued 
that price fixing, regulation of production, and division of regional markets could be held 
legal under the Sherman antitrust laws only if they were based on a single patent. There 
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did not exist such a dominant patent for the corrugated paper, and therefore the 
Corrugated Paper Company restricted the manufacture and sale of an unpatented article 
in an illegal way, he argued. Following up his brief in a personal letter to Jacob Dauch, 
the attorney doubted if the trust would run a risk of prosecution at the moment, but 
encouraged him to explore alternative organizational structures because of the way 
judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws were changing.169 
Unexpectedly, an invention by Samuel Langston presented potential relief for the 
corrugated patent trust. Earlier Langston’s successful firm had presented a serious 
challenge to the patent pool, but the Corrugated Paper Patents acquired from the inventor 
what was potentially the much searched for fundamental patent. In 1908, Langston 
received a patent for a new type of converting machine that was regarded as the 
trailblazer of modern capital intensive mass production of single and double faced 
corrugated paper. Corrugated Paper Patents managed to acquire the rights to the patents 
that covered this invention. The contract also forbade Langston from engaging in making 
or selling the corrugated machines, and limited his business to other converting 
machinery. 170 
Langston’s radical technological departure induced other machinery suppliers to 
imitate it. In 1911, firms outside the Corrugated Paper Patents Company formed the 
Corrugated Paper Manufacturer’s Association, which strove efforts to invalidate the 
Langston patent monopoly. George Swift circumvented the Langston patents and 
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commercialized a very close imitation, delivering what was probably the most severe 
technological blow to the patent trust. Meanwhile, Arnold Pacyna of the Chicago Folding 
Box Company obtained two additional patents on Langston imitations in 1911. Tobias 
Raffel attempted the same, but failed to circumvent the Langston patent claims. The 
Corrugated Patents Company litigated Raffel’s Paper Working Machines Company for 
patent infringement. A lengthy and expand ing legal battle, fuelled in part by the personal 
antagonism of Langston and Raffel, continued until the death of the latter in 1920. 
Langston was relatively successful in his litigation, but came inadvertently to rather 
accelerate imitation and eventually undermine his own patents.171  
When Raffel’s Paper Working Machines Company went bankrupt in 1916, 
largely due to the extensive patent litigation, its experienced former employees 
established machine shops that specialized in Langston imitations. The S & S Corrugated 
Paper Machinery Company was a direct offspring of Raffel’s firm, and continued to be a 
leading corrugated machinery supplier long after Langston himself exited the business 
during the 1940’s. Another firm established by Raffel’s former employee was the 
Progressive Corrugated Paper Machinery Company. It also commercialized Langston 
imitations. The Corrugated Machinery Association that consisted of 15 firms that 
competed fiercely with the members of the Corrugated Paper Patents Company acquired 
the patent portfolio of the bankrupt Raffle. The supply of corrugated machinery increased 
because of these firms, but also because Langston’s patents weakened during the lengthy 
legal disputes. An appeal in the Corrugated Paper Patents v. Peter Heibel & Sons & 
Manufacturing Company in 1917 invalidated important claims of the 1908 Langston 
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patent. The court ruled that earlier patents by Jefferson T. Ferres, and some others, 
anticipated clearly the Langston patent. The aggressive infringement litigation by 
Langston backfired severely, then, and he not only facilitated a nascent imitation-
industry, but eventually lost his patent control, too.172 
It is difficult to estimate how the disintegration of patent cartels influenced the 
rate of innovation in the corrugated machinery industry. Yet, when the early twentieth 
century experience in the corrugated paper industry is contrasted to that of late nineteenth 
century, the most striking difference is the rate of innovation and its impact on economies 
of scale. Jefferson T. Ferres’ 42 inch wide converting machine in 1895 produced ten feet 
of corrugated board a minute. By 1910 the corrugating machines averaged 30 feet a 
minute, and by 1917 machines of 63 inch widths averaged speed between 60 and 75 feet 
a minute.173 
The effects of technological innovation and intellectual property rights on the 
organization of the industry, and its technological learning were amplified by antitrust. In 
1921 the antitrust authorities charged the Corrugated Paper Manufacturer’s Association 
with price fixing and other unfair trade practices. The association consisted of ten 
corrugated converting firms that served exclusively the New York City market, and were 
not integrated backward into paperboard production. Grover Daly has argued that the 
case echoed Supreme Court rulings on American Hardwood Manufacturer’s Association 
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and the so-called Linseed Oil –decision, which intensified the competitive environment in 
the U.S.174 
Technological innovation and public policy together, then, prompted change in 
the corrugated paper container industry. During the 1920’s, individual paper container 
firms responded to these challenges by adopting clear corporate strategies of vertical 
integration, economies of scale, and internalization of research and development. The 
Hinde and Dauch Paper Company pioneered the new tactics. The company also expanded 
its paperboard manufacturing capabilities in Ohio, added new converting factories within 
the vicinity of major metropolitan areas, established vertically integrated subsidiary in the 
Canada, and acquired major interest in the Frohman Chemical Company that supplied 
critical paper chemicals. Other leading corrugated firms soon followed suit, thereby 
changing the basic dynamics of the industry’s evolution. 175 
 
Emergence of Strategies of Scale and Scope  
The paper box was established as a standard shipping container just as the U.S. 
war mobilization effort had begun. The booming demand for all kinds of paper containers 
prompted managers of paper converting firms to revisit strategies of vertical integration. 
Traditionally the industry had focused on paper converting operations and purchased 
necessary paperboard from specialized suppliers. The dynamics of this supplier 
relationship were shaped by allegations that the paperboard industry was benign to 
collusive practices. In 1911, the members of Easter Boxboard Club were indicted for 
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attempting to increase prices in the New York City markets by fixing prices, dividing 
markets, restricting production, and other unfair trade practices prohibited by antitrust. 
The Chicago Folding Box Company charged thirty-nine local box board manufacturers 
with similar violations in 1912. These cases exhibited forces that anticipated the 
backward integration of box converters.176 
Naturally the paperboard firms followed strategies intended to impede those of 
their major clients. The leading box board manufacturer, American Strawboard Company 
was reorganized into the larger United Box Board Company with over 6 million dollar 
capitalization. Its managers hoped to gain price setting power through its impressive size 
and market share. Similar considerations prompted the entry of the largest pulp and paper 
enterprise into box board business. In 1912, the International Paper Company retooled in 
newsprint capacity into specialty production, and increased four-fold its production of 
box board. The paperboard industry was enticed into price fixing both because of 
potential over-capacity, and by booming demand during the war mobilization. 177 
Another Chicago paper box firm charged 54 firms of antitrust violations in 1916, 
and alleged that the Paperboard Association was nothing but an arena for price fixing. 
Sixty to seventy Chicago box converting factories converted annually about 200,000 tons 
of paperboard into 300 million paper boxes of different types. Contemporary observers 
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concluded that the paperboard firms attempted to force box converting firms to pass on 
profits due to the increasing demand for paper containers.178 
As the war effort increased demand for paper containers, the box converting firms 
began to experience shortage of paperboard. New York City paper box firms responded 
by attempting to coordinate their supply of paperboard, and considered integrating into 
paperboard production collectively in 1916. Such initiative demonstrated how different 
the capital intensity in paper box converting and paperboard production was. The former 
business was relatively easy to afford, whereas the paperboard production required the 
installation of expensive paper machines, and necessitated often backward integration 
into pulp production and logging.179 
The leading paper box firms adopted aggressive strategies of backward 
integration in order to control the price of paperboard and ensure its steady supply. 
Robert Gair Company acquired in 1921 the Haverhill Boxboard Company in 
Massachusetts, Piermont Company in New York, and Thames River Specialty Company 
in Connecticut. These paperboard mills supplied Gair’s converting plants in nearby 
metropolitan areas. In addition, the company increased its capital. All the leading paper 
box firms followed suit during the 1920’s.180 
The Hinde and Dauch Paper Company was by 1920 already the world’s largest 
paper box manufacturer, and its aggressive policy of growth impeded entry of others into 
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the industry. Its managers followed strategy of scale and scope in part because they had 
to cope with increasing production capacity and declining prices. During the 1920’s, the 
paper container industry grew rapidly, and shipments averaged almost ten per cent annual 
growth between 1923 and 1933, while prices plummeted. Managers of Hinde and Dauch 
emphasized productivity, and focused upon vertical integration and scale economies.181 
At the heels of the war boom in 1918, Hinde and Dauch management discussed 
difficulties with transportation and labor supply that prevented the company from running 
its mills at full capacity. These difficulties reflected the war boom that facilitated 
managerial strategies of growth. Over 90 per cent of Hinde and Dauch containers and 
shipping boxes were delivered to either the United States Government or those of its 
allies. More capacity meant more profits its managers reasoned. The arrival of the post-
war depression in 1920 surprised the industry, and reversed the logic of these growth 
strategies.182 
What began as a slow down developed into a decade of depression that forced 
firms to revisit corporate strategies and deeply shaped the industry’s evolution. From 
early on, the managers conceptualized the problems plaguing the paper container industry 
as over-capacity. Although the cancellation of the war effort caused a temporary decline 
in demand, there was a significant increase in consumption of paper in the U.S. during 
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the 1920’s. Over-capacity caused decline in prices, and the industry could hardly make 
profits despite of increasing demand. This conceptualization of problems caused 
managers to pay attention to the organization of the industry, as they looked to increase 
prices through consolidation of production capacity. 183 
The changed economic conditions during the early 1920’s prompted Hinde and 
Dauch managers to define a strategy that emphasized increase in production capacity and 
entry into different regional markets. In an attempt to integrate backwards, Hinde and 
Dauch contracted to buy all paperboard produced by the Brown Company in 1920. 
Within a year it acquired the whole company, including mills along the Mississippi River 
with ample supply of straw, abundant water and drainage facilities. Railroads provided 
good transportation to large Mid-West centers of manufacturing, such as Chicago, St. 
Paul, Omaha, Kansas City and St. Louis. Completing a move of corporate expansion, 
Hinde and Dauch invested into its new subsidiary, and among other improvements 
increased the daily production of straw paper at the Iowa plant from 20 to over 95 tons. 
Further advancing its shift to the Mid-West, Hinde and Dauch soon thereafter acquired 
the American Strawboard Company from Mid West Box Company, which was offered 
for sale because the latter’s indebtedness.184 
The new conditions prompted Hinde and Dauch to revisit its corporate strategy, 
and in 1922 it appointed a managerial committee for that purpose. Despite over-capacity 
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in the industry, the committee warned, Hinde and Dauch should not enter price-cutting. 
Instead, the insistence on good margin of profit should dictate the long-term strategy of 
the company. The firm resolved to continue its strategy of growth, but decided to focus 
upon the corrugated paper industry. A proposed merger with River Raisin Company was 
abandoned because it produced solid fibre products. The merger would not have resulted 
in improved cost-efficiency or helped the company to gain price-setting power in its 
primary corrugated markets.185 
In the depressed markets of the early 1920’s, the capital efficiency of production 
determined the success of individual firms and was decisive for the success of Hinde and 
Dauch. Its managers carefully reviewed the downtime of each of its machines. For the 
first half of 1922 mills and factories showed radically different figures. Whereas the best 
machines of the company were running close to 90 per cent of the time in Fort Madison 
and Gloucester, others in Ohio and Delphos stood still. The production efficiency of 
fabricated paper machines could be improved 75 per cent, a company review 
suggested.186 While technology, in particular boilers, provided some remedy to the 
downtime,187 the main issue for corporate headquarters was to manage capital efficiency 
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though securing orders at profitable prices. Indeed, Hinde and Dauch managers prided 
themselves in the early 1920’s for not accepting low priced bids for its products.188 
Over-capacity facilitated standardization of the industry. It created conditions that 
favored certain kinds of firms but also other facets of industrial life. Paradoxically 
demands of labor unions and government for a five-day labor week fit with managers’ 
desire to curtail overproduction. In September 1926, the president of Hinde and Dauch, 
Sidney Frohman, complained about over-capacity again: “We can hardly expect any mill 
profits for December or January, but that it was hoped that universal adoption of the five 
day operation approved at the Washington conference with the Labor Department would 
in a measure correct this condition.”189 In January 1927, Frohman assessed that the 
shorter week had the effect of taking 270,000 tons of board off the market. This had a 
stabilizing effect on the prices because of the relative size of the corrugated paper 
industry. 190 
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190 Meeting of the Directors of Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, July 7, 1927; For a detailed discussion of 
how managers assessed demands for a shorter labor week, see also Special Meeting of the Hinde and 
Dauch Paper Company, April 1, 1925; Meeting of the Directors of Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, July 
7, 1927; For the same in relation to kraft liner, see Meeting of Directors, 25 June 1929. Record of the 
Proceedings of the Stock Holders & Directors, February 15, 1917 – April 1, 1937, 55, 104, 202.  
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Together, vertical integration and increased size afforded the managers of Hinde 
and Dauch new tactics to foster specialized customer relationships. They developed 
mechanisms to keep customers at disadvantage in order to maintain good margin of 
profit, and on the other hand to reduce dependence on particular markets. Managers of 
Hinde and Dauch considered the geographical distribution of production capacity as an 
extension of this tactic.191 St Louis could be supplied from the Alton plant, the Illinois 
Glass Company in Indiana from the Muncie plant, and the excess production of 
Bridgeton, New Jersey should be used for Eastern markets to check large consumers 
there from developing their own corrugating plants.192 Another form of this strategy was 
the cultivation of intimate user-producer relationships. Hinde and Dauch installed box 
plants on plants of its large customers, such as Hazel Atlas Glass Company. 193 
Such considerations were critical when Hinde and Dauch decided to acquire the 
Kansas City Packing Box Company and the Kansas City Fibre Box Company in 1926, 
perhaps its largest acquisitions ever. The firm’s plants were located in Kansas City, in the 
center of the Packing House District, and delivered to customers such as Swift, Armour, 
and Procter & Gamble. A straw paper mill was immediately projected at Kansas City in 
                                                 
191 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 12 Sept.  
1923. Minutes of Stock Holders and Directors October 1913 – December 1924, 252-3.  
192 Meeting of the Directors of Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 7 July 1929 Record of the Proceedings of 
the Stock Holders & Directors, February 15, 1917 – April 1, 1937 , 55, 110.  
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of Hazel Atlas and DuPont, see Meeting of the Directors of Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 17 Sept. 
1926; for Hazel Atlas, 25 June 1927 Record of the Proceedings of the Stock Holders & Directors, February 
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order to run down the marginal cost, and similarly the managers paid close attention to 
the railroad shipping opportunities.194 
The fear of additional competition from its own customers reiterated to 
paperboard managers that only through profitable marginal cost could they command the 
organization of the industry. Hinde and Dauch managers began to analyze advantages of 
vertical integration and geographical distribution in greater detail. Transportation costs 
from a kraft mill in Watertown to a projected box plant in Cleveland were too high, the 
president of the company argued in October 1927. Rather than shipping kraft board to 
plants, mills and plants should be built adjacent, the president argued. Another aspect of 
this concern was the frequent complaints that Hinde and Dauch filed at the Interstate 
Commerce Committee in order to bring railroad freights down. 195 
The acquisition of Thompson & Norris Company marked the completion of the 
geographical expansion of Hinde and Dauch in 1927. The new subsidiary had plants in 
Brooklyn, Boston, Brookville, Indiana, and a Canadian subsidiary. The merging of two 
leading corrugated paper specialty firms presented a great challenge for Frohman, but he 
was encouraged by the projection of his New York sales manager who projected 
                                                 
194 Special Meeting of the Directors of the Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 27 Sept. 1926. Record of the 
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doubling sales within two years.196 In addition, Hinde and Dauch acquired the J.M. Raffel 
Company that specialized in corrugating machinery. 197 
Other leading U.S. corrugated paper companies followed aggressive strategies of 
growth, too. The Container Corporation had grown during the 1920’s through a series of 
mergers and vertical integration, as did the Robert Gair Company, National Container, 
and some others. These leading firms operated in several major markets in the U.S. and 
Canada, and were vertically integrated.  
As they completed their aggressive strategies of vertical integration in the late 
1920’s, the emergence of Southern kraft paper called the strategy in to question. Mass 
produced Southern kraft paper and board undersold all other paper grades by a great 
margin, and provided unexpected advantage for disintegrated paper converting plants. 
Particularly small independent converters that served metropolitan areas benefited from 
this, whereas the large scale paper container firms had to struggle to keep their board 
operations profitable.198 
Maps of the U.S. board mills and converting plants demonstrated the new 
industrial organization. Of all U.S. box converting firms in 1928, the Robert Gair 
Company, Container Corporation of America, and Hinde and Dauch are the only ones 
that have significantly integrated backwards. Gair owned five paperboard and one 
specialized corrugated board mills; Container Corporation five paperboard mills; and 
                                                 
196 Meeting of the Directors of Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 19 Oct. 1927. Record of the Proceedings 
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Hinde and Dauch three paperboard and three specialized corrugated board mills. All were 
strategically located to supply converting operations in the vicinity of major markets. The 
leading paper container firms differentiated themselves from the smaller ones. The 
strategy of vertical integration and economies of scale was crafted by managers during 
the 1920’s. Yet, as the price decline of paperboard began to undermine it, the managers 
of the leading corrugated firms responded by assigning product innovation more central 
role in the corporate strategy. 199 
 
Product Innovation and Evolution of Technological Learning 
If paper box converters could integrated backwards, paperboard manufactures 
could do so forward. A leading U.S. newsprint producer, St. Regis Paper Company, 
installed paper box converting machinery at its paperboard mill in Herrings, New York, 
in 1921, but divested the plant. The Waldorf Box Board Company of St. Paul acquired in 
the early 1920's the Collins Converting Company, and the Standard Paper Company of 
Kalamazoo, Wisconsin, installed machinery to convert board from its three 
papermachines. The Ohio based Gardner Board and Carton Company integrated forward, 
too, and acquired a number of smaller paper converting plants. Such moves seldom paid 
dividend during the 1920’s. No such venture equaled the operations of the incumbent 
                                                                                                                                                 
198 These mergers are studied in detail in Harry L. Wollenberg to M. A. Wertheimer 14 June 1928. David 
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Folder #12. 
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corrugated paper firms, and it is suggestive that St. Regis divested its box converting 
plant rather quickly. 200 
The corrugated and other specialty converting firms deployed intensive defensive 
tactics in order to frustrate the forward integration by their paper suppliers. As the basic 
converting machinery technologies came publicly available, the paper container industry 
focused upon product patents. The most famous example of these tactics was perhaps the 
“Bliss Boxes,” a family of standard corrugated paper boxes patented by Herbert R. Bliss 
and his two brothers, and licensed to converting firms through the expiration of patents in 
1938. Such rapid diffusion of product innovation in the corrugated paper industry 
presented a challenge to the largest firms, and they responded by claiming large 
intellectual property rights to specialized product areas. Hinde and Dauch centralized 
product development and management of intellectual property rights to company 
headquarters in Sandusky, Ohio, by 1919. During the subsequent years, these routines 
were increasingly systematized as the company grew in size. The company expanded 
actively its already large paper product patent portfolio, organized innovation into a 
department of experimental box design, and added specialized patent engineers who 
monitored North American and international corrugated paper box patents that should be 
considered for acquisition by the company. The company’s expert patent attorneys also 
                                                 
200 This is Gardner. Fftieth Anniversary, 1900-1950. Gardner Board and Carton Company 1950, 12-13; 
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examined rival products and vigorously pursued potential infringers to settle out or in the 
court.201  
Industry wide, these efforts were, to say the very least, intensive enough to slow 
down the entry of new firms into the corrugated paper industry. During the 1920’s many 
of the large-scale pulp and paper firms attempted to diversify into more profitable 
specialty products. Thomas Heinrich has demonstrated the difficulties of the International 
Paper Company to diversify into new products during the 1920’s and 1930’s. Although 
the company did emerge as the world’s largest producer of paperboard during this period, 
it did not integrate forward into paper box converting until 1940. A study of similar 
efforts of a Wisconsin pulp and paper firm, the Marathon Paper Mills, suggests that the 
organization of intellectual property rights constrained its ability to enter new markets.202  
Marathon Mills was controlled by an ambitious papemaker, Clark D. Everest, 
who proposed the merger of his sulphite board operations and the Menasha Printing and 
Carton Company, whose food paper containers were a big success in the Mid-West. 
Everest initiated intensive merger talks –materialized in a stream of letters- with his long 
time friend George S. Gaylord of Menasha Printing and Carton Company in 1920. Steven 
B. Karges has shown that both men assessed in amazing detail the benefits of the merger, 
and yet failed to proceed with it. The merger of the two firms took place only after seven 
years of negotiations. Everest was desperate to diversify standard board production into 
more profitable converting products during the 1920’s, and regarded entry into the 
                                                 
201 Correspondence Course,13-14, Squire, A Brief History; Hinde and Dauch Paper Company Annual 
Report 1919. Westvaco Collection #2830, Box #46; Bettendorf, A History. Paperboard and Paperboard 
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corrugated paper products a good choice. He pursued close negotiations on a joint 
venture with the Sefton Manufacturing Company, too, but the converter hesitated and 
was eventually acquired by the Container Corporation of America. Everest’s problem 
was that his attempts to diversify production were repeatedly frustrated by intellectual 
property rights, and after nine years of depressed business he exclaimed: “…90 % of the 
business and all the profitable business is covered by what some one claims to be an 
infringement. Just how we come out on this, I don’t know.” 203 
In 1928, the Hinde and Dauch and Container Corporation acquired large 
competing converting firms, further troubling Everest and his associates. They argued 
that such concentration in the industry worsened the effects of the recent disintegration of 
the Corrugated Box Division of the Paperboard Industries Association, and predicted 
more competitive times for the Marathon Mills. Everest responded to these concerns by 
intensifying his attempts to integrate forward, and eventually in 1929 he was close to 
entering the corrugated paper industry by acquiring two specialty firms with large patent 
portfolios. Clarence Schoo of Massachusetts General Fibre Box Company explored the 
industry and intellectual property rights on the behalf of Everest, and informed him of the 
potential of the Wayne Paper Goods Company. Managers of the company argued that 
there was no fundamental patent for set-up or corrugated boxes. The company secured 
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patents in great volumes, much like the Radio Corporation of America or General 
Electric, which generated large license revenues from patents on small technical details, 
the manager boasted.204 
Such defensive patent strategies of the leading paper converter firms were 
strengthened with the onset of the Great Depression. Declining demand and prices of 
standard paper boxes prompted Hinde and Dauch to attempt to diversify its paperboard 
production. In the midst of the deepest recession in nation’s history in 1933, Sidney 
Frohman reported to his Board of Directors about innovation with tremendous success. 
Orders for special insulation for electrical refrigerators had increased so much that the 
company’s Sandusky mill was working 24 hours a day. To secure this profitable 
business, Hinde and Dauch must obtain exclusive rights to this product, Frohman 
continued. The company had begun to manufacture corrugated paper heat insulation for 
electrical refrigerators and building insulation under a General Electric Company 
licenses, but was in the process of applying for its own house insulation patent.205 The 
electric giant had filed an application for a stronger patent and Hinde and Dauch had to 
enter negotiations with it, Frohman said.206 
 
                                                 
204Harry L. Wollenberg to M. A. Wertheimer 14 June 1928; H. J. Miller to Clarence J. Schoo, 19 March 
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Figure 4-2. Most of these Hinde and Dauch Paper Company corrugated paper 
products in 1925 were patented. Source: Hinde & Dauch Paper Company Annual 
Address of the President to the Stock Holders, 1925. West Virginia Pulp and Paper 
Company Collection. Number 2830, Box 46. Courtesy of the Division of Rare and 
Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library. 
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Everest attempted to diversify his paperboard production into insulation materials 
too, but an analysis of the patent situation threw cold water on these aspirations. A 
Marathon Mills engineer, Allen Abrams, affirmed in 1929 that the Marathon Mills was 
developing a good insulating material, but concluded: “However, because of the previous 
experimentation done by other persons and because of the patent situation on the Balsam 
Wool process we are temporarily discontinuing the work.”207 
Everest, an experienced manager of innovation, had successfully diversified into a 
number of different kinds of forest products, and thus developed a persistent routine of 
research and development. Yet his efforts to enter the paper insulation business were 
impeded by the leading specialized paperboard converting firms. Everest asked his 
technical research department to find out if the insulation knowledge could be adapted to 
the so-called rapid frozen foods. In subsequent reports, Abrams concluded that Robert 
Gair Company’s research laboratories possessed the best knowledge on the subject. 
Everest contracted specialized engineers to further study the subject. The extensive 
search confronted the proprietary knowledge of Hinde and Dauch in 1933, when an 
engineer informed Everest that they did not have insulation board that fit the GE 
refrigerators.208 
The GE insulation business was good for Hinde and Dauch. In 1933, GE 
produced 85,000 sets, and the company projected to reach its maximum production 
capacity, about 160,000 sets next year. GE’s “Knight Patent,” which covered most paper 
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insulation products, was critical for this projection. 209 Worried, Frohman told the board 
that GE, which had to rely on external manufacturers of refrigerator insulation sets, 
played its cards well. GE had placed orders in competing paper firms “at prices 
considerably below those quoted by our company,” he said. The solution, Frohman 
argued, was to secure an exclusive license from GE before Container Corporation, 
Ashtabula Paper Company or any other competitor. Three months later, in August 1933, 
Hinde and Dauch had secured this. The agreement enabled the control of prices through 
the fact that Hinde and Dauch could depict them in sublicense contracts. Yet, numerous 
infringements undermined the patent’s value, and in 1935 Hinde and Dauch and GE 
redrafted the license agreement in favor of the papermaker. Hinde and Dauch secured full 
power to police proprietary rights and to order price in paper insulation products. In 
addition, GE agreed to reduce the royalty percentage in half. By 1936, the insulation 
business was so good that Sidney Frohman proposed the establishment of a separate 
division for it.210 
His proposal searched to clarify innovation’s organizational place within the firm. 
While undifferentiated product markets, such as newsprint, featured simple user-producer 
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relationships, the relationship was often more complex in special products. The 
managerial overview of business relationships assumed heightened importance on a par 
with innovation. Intellectual property rights enabled Hinde and Dauch to coordinate such 
complex user-supplier relationships. A licensee of Hinde and Dauch, the Detroit Paper 
Products Company, sold its entire production to the Kelvinator Company that depended 
solely on it. In 1938, Kelvinator threatened to build its own plant and the Detroit Paper 
would lose large volume of business. Charging Kelvinator with infringement of its 
Knight patents, Hinde and Dauch was able to stop such an initiative.211 
Innovation and intellectual property rights constituted key components in the 
strategy of Hinde and Dauch during the 1930’s. In 1938, the company completed the 
development of specialized machinery for manufacture of insulation for electrical 
refrigerators. The considerable cost reductions of new machinery gave Hinde and Dauch 
an additional advantage. The Gibson Company of Greenville, Michigan, requested the 
new machinery to be installed at its plant, causing further savings in transportation 
charges.212 
Cost efficiencies like this contributed to economies of scale, as Hinde and Dauch 
was able to invest in increased production capacity. In 1939, the company had assembled 
five of the new type of machines for manufacturing paper insulation sets that each cost 
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$12,000. Two of these were placed at the Gibson plant in Michigan, while two remained 
at Sandusky supplying an order placed by Westinghouse for 1939. Because more 
machines were being assembled, Hinde and Dauch searched to win contracts by other 
manufacturers of electrical refrigerators as well.213 
As the Hinde and Dauch managers fostered specialty production, niche 
innovation, and intimate user-supplier relationships, they significantly re-shaped the 
company’s knowledge base. The company was most willing to invest and install 
machinery and equipment when it could secure markets and clients through innovation, 
and control competition through intellectual property rights. Moreover, the intimate user-
producer relationships informed investment strategies about demand. In addition to 
insulation products, this strategy was replicated at Hinde and Dauch in specialized boxes 
for furniture, mid-soling for shoes, and most notably in specialized products for the 
automobile industry. 214 
Based on its experience with GE, Hinde and Dauch began in 1935 to develop 
insulation and instrument boards for automobiles in cooperation with the Ford Motor 
Company. In January 1936, Ford placed an order of over 120,000 panels of corrugated 
body fillers, and subsequent orders would be placed -depending upon Hinde and Dauch’s 
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ability to deliver- from Ford’s Canadian, South African, River Rouge, Los Angeles as 
well as Eastern plants. This potential prompted Hinde and Dauch to invest $15,000 in 
improvements of one of its Sandusky paper machines, as well as the acquisition of new 
machinery and equipment.215 
In 1936, Hinde and Dauch used about 65 per cent of its total mill production 
capacity. 216 Because innovation enabled improvement in run-time of production 
machinery, the company pursued cooperation with Ford. Predictions of demand were 
critical for Hinde and Dauch’s decision to pursue innovations for the automobile 
industry. During a demonstration of the new product to Ford management, Edsel Ford 
told Frohman that in paper insulation and dash board: “they had found something they 
had been looking for during the past several years as a better substitute for what they 
have heretofore been using.”217 
In addition to Ford, Hinde and Dauch considered as Chrysler Corporation, Federal 
Motors and Murray Corporation potential markets for its insulation products. 
Preparations for larger production capacity followed immediately. Machinery at 
Sandusky was retooled, and a mill at Muncie, Indiana that had been down for several 
years was reconditioned throughout. The directors of Hinde and Dauch expected the 
business to amount to $600,000 annually. As the business grew in volume, the 
organization of production became an issue again. New customers, like the Budd Wheel 
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Company, proposed to license manufacturing rights and build a production lines that 
supplied only itself. Ford wanted to take over the production too. Because Hinde and 
Dauch had invested in machinery that supplied Ford, it did not consent, and wanted 
instead to negotiate a long-term contract.218 
Specialized product innovations enabled the leading paper converting firms to 
enter new markets. The new products required very different types of capabilities than 
simple paper box manufacturing, and therefore prompted the transformation of the 
knowledge base of the incumbent paper converting firms. Moreover, the importance of 
intellectual property rights for basic corrugated paper box business declined. In 1938, the 
central patents that covered the best-selling “Bliss boxes” expired. These dynamics were 
in part reflected when the International Paper Company finally entered the mass 
production of paper converting products. IP and Hinde and Dauch built jointly a fully 
integrated pulp, paper, and converting plant to Florida that produced boxes for oranges. 
Hinde and Dauch granted an exclusive license to IP to manufacture these boxes under its 
patents. Although the paper giant was limited by intellectual property rights in this 
venture, its experience of running the Florida plant facilitated its entry into mass 
production of non-proprietary corrugated products in 1940. The world’s largest producer 
of paper bags, the Union Bag and Paper Company, followed a similar course. The 
company abandoned its strategy of purchasing all the paper it converted into specialized 
paper products and integrated backward into pulp and papermaking. It built a giant kraft 
pulp and paper mill in Savannah, Georgia in 1939. The company had extensive 
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experience in bag converting machinery, and it installed a large converting plant at the 
Savanna mill. The maturation of the paper container technologies frustrated attempts to 
cover major lines of business with patents, and lowered barriers of entry. 219 
The declining importance of intellectual property rights in the major lines of paper 
container business induced cooperation and concentration in the industry during the 
1940’s. Collusive practices were largely banished from the industry by a landmark 
antitrust case in the late 1930’s, when the antitrust authorities charged 28 leading firms of 
illegal trade practices. The defendants controlled 56 per cent of the U.S. markets, and the 
nine largest firms one third. In contrast, the 178 smallest, typically local firms shared 44 
per cent of the U.S. markets. The charges alleged that the industry had continued 
cooperative practices, such as price fixing and production quotas, after the dissolution of 
the New Deal National Recovery Administration, during which such practices had been 
granted immunity from antitrust. The defendants agreed with a consent decree in 1940.220 
The decree reinforced firms’ reliance on economies of scale, and the onset of the 
Second World War amplified the dynamics of concentration, as the demand for paper 
boxes surged. During the wartime mobilization, 80 per cent of military shipments were in 
standard paper containers. The new demand facilitated mass production technology in the 
basic standard products. The speed of basic corrugating machinery increased from 300 
feet per minute in 1940 to 600 by 1955. During the same period, the annual shipments of 
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corrugated board increased from 33,000 tons to 93,000, while the utilization of 
paperboard production capacity increased from 73 per cent to 88. The industry boomed 
again.221 
Such developments prompted managers to emphasize economies of scale, and a 
wave of mergers followed during the 1950’s. Over fifty leading specialized corrugated 
paper containers firms were reduced to fifteen national, vertically integrated firms in 
thirteen combinations. Vertical integration characterized seven of these mergers, four 
were horizontal mergers of converters, and in two cases a manufacturer of metal and 
glass containers diversified into paper containers. The fifteen industry leaders dominated 
U.S. markets with annual value of 2.7 billion dollars. These firms had similar 
organizational capabilities and overlapping geographical operations. Thus, their 
managers’ ability to deploy strategies of differentiation was inherently constrained.222 
 
Conclusions  
The co-evolution of industrial organization and technological learning is striking 
in the North American paper container industry between 1870 and 1960. Innovative firms 
employed intellectual property rights to protect their specialized markets, but over time 
new entrants always gained market share. The maturation of technology, imitation, 
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222 Daly, The Corrugated Container Industry, 74-75; Robert Gair Today, 13. 
 120 
expiration of intellectual property rights, and the law were the central dynamic forces that 
undermined firms’ attempts to maintain barriers of entry over a long period of time. As 
the leading specialized firms lost their ability to control specific market segments through 
patents, they often responded by creating new markets with innovative new products. 
The history of the North American paper container industry between 1870 and 
1960 is a story of continuously diminishing role of differentiation for corporate strategy. 
Although the paper container industry displayed tremendous capacity for new product 
innovations over a long period of time, by the 1950’s its industrial organization did not 
foster radical technological departures. The specialized, large, vertically integrated paper 
container firms resembled each other, and were more likely to compete by improving 
production efficiency than product differentiation. In contrast, radical technological 
departures propelled two European firms, Swedish Tetra-Pak and English Smurfit-Stone, 
into global paper packaging giants by the late twentieth century. 
 121 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
SULPHATE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, 1850-1960 
 
 
 
The most significant structural and technological change in the North American 
pulp and paper industry in the twentieth century was the replacement of the sulphite 
process as the dominant pulping technology by the sulphate process. Between 1914 and 
1959, the annual production of sulphate pulp increased over 232-fold from 53 tons to 
over 12,000 - averaging thirteen percent annual growth over almost half a century. This 
growth accounted for most of the expansion of whole U.S. pulp and paper industry, as the 
share of sulphate pulp from the national annual production increased from about two per 
cent to almost 60 within the same period. This particular industrial evolution involved 
complex dynamic forces, such as innovation, relocation, consolidation, and vertical 
integration and disintegration, which are fundamental for our understanding how 
industries behave over a long period of time. 
Technological breakthroughs punctuated the long-term growth of the sulphate 
industry, and distinct periods of industry transition exhibited different mechanisms and 
speeds of diffusion of innovation. The history of the North American sulphate industry 
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offers an analysis of reciprocal relationships between dynamics of diffusion of 
technological innovation and its sources. Indeed, during rapid bursts of growth the locus 
of innovation shifted constantly within the complex and large industrial organization that 
included the community of specialized manufacturers that built the pulp and paper 
machines, and the ones that ran them.223 
 
Table 5-1. Wood Pulp Production in the United States by Grade, 1909-1959 
(Thousand tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Grade  1909 1914 1919 1929 1939 1947 1959 
Ground Wood 1,179 1,294 1,519 1,638 1,445   2,050   2,883 
Sulphite 1,018 1,151 1,420 1,689 1,946   2,773   2,442 
Soda    299    348    411    521     442     491      410 
Sulphate   na      53    120    911 2,963   5,355 12,317 
Total* 2,496 2,893 3,518 4,863 6,993 11,917 20,933 
 
Sources: Manufacturers, 1919. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1923, 
558; Census of Manufactures 1947. Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1949, 318; Biennal Census of Manufactures 1931. Washington: Government 
Printing Office 1931, 487; Census of Manufactures 1958. Vol. II.. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office 1960, 26A-12. 
*Note that Total Wood Pulp includes specialty wood pulps, such as semi-chemical and 
defibrated pulp, not given here. 
 
Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the industry’s long-term evolution, until 
the late 1930’s, was the absence of sustained effort to coordinate technological learning. 
In this sense, the organization of technological learning formed a stark contrast to other 
major segments of the pulp and paper industry. Managers and industry leaders did 
                                                 
223 Theoretical conceptualization of these communities as "technology clusters" and "operational clusters," 
and discussion of literature is offered in David G. McKendrick, Richard F. Doner, Stephan Haggard, From 
Silicon Valley to Singapore. Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Drive Industry. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press 2000, 37-65. The evolution of sulphate and hard disk drive industry 
share surprisingly many features, such as diffusion of innovation, role of mass production, relocation, and 
many others, and for this reason this chapter applies, as well as confirms, several insights of the careful 
examination of co-evolution of industry-wide learning and relocation by McKendrick et al. 
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attempt to coordinate many aspects of the expanding sulphate industry, but failed to 
consider the internalization and control of underlying technology. The managers of 
leading North American pulp and paper firms had done so successfully in the case of 
other technologies, such as sulphite pulp, napkins, feminine hygiene products, 
newsboard, paper boxes, bags, and many others. Instead, the leading sulphate pulp and 
paper firms relied largely on external sources of innovation, and the industry became 
mired in enduring over- investment into new capacity and price depression. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, the North American sulphate industry 
was patterned by strong regional differences and inter-regional competition. The nascent 
industry arrived originally from Scandinavia to the continent through Canada, but 
practically disappeared from there while reaching a considerable size in the U.S. Lake 
States by 1920. The growth of the U.S. industry took off with the emergence of Southern 
mass production in the late 1920’s. As a result, sulphate firms constituted very different 
industrial organizations in the Lake States, South, and Pacific Coast in terms of 
technological capabilities and factor endowments. Within this setting, regional industrial 
organizations influenced greatly how managers chose to cope with simultaneous 
expansion and over-capacity. 
Inter-regional competition was underpinned by innovation, and continental 
concentrations of sulphate mills embodied very different systems of innovation until the 
1950's. Although radical technological departures retired other pulp processes and older 
sulphate equipment rapidly and repeatedly, different regional industrial organizations 
embodied relatively distinct technological styles, and therefore adopted innovations 
selectively and asymmetrically when seeking competitive advantage. First when a small 
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pool of highly specialized sulphate process machinery supplier firms assumed managerial 
control of the underlying technological knowledge after World War II, new innovations 
diffused rapidly and evenly throughout the global industry. The leading North American 
sulphate firms responded by developing similar continental strategies and structures 
relatively rapidly, and ended the era of regional differences. 
 
Early Development of Sulphate Wood Pulp Technology 
The discovery of “artificial” soda, sodium carbonate, by Nicolas LeBlanc laid the 
foundation for the modern sulphate pulping processes in the late nineteenth century. In 
1775, a reward offered by the French Academy of Science prompted LeBlanc to patent a 
process for making caustic soda ash from common salt. The patent described a process 
consisting of mixing of one part sodium sulphate, one part limestone or chalk, and one-
half part charcoal that was introduced to a separately fired reverbatory furnace. The mass 
was raked through the furnace, and the resulting thick material was cooled and solidified 
to a “black ash” containing nearly one-half of sodium carbonate. In subsequent 
refinements, the carbonate was recovered by countercurrent leaching in a series of tanks, 
and from the resulting solution the crude “black salt” could be obtained by evaporation. 
The soda could be purified by recrystallization, or sodium hydroxide could be obtained 
by causticizing the carbonate solution with lime. The LeBlanc process constituted the 
basic method to manufacture soda ash with high sodium sulphide content until the 
1880’s, after which the ammonia-soda process and subsequently developed direct 
production of caustic in electrolytic chloralkali cells replaced it. The availability of the 
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LeBlanc soda process provided impetus for new chemical industries that employed soda, 
among them the wood pulp industry. 224 
As the rag shortage increased the price of paper in mid-nineteenth century 
Europe, quite a few entrepreneurs began to examine how to apply centuries old method 
of using alkalines to separate cellulose fibers from other nonwoody plants to wood pulp 
processes.225 Hugh Burgess and Charles Watt first discovered how to use alkalies in the 
pulping of wood. Their English patents in 1851 described a soda pulp process that 
consisted of boiling wood in caustic alkali at high temperature, and made specific use of 
the soda ash produced by the LeBlanc process. The soda pulp process did not become a 
commercial success in England, however. The inventors secured an American patent in 
1854, and opened a mill in Pennsylvania. Burgess and Watt used aspen to make soda 
pulp that contained neither a long or strong fiber, but when mixed with rag pulp produced 
good quality writing paper with a pricing advantage. Relying on a patent monopoly, they 
incorporated the American Wood Paper Company and constructed a large-scale pulp and 
paper mill in Manayunk, Pennsylvania, in 1863. This prompted the emergence of soda 
pulp-writing paper industry in Pennsylvania, but difficulties with the pulping process 
arrested its expansion. 226 
The most severe impediment for the diffusion of soda pulp process was the high 
cost of soda ash, the source of alkaline for the process. In order to improve the 
                                                 
224 Roy P. Whitney, “Introduction,” in Roy P. Whitney (ed), Chemical Recovery in Alkaline Pulping 
Processes. TAPPI Monograph Series No. 32. New York: TAPPI 1968, 1-14. 
225 Roy P. Whitney, “Introduction,” 3. 
226 Dard Hunter, Papermaking. The History and Technique of An Ancient Craft . New York: Dover 
Publications 1978 (1947), 390-391; Royal S. Kellogg, Pulpwood and Wood Pulp in North America. New 
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productivity of the process, entrepreneurs focused their efforts on the recovery of 
chemicals from the pulping process waste liquor. The soda process produced chemical 
waste called the weak black liquor, and it could potentially be processed into reusable 
soda ash. Initial attempts towards this end at American soda pulp mills followed closely 
the LeBlanc technology. Fluid weak black liquor was processed with external heat into a 
“black ash,” which was cooled and leached to give a sodium carbonate solution. This 
process consumed external energy to recover sodium carbonate, and a 60 per cent 
recovery of original chemicals was considered good yield. These improvements were not 
sufficient to increase the adoption of the soda process significantly. The main reason 
limiting its acceptance continued to be the high price of sodium carbonate, as well as the 
energy intensity of the chemical recovery process.227 
The idea of improved economics of the soda process induced a broad-based effort 
to develop improved chemical recovery system during the nineteenth century. Many of 
the improvements were borrowed from other chemical industries. Soda pulp mills 
replaced the old reverbatory chemical recovery furnaces with rotary ones that had been 
pioneered in the LeBlanc soda industry. Of equal importance was the transfer of new 
evaporation technology from the sugar industry to the pulp industry in the late nineteenth 
century, as these direct contact evaporators improved the recovery yield significantly. 
These improvements mattered little in the U.S., where the relatively mature ground wood 
and sulphite pulp technology attracted the attention of the leading pulp and paper firms. 
In the U.S, the soda pulp industry was largely confined to Pennsylvania, where mill 
                                                                                                                                                 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1923, 35; Lyman Horace Weeks, A History of Paper-Manufacturing 
in the United States, 1860-1917. New York 1969 (1917), 227-231. 
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owners struggled to improve the efficiency of the recovery process. The wide adoption of 
a new innovation, direct production of caustic in electrolytic chloralkali cells, in the 
1890’s was critical for the industry’s continued competitiveness.228 
Relative immaturity of technology and high cost of chemicals limited the 
diffusion soda pulping process, but a small technological community of inventors 
believed in the possibility of commercially viable alkaline wood pulp process and 
continued to innovate. American Asahel K. Eaton obtained in 1870 a patent for 
remarkable improvement of his earlier 1864 patent for the soda process. Eaton substituted 
more expensive sources of alkali with oxysulphide of calcium or sulphide sodium that 
were considered a waste, and therefore relatively cheap. The patent claimed to disclose 
for the first time the sulphide sodium as a solvent in wood pulp, but its description of 
chemical details of the pulping process were rather vague. This discovery went unnoticed 
by the North American pulp and paper industry, whose managers were preoccupied with 
the adoption of the groundwood and sulphite pulp processes. Besides potential 
technological problems, the Eaton process could not be adapted to the production of 
white newsprint, writing, or book paper, and there was simply little or no demand for 
it.229 
In Europe, the disclosure of similar invention triggered rapid structural change 
and expansion in the pulp and paper industry in the 1880’s. In an attempt to get around 
previous patents on boiling process with sodium sulphate, Carl F. Dahl invented in 1879 
in Danzig, Germany, an alkaline wood pulp process that drastically reduced the cost, 
                                                 
228 Thomas M. Grace, “Perspectives on Recovery Technology,” 45-47. In Thomas M. Grace (ed), Forum 
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expanded the range of adaptable tree species, and produced a new kind of extremely 
strong paper. The process substituted traditional sources of alkaline in the pulping 
process with sodium sulphate, which was considered essentially as a waste. Dahl’s 
American patent from 1884 described in great detail the whole process, the recovery of 
sodium salts from the waste liquors, and made very broad and fundamental claims for 
having disclosed a distinct sulphate process.230 
The basic sulphate wood pulp process discovered by Eaton and Dahl could be 
adapted to the cooking of range of a different kinds of wood pulps, most importantly 
wood species with high resin content that did not adapt to the groundwood or sulphite 
process, such as the pine. The immediate success and rapid diffusion of Dahl's pulp 
process was due to its innovative characteristics. The patented pulp process became 
known as the “Kraft process” according to the German word for "strong." The process 
involved the intentional undercooking of pulp in order to produce a very dark, 
unbleachable, but extremely strong stock that enabled the manufacture of papers with 
superior strength. The kraft pulp consisted of the heaviest possible individual fibres, 
which were hydrated into extreme condition, making the pulp very “wet” or “slow” in the 
language of paper makers. Such pulp readily found many applications in the Europe, such 
as industrial wrapping papers.231 
These wood pulp process highlighted the divergent evolutionary paths of the 
North American and European pulp and paper industries. The kraft process diffused 
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rapidly in the European pulp and paper industry, where soda pulp mills were widely 
retooled into the new technology. Such structural change was in particular rapid in the 
pine rich Scandinavian countries, and Germany. In North America, on the contrary, 
discovery of the kraft process went unnoticed. Although a host of reasons, including the 
competitive structure of groundwood and sulphite industry, contributed to this, the most 
fundamental reason was the organization of the Pennsylvania soda pulp industry. These 
firms supplied almost exclusively writing paper markets, and the kraft process allowed 
only the production of dark, colored, and stiff papers, such as cover and industrial 
wrapping papers. The absence of large pine and spruce stands may have contributed, too, 
although plenty of other adaptable tree species, such as hemlock, were available in the 
region. Thus in the North America, firms and industries with pre-existing capabilities that 
would have supported the early adoption of the kraft process, did not do so.232 
Once the North American pulp and paper industry begun to adopt the sulphate 
process in the early twentieth century, it constituted a distinct and new nascent industry. 
Characteristically, the role of individual entrepreneurs and engineers was central, as the 
skills and knowledge circulated most efficiently with people. In 1907, Norwegian Olai 
Bache-Wiig constructed the first North American kraft mill at East Angus, Quebec for 
Brompton Paper & Pulp Company. Three years later, Wiig introduced the industry to 
Wisconsin by establishing Wausau Sulphate Fibre Company. American Joseph H. 
Wallace traveled and learned the kraft process in Sweden in 1906, and subsequently 
organized a commercial size experimental run with the Southern pine there. Encouraged, 
he incorporated the Southern Paper Company in 1912,and built the pioneering Southern 
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kraft pulp mill at Moss Point, Mississippi, that was acclaimed for producing kraft paper at 
lowest cost in the world. Largely due to distance to major markets and Northern 
competition, the Southern kraft industry did not take off until roughly a decade later. 
Although the production of sulphate pulp increased rapidly during the following decade, 
in the context of giant sulphite and groundwood operations it amounted to a small vibrant 
industry at best. The emerging industry concentrated to Quebec in Canada, and in the 
United States in particular to Wisconsin and other Lake States.233 
In Canada the annual production of sulphate increased from 33,000 tons in 1912 
to 188,000 tons in 1920. In the United States the annual production more than doubled 
between 1914 and 1919 to 120,000 tons, but this was a tiny slice of over three and half 
million tons of annual wood pulp volume. In the context of an industry dominated by 
capital intensive large-scale enterprises, such as International Paper Company, these high 
growth rates of the minuscule sulphate industry carried little importance.234 
Managers of the leading pulp and paper firms followed corporate strategies built 
around economies of scale, and recognized little or no incentives to examine or invest in 
the kraft process. A number of North American authors argued that the production of 
kraft pulp that would equal the quality of European pulp was impossible, and it was more 
convenient to import it. The relative quality of kraft pulp did not constitute a fundamental 
issue for managerial decisions about pulp processes, whereas practical reasons, such as 
potential markets and efficiency of production, were decisive. Problems with the kraft 
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technology in the early twentieth century severely constrained attempts to achieve true 
economies of scale. In 1908, one of the most prominent paper engineers in the early 
twentieth century North America, J. A. De Cew, argued that the great potentiality of the 
kraft process was frustrated by lack of economies of scale in the machinery:235 “An 
American objection to the kraft process is the apparent necessity for the use of the 
Kollergang [machine used for the final separation of the fibres and the first stage of fibre 
hydration], which apparatus is not in favor on this continent on account of its small 
capacity in proportion to the power required.”236 
The European origin of kraft machinery was manifest in vocabulary and 
technological style of the industry. While necessary machinery for almost every phase of 
the kraft process embodied the European style, limiting economies of scale, this was most 
evident in the heart of the kraft process, the chemical recovery cycle. Rapid early 
diffusion of the kraft process had provided European papermakers with a sustained lead 
in the knowledge of sulphate pulping, and they produced most new machinery. The 
expiration of fundamental patents gave an important boost for technological learning in 
the kraft pulp technology by 1900. A continued effort to improve the sulphate process 
followed the expiration of the Dahl patents, but inventors were not able claim broad 
intellectual property rights on the process anymore. Technological learning in the 
sulphate process focused upon the recovery of chemicals, and indeed engineers 
conceptualized the whole sulphate process as revolving around the recovery cycle. 
                                                 
235 In a rule the product of the pioneering North American kraft mills was compared to the European kraft 
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Around 1900, the kraft process had two distinct advantages over the prevalent 
chemical pulp technology, the sulphite process. The possibility reclaiming chemicals 
from the sulphate process presented potentially a very considerable saving, and fueled 
invention and adoption. Second, the sulphate process lent itself to woods with high resin 
content, and expanded widely the range of tree species - most importantly the pine - that 
could be pulped economically. The sulphite process was limited to the non-resinous 
woods, spruce being the major source of cellulose for the industry. Territorial expansion 
of the kraft industry was not a mechanical replication of existing basic production 
processes, however, and engaged firms into a comprehensive learning experience as they 
adapted basic sulphate pulping technologies into different biological environments.237 
A severe disadvantage of the sulphate process was its intense odor, described 
typically as “intolerable.” The smell was formed during the cooking and recovery 
process, and polluted large areas close to a mill. Indeed, this was considered a serious 
enough nuisance to attempt to limit the industry to sparsely inhabited regions. 
Environmental concerns also included stream pollution, as the discharged chemicals 
often had destructive effect on downstream ecology of rivers, but this applied to sulphite 
and soda mills, too. Improved treatment of chemical waste liquors potentially reduced 
these severe social costs, and established the other important incentive –along with the 
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improved economic efficiency– to focus research and development efforts on the 
recovery cycle of the kraft pulp process.238 
The chemical recovery cycle and its energy efficiency constituted the critical 
economical bottlenecks of the kraft process. The Kraft industry had improved the energy 
efficiency of the process by replacing older reverbatory furnaces with rotary ones, but 
these required heavy maintenance. The chemical processes deteriorated equipment 
quickly, and necessary maintenance of the brickwork alone destroyed the economics of 
low-capacity standard rotary recovery units. The flow of recovery process was also 
relatively slow and labor intensive. Black ash discharged from a rotary recovery furnace 
was mixed manually with salt cake and slabwood before being shoveled into the 
smelter.239 
The energy efficiency of turn of the century rotary furnaces was poor, too. These 
rotary furnaces consumed auxiliary fuel, and substantial losses were suffered during the 
discharge of black ash from the furnace. Rotary furnaces could not burn all carbon in the 
black liquor, and discarded black ash with considerable content of unburned carbon. The 
relatively uncontrolled infiltration of air into the discharge worsened the loss of heat. 
Lastly, rotary recovery furnaces were vulnerable to destructive, violent explosions that 
disrupted mill operations, and injured and killed labor.240 
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Figure 5-1. Technological structure of the sulphate pulping process cycle. The 
pulp digesting process itself occurs during the phases one and two, and the recovery cycle 
during the phases three and six. This textbook was prepared under the direction of the 
Joint Executive Committee on Vocational Education Representing the Pulp and Paper 
Industry of the United States and Canada, and summarized North American technological 
learning in the industry. Source: Karl M. Thorsen, “Manufacture of Sulphate Pulp,” 4. In 
J. Nevell Stephenson (ed), The Manufacture of Pulp and Paper. A Textbook of Modern 
Pulp and Paper Mill Practice. Vol. III. 2nd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 
1927, Section 6. 
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Efforts to reduce maintenance, eliminate the use of auxiliary heat and explosions, 
and to improve liquor evaporation and heat recovery constituted the major lines of 
engineering work in the kraft pulp industry during the early twentieth century. Europeans 
possessed evidently superior capabilities in the kraft process, and occupied the frontier of 
technological learning. Technological learning in kraft process in the early 1900’s 
centered upon the improvement of evaporation in the recovery cycle, since this held the 
key to energy and chemical efficiency. Black liquor –which contained all the chemicals 
used in the cooking– was manufactured from weak black liquor by evaporation. Early 
installations followed the idea of direct evaporation, in which the liquor was held in a pan 
under hot gas. In an effort to improve heat efficiency, Carl Dahl had constructed a steam-
boiler arrangement that used auxiliary fuel for the evaporation. In the 1890’s, chemical 
engineers realized that it was technologically possible to recover fuel in addition to the 
chemicals, if the evaporator was run like a gas generator. Such improvements required 
papermakers often to learn from the experience of other industries.241 
The North Americans had the advantage of learning of evaporator techniques 
developed in the nineteenth century sugar industry, where economies of scale were 
emphasized. American Homer F. Yaryan had invented a multiple effect evaporator to 
concentrate sugar liquors, and construction based on his patent became almost universal 
in the North American soda, and early kraft pulp industry. Developed into steam-heated 
multiple-effect evaporators, the Yaryan was a horizontal, rotary liquor- in-tube 
construction that enabled almost energy self-sufficiency of the recovery cycle. The 
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technology peaked in the years immediately following 1900, when Americans turned 
their attention to the European evaporator technology again.242 
The Europeans hardly ever employed the Yaryan evaporators. Instead, the leading 
Norwegian and Swedish mills relied on rotating disc evaporators. Josef E. Hedin 
summarized his experience of running them in his North American kraft mill when he 
stated that the Scandinavian evaporators “have high efficiency, need very little repairing, 
and work practically without the use of coal.”243 His bold claims that disc evaporators 
were far superior to the conventional Yaryan were situated within the broader phenomena 
of technological learning in the kraft pulp technology around 1910. After years of 
experimentation, engineers agreed that vertical rotary digesters of 1,000 cubic feet 
represented best practice in the industry. They were more expensive than other designs, 
but paid back several times a year by giving better black liquor, better pulp, and by 
saving time, Hedin concluded in his important review. 
Such assessments summarized the early North American learning experience 
from running kraft mills, and importantly presaged the efforts to innovate during the next 
decade. Improvements in the evaporator technology were matched by a number of other 
significant innovations in the kraft process. Concurrent maturation of many, if not all 
technologies involved, induced a more comprehensive chemical engineering approach to 
the kraft pulp process around 1910. During the following decade, North American 
managers and engineers effectively Americanized the kraft pulp technology, as they 
focused upon throughput and efficiency. However, increased technological learning in 
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the North American kraft pulp industry occurred in the absence of any significant 
managerial coordination as experimentation occurred mostly at scattered mills and 
relatively small pulp and paper firms. 
 
Regional Learning in the Kraft Process, 1910-1927 
Technological learning in the kraft process technologies remained dispersed at 
various North American locations between 1910 and 1927. This organization of research 
and development shaped deeply the diffusion of innovation and direction of inventive 
activity until the late 1930’s. The engineering community embodied the most important 
mechanisms to coordinate technological learning at the early stages of emerging kraft 
pulp industry in the North America between 1910 and 1927. The Technical Association 
of the Pulp and Paper Industry (TAPPI hereafter) was established in 1914, and it early on 
appointed a small committee on sulphate technology to review and diffuse innovations. 
The committee did not engage in a systematic research and development program, as 
other TAPPI committees did in the case of technologies deemed more important for the 
industry's competitiveness, such as standardization and sulphite pulp. In this context an 
industry outsider from chemical engineering conceived an invention that trigge red a 
renewed wave of learning in the kraft pulp process during the 1910’s.244 
The chemical engineering approach to the kraft process and its recovery cycle 
reached an important threshold during the winter of 1909 and 1910, when Hugh K. 
Moore, Ph.D. was invited to renovate and reconstruct a sulphate mill in La Tuque, P.Q., 
Canada. Moore had no prior experience in the sulphate process, but had built a reputation 
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with his work and publications within the American chemical engineers. Cooperating 
eventually almost for a decade with the Brown Company, he began his work by 
improving and perfecting the efficiency of the process. Moore’s most lasting and 
significant contribution to the kraft process was the patented construction of a new type 
of recovery furnace that marked a radical departure from the standard rotary furnace. 
Moore and his collaborators discovered a method to spray black liquor into a stationary 
furnace, and greatly improved the chemical recovery and heat efficiency of the 
process.245 
Moore detailed his experiences at the La Tuque mill in an article eight years later 
in Metallurgical and Chemical Engineering. Although an obvious marketing pitch for the 
Brown Company’s proprietary kraft technology, the article demonstrated a stylized 
chemical engineering approach to the process. Moore claimed that fifteen specific 
technological problems in the recovery cycle had attracted his attention in 1909, 
including the loss of alkali, turpentine, and sludge, and the poor energy economy of the 
process that culminated in every digester batch discharging 18,000 lb. steam in the 
atmosphere. The graphic descriptions of the potential losses, labor intensive phases of the 
process and maintenance of equipment echoed frustrations at every North American kraft 
mill. The Brown Company equipment promised a remedy, and Moore claimed as the 
“tangible results” of his process:246 
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We have been enabled to produce over 1600 horse-power from our liquor in 
addition to recovering the heat generated in the gas producer. We saved all hour 
hospital bills and damages arising from explosions, we reduced the repair bills in 
the furnaces enormously, we saved all the repairs on incinerator and disk 
evaporators and the power required to run the same, we saved about 60 men’s 
labor in various departments and, above all, got an even, uniform production 
quality never obtained before. In addition to the above it alone was the means of 
increasing the production many times.247 
 
Moore managed at Brown Company a research and development effort between 
1911 and 1916 that constituted a technological watershed for the kraft pulp process. His 
patent in 1915 defined a complete sulphate pulp waste liquor treatment system, whose 
technological heart consisted of the so-called “explosion process.” In this process lignin 
liquor, recovered from the sulphate waste, was sprayed into extremely hot furnace and 
“exploded.” As a result of the occurring efficient burning, the sulfate of soda fell on the 
furnace floor and was combusted. The discovery certainly improved the economy of the 
recovery cycle, but it was plagued by many technological problems. Moore’s promises of 
an immediate bonanza proved exaggerated, but his discovery certainly redirected efforts 
to improve the recovery process.248 
The “explosion process" emphasized that the key to economically efficient kraft 
pulp mill was improved chemical recovery, typically characterized by experienced 
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papermakers as the “weak spot of the sulphate industry, where money can be made and 
just as easily lost.”249 Potential improvement of the recovery cycle of kraft pulp process 
relieved North American industry’s dependence on European imports, and in particular 
from the disturbances caused by the World War I. The war had cut off German supply of 
kraft to the North America, and greatly decreased Scandinavian imports, too. The kraft 
pulp consumption had peaked in the Germany, where the search for strengthened material 
independence had fueled a range of product innovations in kraft papers. For these reasons 
the price of kraft pulp had boomed, and by 1917 it traded some 20 per cent higher than 
sulphite pulp that was much more expensive process. The First World War, by 
redirecting traditional sulphate trade flows, established new incentives and reinforced old 
ones for the North American kraft pulp firms to intensify efforts to improve the chemical 
recovery technology. 250 
Such incentives awoke the interest of leading large-scale pulp and paper 
enterprises into the kraft pulp process, and they began to examine its potential. Managers 
of the leading firms, such as IP, attached new strategic meaning to the kraft pulp process 
between 1915 and 1925. Structural change was precipitated by IP's decision to retool 
three plants of its wholly owned Continental Paper & Bag Mills to use kraft pulp 
purchased from the open markets. In 1919, IP acquired a small sulphate pulp mill in 
Maine that used northern timber. The decision triggered a long and gradual process of 
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industrial change between 1925 and 1940, by which large scale vertically integrated firms 
occupied the sulphate pulp and paper industry. 251 
The combined efforts of paper makers evidently accelerated the rate of innovation 
and matured kraft pulp technology. Moore’s invention was critical in this sense, but it 
also paradoxically set the kraft technology on two very different paths of development. 
The North American kraft pulp industry became split into the proponents of stationary 
recovery furnace, and those who looked to improve the old rotary furnace. This 
technological division was manifest between 1916 and 1935, when the North American 
kraft paper industry was divided into these two schools of chemical recovery technology. 
They shared a belief in reduced environmental pollution and improved efficiency of the 
process, but provided very different technological solutions.252  
The major difference between the rotary and stationary furnaces was their 
adaptability to economies of scale, and the pre-existing capabilities of firms predicted 
how their managers regarded the potential of the two alternatives. From the beginning 
Moore and his followers argued that the maintenance of the rotary furnaces was too 
costly, and that its size and capacity was limited by inherent technological factors. Rotary 
furnaces required the use of too dense black liquor, they argued, whereas in stationary 
furnaces efficient burning was achieved with more liquid liquors. Stationary furnaces, 
however, suffered from severe technological problems of their own. Among the chief 
shortcomings of the design was that the method of spraying liquor created poor heat 
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economy. This was made worse by an inadequate boiler design that proved difficult to 
improve. For these reasons stationary recovery furnaces received only relatively little 
attention before 1935, and were advanced in relative secrecy by only a few committed 
people.253 
Between 1923 and 1927, Charles E. Wagner improved significantly the stationary 
furnace by controlling the supply of air, and thereby developing the heat economy of the 
process. He is regarded as having fundamentally improved the stationary furnace, and for 
having established that a proper boiler arrangement was the key to a successful recovery 
cycle. Wagner himself was unable to install a boiler successfully, however, until he began 
collaboration with George H. Tomlinson in 1926. Together the men built a stationary 
recovery furnace at the soda pulp mill of Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd., in Cornwall, 
Ontario. Later Tomlinson argued that Wagner’s design led to a “complete and absolutely 
failure.”254 The men parted, but Tomlinson continued to improve the stationary furnace, 
and eventually built several improved ones for Howard Smith Paper Mills.255 
The Cornwall mill was the first to embody the fundamental principles 
characteristic of modern stationary recovery furnaces eventually introduced successfully 
in the late 1930’s, and which quickly became the industry standard. The early Tomlinson 
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furnaces suffered from heavy maintenance costs and poor heat economy, and sulphate 
and soda firm managers preferred established stationary furnace design. Tomlinson 
remained at the employment of Howard Smith Paper mills that guarded improvements in 
its processes. In contrast, Wagner was employed by the New York City contract 
engineering firm J. O. Ross Engineering Corporation, and worked for the relative free 
diffusion of his type of stationary furnace. Despite his efforts, stationary furnaces were 
adopted only on rather limited scale in the North America.256 
The eventual emergence of stationary furnaces as the industry standard depended 
on learning from innovations introduced first in rotary furnace design. Most important of 
these was a new spray method that facilitated the tremendous improvement of the energy 
efficiency of the recovery cycle between 1900 and 1930, when it was improved from 
consuming external energy of 5 million Btu/ton to a surplus of equal size. In 1923, 
William M. Carey invented a method to spray very concentrated liquor into rotary 
furnaces while installing a unit for Gulf States Paper Company at Braithwaite, Louisiana, 
thereby enabling significant new economies of scale. The efficiency of burning increased 
with the degree of density of lignin liquor, and this discovery was adapted to stationary 
furnaces, too. The liquor was fed into stationary furnaces through a spray nozzle, and 
allowed potentially larger volumes than stationary furnaces, into which the liquor was 
introduced in more solid form. In 1926, the Braitwaite mill was relocated to Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama, and there Carey built improved rotary recovery furnaces that used a 
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concentration of 70 per cent liquids.257 The pace of innovation in the kraft recovery cycle 
accelerated during the early 1920’s, and critically underpinned the tremendous expansion 
of the U.S. production of kraft pulp after 1925.258 
Organization of the kraft pulp industry shaped the direction of research and 
development in chemical recovery processes. The industry was populated with small 
units when compared to the leading sulphite and groundwood pulp mills, and this 
industrial organization fueled a continued belief in the viability of rotary recovery 
furnace, as well as led managers to downplay that its scale economies were inherently 
limited. Between 1915 and 1935, most North American kraft mills trusted improved 
rotary furnaces. In the United States Adolph W. Waern improved the Swedish style 
rotary furnaces at the mill of D. J. Murray Manufacturing Company in Wausau, 
Wisconsin.259 Other improvements to rotary furnaces in the early 1920’s included the 
Sandberg-Sundblad, de Verdier, and Carey rotaries. This sustained and industry-wide 
wave of technological learning was the main reason for relatively quick improvement of 
the efficiency of chemical recovery cycle. The task posed a formidable technological 
challenge, noted by the leading pulp wood expert in the North America, Royal S. 
Kellogg, in his 1923 authoritative textbook. Kellogg argued that the sulphate recovery 
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systems were universally known to be expensive, and “few have proved commercially 
profitable.”260 
 
Table 5-2. Number of Sulphate Pulp Digesters, Average Digester Capacity, 
and Total Digester Capacity (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) in the United States, 1914-1954*. 
 
Year Digesters Average Unit Capacity U.S. Production Capacity 
1914  23   3,383       77.820 
1919  59   4,288     252,995 
1921  70   3,755     262,821 
1923 101   4,115     415,628 
1925 114   4,365     497,647 
1927 122   5,709     649,490 
1929 113   7,517     849,400 
1931 183   7,155   1,309,400 
1937 268 12,569   3,368,460 
1947 387 15,081   5,836,464 
1954 622 32,275 11,151,218 
 
Sources: Census of Manufactures 1914. Vol II. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office 1919, 618. Biennal Census of Manufactures 1927. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office 1930, 568; Biennnal Census of Manufacturers 1931. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1935, 488; Census of Manufacturers: 
1947. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1949, 321; Census of 
Manufactures 1954. Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1955, 26A-
31. 
*Note that Total U.S. Capacity is calculated maximum throughput, and differs 
from the actual annual sulphate pulp production. 
 
The average capacity of sulphate digesters increased significantly during the 
1920s, manifesting the stabilization of pulp process technology and diffusion of 
innovations. Although the rated capacity experienced a slight decrease around the post-
World War I depression, the maturation of technology boosted over 30 per cent increase 
in the average capacity of sulphate digesters between 1919 and 1927. As is evident from 
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the Table 5-2, new scale economies occurred in the sulphate pulp process first after 1925, 
however. In 1929, 114 digesters produced 72 per cent more sulphate pulp than 113 in 
1925. The size of sulphate mills increased as the necessary technology, most importantly 
the chemical recovery cycle, matured. 
In North America, Wisconsin evolved to be the main site of technological 
learning in the sulphate process technology between 1915 and 1925. The early kraft pulp 
industry had concentrated into Wisconsin, which produced roughly half of the annual 
U.S. production of about 50 short tons in 1914, and one third of the 120 short tons in 
1919.261 Wausau Sulphate Fibre Company was one of pioneering kraft firms, and had 
installed a second paper machine at its vertically integrated kraft mill by 1913.262 The 
U.S. Forest Service had an experimental station for the study of pulp processes at 
Wausau, and the Pulp and Paper section of its Forests Products Laboratory in Madison 
was headed by Dr. Otto Kress, one of the leading paper scientists of his time and later 
instrumental for the establishment of Institute of Paper Chemistry in Appleton. These 
research institutes carried out research and development in cooperation with the 
University of Wisconsin that supported the local nascent kraft pulp industry, where most 
firms lacked necessary capabilities for such work.263 
Reflecting the increasing local investment into the kraft technology, a few key 
members of the Wisconsin pulp and paper industry established the By-Products Research 
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Association to investigate and advance sulphate pulp processes in October 1923. The 
association contracted professor Alfred H. White from the University of Michigan to 
study recovery processes, and arranged an experimental site at a mill in Ann Arbor. 
Following other similar projects, a new chemical recovery system was installed at the 
kraft mill in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, in 1924. The recovery of by-products from black 
liquor was initially the central goal of the project, but the vice president of Stevens Point 
Pulp and Paper Company, E. G. Goodall, noted how the improved smelting and heat 
economy of the recovery cycle quickly replaced it. Learning by running the experimental 
recovery cycle, Goodall and his associates replaced the original style smelters by a new 
method of low temperature reduction. 264 Goodall explained: “Every one concerned 
recognizes the big advantage of this latter possibility, for the reason that we all know that 
one of the big draw-backs with the sulphate system is the excessive cost of upkeep in 
smelting and incinerating departments, due entirely to the excessive high temperatures 
developed in present day smelting furnaces.”265 
The pioneering $25,000 recovery plant was lost through accidental fire in 1924. 
This forced the association to attract new members, and diffuse the new practices beyond 
the originally rather closed Wisconsin group. In Wisconsin, industrial organization and 
the presence of specialized federal and university research and development units 
supported a broad wave of learning in kraft technology. These factors created the 
situation noted by Thomas M. Grace that the research and development on rotary 
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chemical recovery furnace was relatively public in contrast to the secrecy surrounding 
stationary recovery furnace.266 
Rapid diffusion of kraft pulp innovations propelled industrial relocation in the 
North American pulp and paper industry. The cost and availability of pulp wood in 
traditional industrial regions was a persistent subject of debate. This had been also 
another chief justification for the massive relocation of newsprint capacity from the U.S. 
into Canada. The kraft process was the first pulping technology that could potentially 
utilize on large scale the vast stands of Southern pine, often characterized as “waste,” and 
thus prompted managers to consider a Southern strategy. 267 
Exemplifying this trend and the underlying dynamics, F. L. Moore prepared on 
behalf of northern investors the building of a kraft mill at Houston, Texas in 1922. He 
noted in particular how kraft papers were utilized in many ways not imagined ten years 
earlier, and trusted that they would increasingly replace the Northern sulphite papers. 
Moore himself confessed to be a lay man in papermaking, so he had contracted the 
engineering services of pioneering Joseph H. Wallace. Wallace had followed the example 
of another industrial chemist from the pulp and paper industry, A.D. Little, and launched 
a successful career in contract engineering in the New York City. 268 
The emergence of an independent and distinct industry supplying sulphate pulp 
machinery, technology, and knowledge accelerated the diffusion of innovations, and 
unleashed new competitive forces in the early 1920’s. These changed conditions were 
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recognized by the managers of pioneering American kraft pulp firms, such as the 
Chesapeake Pulp & Paper Company. The company had been incorporated in 1913, and 
built a kraft pulp mill with 22 ton daily capacity at West Point, Virginia. The pulp was 
sold and shipped to buyers, and a Fourdrinier paper machine was integrated into the mill 
first in 1930. Despite its early success, the mill soon demonstrated how rapid 
technological breakthroughs could retire much of the older kraft pulp equipment, and 
foster intensified competition between incumbents and new entrants. Most of the early 
specialized American kraft pulp mills had been established in the early 1910’s, and just 
ten years later they were locked in with equipment of limited capacity and economies of 
scale.269 
Chesapeake exemplified such a development, and its managers responded by 
launching a dramatic expansion and modernization plan in the early 1920’s. The core of 
these actions was the purchase of latest kraft process innovations. In 1922, a $50,000 
Swedish Kamyr pulp dryer was installed at West Point, and according to the company 
historian, drier pulp returned the investment within fifteen months in reduced freight 
costs. Also critical for profitability was modernization of the chemical recovery system. 
In 1923, the company improved the yield of its rotary recovery furnaces by installing a 
$50,000 quadruple-effect evaporating plant supplied by the Massachusetts firm Ernest 
Scott & Company. The adoption of latest technological innovations increased production 
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and productivity for Chesapeake, which reached a daily capacity of 75 tons in 1925, 
bringing the company back into the black after five years of losses.270 
The managers of leading North American pulp and paper firms became 
increasingly aware of opportunities enabled by innovations in the kraft process and 
products around this time. They had observed first hand the surge in use of kraft paper in 
paper boxes and sacks during the World War I. In addition, new process innovations 
enabled economies of scale in kraft pulp production, and thus made it more attractive for 
vertically integrated large scale enterprises. Most importantly, the critical process 
innovations were increasingly commercialized by industry outsiders and thus diffused 
relatively freely. These factors prompted the leading pulp and paper firms to revise the 
place of kraft pulp and paper in their corporate strategies, and to give it a more prominent 
role after 1925. 
While kraft paper firms across the North America forecast increased demand, they 
differed markedly in their strategies. The potential of Southern kraft pulp and paper 
production constituted the most difficult strategic choice for managers without significant 
mills there. IP, with major operations in the North East and Canada, and the leading 
Wisconsin firms considered this strategic question throughout the 1920’s, and arrived at 
contrasting conclusions. IP decided to follow up its early experiments in the South by 
steadily increasing investment into the region, whereas Wisconsin firms played down the 
potential of Southern kraft. William H. Bissell, president of large Wisconsin lumber firm, 
rejected an offer to invest in the South by saying: 
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I want to correct the misapprehension that seems to obtain with so many of our 
Southern friends, evidenced by their repeated statements that there is a shortage of 
raw material in the North for producing pulp and paper. While eventually our 
home supply will doubtless be exhausted, certainly so unless reforestation 
measures are adopted, yet the standing supply of paper and pulp timber in 
Wisconsin and Northern Michigan we feel is amply sufficient to keep all the mills 
going at their present rate of production for more years than any of us can hope to 
survive… As an investment proposition I personally do not look with favor upon 
attempting to establish industries of this kind in the South, or far from our present 
operations. We have here ample water power, an abundant supply of raw material, 
a well trained and efficient supply of labor (both skilled and common) that has 
grown up in this industry. We have also ready access to our important markets at 
a reasonable freight cost, and do not understand that returns from similar 
investments in the South approximate the results we are getting in our home 
state.271 
 
This encapsulated the attitude of Wisconsin forests industry managers effectively. 
Such views emerged from the state's industrial organization and the character of kraft 
process technology in 1924. Managers of small and medium sized firms preferred 
proximity to Mid-West customers, and were skeptical of potential scale economies of 
kraft mills. In addition the kraft wrapping paper business, which was the main product of 
Wisconsin kraft mills, experienced a deepening slump in the mid-1920’s. Statistical 
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surveys by the Wrapping Paper Manufacturer’s Service Bureau confirmed rapidly 
increasing inventories at the 27 member companies in 1924, and that together their mills 
continued to produce over 200 tons a day above orders at hand. Wisconsin pulp and paper 
managers revived cooperation as an attempt to arrest over- investment into new 
capacity. 272 
Firms performed differently, and therefore regarded the potential of cooperation 
differently. Clark D. Everest controlled and managed the powerful Marathon Mills paper 
group with the largest kraft tonnage in Wisconsin, and he was quite confident of his 
operations in 1924. Ridiculing the calls for cooperation by the other members of 
Wrapping Paper Service Bureau, he claimed:273 
 
We have pounded down the cost to a point where I do not believe there is a 
concern in the United States that can make similar grades of paper on a basis of 
cost comparable with ours. At the same time, we have manufactured a little over 
15% more paper over the first sixth month than in 1923… The whole secret of the 
thing is that we have run the mill to production at all times.274 
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Like other managers of the Wisconsin community, Everest dismissed the idea that 
the Southern kraft paper industry could compete with the established capabilities of his 
firm. The Wisconsin logic had made a full circle. Other managers gave the general 
weakness of business and mills as reasons not to invest in the South, and Everest did so 
because of the strength and productivity of his business. 
When Wisconsin industrialists did invest in the South, as Clark D. Everest 
ultimately did on a modest scale, the point was to diversify production and learn new 
product technologies. Everest oversaw the erection of a pulp mill at Laurel, Mississippi, 
that was a stage for feverish search for new cellulose based products. After many years of 
trial and experimentation, George H. Mason introduced at the mill Masonite board, a type 
of pulpwood board. Renamed as Masonite Corporation, the Laurel mill monopolized 
through patents a lucrative share of the construction product business. IP instead 
recognized the South as a site for new competitive mass production of cheap basic grade 
pulp and paper. The organizational evolution of technological learning in the kraft 
process, as well as the unexpected Great Depression, rewarded IP’s strategic choices 
between 1925 and 1940. 
 
Emergence of Southern Mass Production and Industrial Relocation, 1925-1931 
Maturation of technology enabled the introduction of mass production of kraft 
pulp and paper between 1925 and 1931. The rated annual pulp capacity of U.S. sulphate 
digesters increased during this period from half a million tons to 1.3 million (see Table 5-
2. above), and most of the new capacity was built by new entrants to the industry. The 
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North American kraft pulp and paper industry entered a phase of rapid expansion after 
1925, and most of the new capacity was located in the South. 
This shift in the geographical organization of kraft industry revealed and released 
dynamic forces that depicted structural change in the whole North American pulp and 
paper industry. Recovery from the World War I depression and technological innovation 
fueled investment into new equipment and capacity by entrants, as well as incumbent 
kraft firms. The investment boom turned into a self- feeding cycle, as the entry of large 
scale enterprises accelerated the rate of sulphate process and product innovation, which in 
turn gave rise to new economies of scale and markets that attracted new investments by 
rivals. Thus new investment flowed into the industry between 1925 and 1931, financing 
mass production of kraft pulp and paper on an unprecedented scale. As production of 
U.S. kraft wrapping paper increased about 80 per cent between 1925 and 1931 (see Table 
5-3.), the price of Southern kraft wrapping paper declined from five cents per pound for 
F.O.B. paper in 1926 to two and half for delivered paper in 1932.275 
As over-capacity and the Great Depression began to grind down industry profits, 
the focus of technological learning shifted from scale economies to product 
differentiation. Between 1925 and 1940, the share of sulphate pulp from the combined 
U.S. wood pulp production skyrocketed from about five percent to over forty, and this 
occurred in the context of total production of wood pulp increasing from 3.4 million 
metric tons to 6.3. As a result of this boom, a persistent condition of over-capacity 
emerged by the late 1920’s that eased first during the World War II mobilization. In a 
desperate search for an exit from the depressed basic commodity kraft paper grades, 
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managers attached growing importance to product innovations that enabled entry into 
specialty markets less susceptible to imitation, standardization, and downturn in the 
general economic cycle. This shifting managerial strategy innovation by the leading firms 
helps to explain why the kraft boom continued throughout the Great Depression. 276 
 
Table 5-3. Production of Kraft Wrapping Paper in the United States, 1909-
1931 (Tons of 2000 lbs.)  
 
Year Total 
1909   12,661 
1914 109,753 
1919 192,583 
1925 479,975 
1931 867,743 
 
Sources: Manufacturers 1919. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1923, 560; Census of Manufacturers: 1927. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office 1930, 557. 
 
Much of the new capacity was erected during the early stages of Great 
Depression, which amplified the effects of technological innovation. Incumbent 
individual mills with old production technology lost share to new entrants enjoying the 
competitive advantages of new technology that enabled low cost mass production. On the 
other hand this presented classic “catch-22” problem for the industry, because if all mills 
and firms followed this logic, a price destroying over-capacity would ensue. 
The Great Depression, rapid process and production innovation, regional factor 
endowments, and the particular situations of individual firms established the complex 
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framework in which corporate managers attempted to balance short term gains with long 
term strategic choices. The Wisconsin industrialists worried about becoming underdogs 
in the kraft industry, and followed closely developments in the South. Forced to 
reconsider their earlier strategy, the managers of leading Wisconsin firms considered the 
possibility relocating their kraft production. The Kaukauna firm, Thilmany Pulp and 
Paper Company, and Clark D. Everest were first to respond. In 1927, they organized 
Longview Fibre Company, which built an integrated sulphate mill at Longview, 
Washington, with 100 ton daily capacity of pulp and board. It was the third kraft mill in 
the Pacific Coast, following Crown Zellerbach’s 60 ton daily capacity sulphate mill in 
Port Townsend, and the integrated 50 ton pulp and 55 ton paper mills of the St. Helens 
Pulp & Paper Company. Three years after proudly assuring the long term 
competitiveness of the Wisconsin kraft paper industry, Everest importantly revised his 
analysis in 1927:277 
 
I am of opinion that except for wrapping paper purposes, within the next five 
years you will see the South hemmed in about the same relative position as the 
Northern kraft mills and I think the West Coast people will have the same relative 
advantage over the South as the South has now over the North. This will force the 
Northern people into the manufacture of higher grades and specialties where 
strength and folding qualities are a necessity and where deliveries are made on 
comparatively short freight rates… I do not think you will see any further 
development in Kraft either in the Central Western states or on the East Coast. 
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There may probably be some additional developments in the South and 
particularly on the part of International [Paper Company].278 
 
The potential of the Pacific Coast for the expansion of Wisconsin kraft pulp 
depended critically on technological learning, besides the usual factor endowments. 
Analyzing these questions in 1927, Dr. Hugh P. Baker repeated well known facts before 
discussing the need for research and development: Ample supply of cheap timber and 
energy, and labor that equaled costs in the Mid-West and East. Among the Pacific tree 
species the Red Fir best applied to the sulphate pulp process, but its use required 
considerable refinement of the basic technical processes. While Southern kraft mills 
constituted a major competitor, their experience and research work in the sulphate 
pulping of the Southern Pine lent little or no technical support to the Pacific mills. 
Baker’s analysis demonstrated how vulnerable the technological stability of pulp and 
paper making process was. Although firms had relatively symmetric access to basic 
manufacturing technology, specificity of regional biological environments required the 
adaptation, or differentiation, of pulp and paper processes.279 
In the late 1920’s, Everest was deeply engaged in revising his corporate strategy 
in the rapidly changing North American pulp and paper industry. His mills produced 
evenly sulphite and kraft pulp and papers, and he worried increasingly of Canadian 
competition in the sulphite pulp and papers. Canadian newsprint and book paper mills 
                                                                                                                                                 
#40, Folder #2. 
278 Clark D. Everest to Hugh P. Baker, 30 Sept. 1927. DCE Papers, Box #40, Folder #2. Exemplifying how 
rapidly the competitive environment in the kraft paper industry was changing, Everest proposed himself in 
1929 a joint Southern kraft pulp and paper venture to the pioneering Brown Paper Company of Louisiana. 
Clark D. Everest to H. L. Brown, 29 July 1929. DCE Papers, Box#61, Folder #19. 
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undersold easily their U.S. rivals, and it is suggestive of these dynamics that IP had 
relocated all of its newsprint capacity to Canada by the early 1920's. Everest had 
originally responded to the Canadian mass production by focusing on scale economies, 
and by fostering product innovation for specialized markets. In the late 1920’s, he began 
to emulate this strategy in the kraft paper industry. 280 
Reorganization of capital was one central mechanism Everest employed to 
improve efficiency and create strategic capabilities. He controlled a large and diverse 
group of pulp and paper firms, and planned the consolidation of five of his box making 
firms into single holding company to finance the modernization and expansion of the 
Ontonagon Fibre Company kraft mill. Proximity to principal markets and good quality 
were other major competitive advantages of the Wisconsin paper industry. Quality 
required constant improvement, however. An industry analyst warned Everest that 
although the Southern kraft paper continued to be of poor quality, and therefore could not 
substitute the higher priced Wisconsin kraft papers, the Southerners were intensely 
working on the issue.281 
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Strategic and technological challenges associated with kraft production processes 
were amplified by a product innovation, kraft paperboard, in the late 1920’s. Kraft 
paperboard substituted for higher priced paperboards, and over time its success split the 
kraft industry into two distinct industries, paper and paperboard, with different clientele, 
organization, and dynamics. Kraft paperboard gave an important strategic advantage to 
entrants in kraft industry, as they were able to choose to supply different kraft paper or 
paperboard markets. 
The perfecting of kraft paperboard took a considerable effort of research and 
development by specialized firms, and the difficulty of its production prevented many 
from entering its production. Typically, this board was manufactured from straw, jute, 
recycled fiber, and unbleached sulphite pulp. The incentives were strong, however, since 
paperboard had emerged in the 1910’s as the most consumed line. A Milwaukee firm, 
Hummel-Ross Fiber Corporation, pioneered the manufacture of kraft board with a 
cylinder machine in the United States in 1924. The developer of stationary kraft recovery 
furnaces, Brown Paper Company, pioneered the mass production of kraft board on a 
Fourdrinier machine at its mill in Monroe, Louisiana, in 1927.282 
Commenting on these and other developments in pulping technology, Everest 
complained to a fellow manager: “With all the new developments in the chemical 
processes, I am beginning to believe that almost any business is in danger of being 
disrupted overnight. While I do not fear any trouble with cornstalks, or any of those 
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things, someone may blunder on to something in the conversion of wood into pulp which 
will put a good many mills to serious disadvantage.”283 
The mounting over-capacity in basic wrapping paper and other kraft papers 
further facilitated transition into the production of kraft paperboard. Kraft paperboard 
resembled closely the higher priced established grades of paperboard, thus offering 
considerable savings for the shipping container industry at the time of decreasing 
demand. Perhaps for these reasons, the partly Everest controlled Longview Fibre was one 
of the pioneering kraft paperboard mills in the North America. Soon many others 
followed the suit, such as Chesapeake Pulp & Paper Company, and IP. 
An aggressive investment program increased Chesapeake's 75 ton daily capacity 
of kraft pulp in 1925 to over 120 by 1930. At that time the company managers deemed 
forward integration into papermaking necessary for sustained competitiveness. After 
experimenting with the production of both kraft paper and board with their Fourdrinier 
machine, they decided for the latter. This choice presented difficult technological 
problems, and required heavy salesmanship to introduce the new product for users 
accustomed to sulphite or straw board. After considerable engineering and sales work, 
Chesapeake successfully entered the paperboard market.284 
Introduction of kraft paperboard enabled IP to fulfill its Southern strategy just 
when it appeared to be frustrated by the deepening depression. 285 IP followed up its initial 
experiments with kraft pulp and paper by acquiring Bastrop Pulp and Paper Company 
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that had a kraft pulp and paper mill in Bastrop, Louisiana, in 1925. Two years later, the 
company acquired the Louisiana Pulp and Paper Company mill, also at Bastrop. With the 
last acquisition IP assumed the employment of Richard J. Cullen, who had experience of 
managing the building of several Southern kraft mills. When IP organized its Southern 
operations in 1930 into a fully owned subsidiary, Southern Kraft Corporation, Cullen 
became its president, reflecting his central role for IP's Southern strategy. Following the 
division’s success, Cullen eventually became the president of IP itself in 1936. 
After 1925, IP accelerated its expansion in the South, and sent the price of kraft 
downwards. This was facilitated by the dissolving of Southern Kraft Paper Association 
just before the onset of Great Depression, too, as it discontinued cooperative efforts to 
stabilize prices. The market breaker, IP, relied on economies of scale and built in 1928 a 
vertically integrated kraft mill at Camden, Arkansas, and acquired another mill at Moss 
Point, Alabama. The company captured probably one third of the U.S. kraft paper 
markets by 1928, and its managers wanted more. The company projected another large 
kraft pulp and paper mill at Mobile, Alabama, by 1929, and rest of the kraft industry 
watched in despair.286 
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Figure 5-2. Over-capacity and the despair of industry leaders. Source: News Letter of the 
National Kraft Paper Manufacturers’ Association. No. 6, 5 Nov. 1930. David 
Clark Everest Papers, Box #77, Folder #9. Courtesy of the State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin. 
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Figure 5-3. Benefits of coordination and vertical integration. Source: News Letter of the 
National Kraft Paper Manufacturers’ Association. No. 6, 5 Nov. 1930. David 
Clark Everest Papers, Box #77, Folder #9. Courtesy of the State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin. 
 164 
Before this investment, many industry insiders believed that the pulp and paper 
giant had reached its limits. IP pursued between 1920 and 1940 an ambitious product 
diversification program into power utility, specialty papers, Canadian newsprint, and 
Southern kraft. The last one constituted a cash cow that resuscitated the other suffering 
ventures, Thomas Heinrich has concluded in his analysis.287 The situation of the leading 
firm enabled rivals an excellent opportunity of strategizing. Trying to assess the effect of 
the Mobile mill on kraft markets, Wisconsin paper managers believed in the summer 
1929 that Canadian losses prevented IP from lowering any further prices for the Southern 
kraft.288 
IP’s situation also prompted other kraft paper firms to attempt to revitalize 
industry cooperation. Looking to prevent the kraft paperboard industry repeating the 
recent experience of kraft wrapping paper, the Paperboard Industry Association 
appointed a committee to negotiate a cooperative plan among the leading kraft 
paperboard firms on 18th September, 1929. The preventive character of these negotiations 
followed from recent technological breakthroughs in kraft paperboard production that had 
created strong incentives for investment and entry. Paper container industry consumed 
yearly about 1,4 million tons of paperboard, of which roughly 800,000 tons was jute 
board. Kraft paperboard equaled in quality jute board, and sold much cheaper. For this 
reason the annual production of kraft paperboard increased from about 37,000 tons in 
1925 to 165,000 in 1928. The kraft firm managers predicted immediate rush of new 
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investment in Southern kraft board, and the central aim of negotiations was to establish a 
mechanism to coordinate how the new capacity was brought to markets.289 
As the president of American Pulp and Paper Association, Everest had 
unsuccessfully attempted to stabilize the kraft pulp and paper industry in 1927. Two years 
later the industry's managers regarded price stabilization as a more viable option. This 
was because much of the pressure on the paperboard market followed from the increasing 
tendency of kraft paper mills to shift production from depressed wrapping paper into 
paperboard. All the participating firms: Albermarle Paper Company, Bogalusa Paper 
Company, Fibreboard Products Company, Hummell-Ross Company, Longview Fibre 
Company, Mead Paperboard Company, Minnesota & Ontario Paper Company, 
Ontonagon Fibre Company, Brown Paper Mill Company, and IP had done so. However, 
Brown and IP differed in critical aspect from the other firms.290 
IP and Brown were the only major kraft paper companies with significant and 
immediate expansion plans in 1929, a fact that put the rest of industry in a defensive 
position. As participants questioned the sincerity of IP's intentions during the 
negotiations, its managers stepped around the issue. Some assured collegues of their 
willingness to participate in price stabilization, but this was dismissed as misleading 
rhetoric. Rivals based their analysis on the fact that IP had not even begun the production 
of kraft paperboard on a significant scale by 1929, and was potentially considering 
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entry. 291 Eventually in December 1929, J. H. Allen, a manager of IP, stated the true 
position of his firm: “We believe each industry trying to straighten out its own 
situation… We are just getting into production in this line. We are not much association-
minded so far.”292 
The industry leader strategy of IP threw cold water at the hopes of the other kraft 
paper firms to be able to cooperate on production and prices, and yet the managers of the 
smaller kraft firms continued to pursue such a possibility because of the miserable 
business conditions. Clarence J. Schoo, a manager of a box converting plant owned by 
the Longview Fibre Company, rationalized such plans in a letter to Everest in 1930:  
 
The only sound basis, if any, upon which to predicate a curtailment of production, 
as I view it, is to decidedly reduce the total amount of board being produced, each 
participant taking his proportionate share, and in the case of a mill making both 
paper and board on the same machine, the total reduction in production should be 
in terms of quantity of board, and not paper… In other words, there is no justice 
in the Brown Company decreasing the production of wrapping paper for the 
benefit of the wrapping paper industry and in that way defeating the real purpose 
of the movement which is to decrease production of board.293 
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Despair is the appropriate characterization of the state of mind of most North 
American kraft paper managers at this time, with the exception of those who were 
pushing an aggressive Southern strategy. Hundreds of letters and dozens of minutes of 
different kind of meetings attest to an intense attempt to coordinate the existing over-
capacity and the future expansion that was deemed inevitable. The emotional character of 
these attempts arose from the speed and totality of the transformation of underlying 
fundamentals of the industry. New Southern kraft mills threatened the viability of the old 
kraft industry plants in the New England and the Lake States. When IP announced price 
cuts against Everest’s predictions in the early 1930, he interpreted the move as a direct 
attempt “to drive Northern mills out of existence.” At an extreme case this anxiety led to 
negotiations between the leading Northern and Southern mills in 1930 about the 
conditions on which IP, Brown Paper Company, and Bogalusa Paper Company would 
suspend the building of any additional kraft mills.294 The emergence of Southern kraft 
paper mass production had an effect on the Pacific market, too, but was limited by 
transportation costs, aggressive expansion of local mass production, as well as the 
reluctance of local paper business people to allow the entry of a market breaker. To a 
great extent these attitudes arose from the intensified competition between the different 
regional U.S. kraft industries.295 
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Table 5-4. Per Cent of Major Manufacturing Regions From the Total U.S. 
Kraft Paper Production, and Total National Capacity Utilization, 1926-1931 (Tons 
of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Region 1926 1929 1931 
New England  29 23 16 
Middle Atlantic 9 10 20* 
South 22 32 36 
Lake States 34 23 18 
Pacific Coast 5 11 10 
Total Capacity 507,785 945,124 1,296,730 
Actual Production 400,727 697,112    850,000 
 
Source: Statistical Survey of the Kraft Paper Industry, 1926-1929. National Kraft 
Paper Manufacturer’s Association. DCE Papers, Box #77, Folder #7; The Kraft Situation 
and What to Do About it. The Kraft Institute, 3 Nov. 1932. DCE Papers, Box #95, Folder 
#14. 
*Includes Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. 
 
The geographical organization of the U.S. kraft industry shifted significantly 
within only five years between 1926 and 1931, as demonstrated in the Table 5-4. The 
Southern mills increased their share of annual national production from 22 per cent to 36, 
while the share of the Lake States kraft industry declined from 34 per cent to 18 within 
the same period. A statistical report by the Kraft Paper Manufacturer’s Association 
confirmed that the annual capacity of New England and Lake State kraft mills had 
remained unchanged around 100 and 50 tons between 1926 and 1931, respectively, 
whereas the annual capacity in the South had increased with 80 per cent to 164 tons 
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during the same period. The South appeared to absorb a lion share of investments into 
new production capacity. 296 
Industry leaders identified IP as the single most important cause of the deepening 
regional differences. Those contemporaries who had vested interests in cooperation, such 
as the secretary of the kraft paper association, Oliver M. Porter, were sometimes unable 
to identify the underlying dynamic forces, such as technology, and explained industrial 
change with attitudes. Porter wrote to Everest in 1930: 
 
Do you see any immediate likelihood of the kraft paper industry as a whole, or the 
Northern mills as a group, pulling out of the present situation? Is there any 
possibility, in your opinion, of permanent improvement being effected until there 
is a change in the executive personnel and production and selling policies of the 
International Paper Company and, therefore, in the attitude of their competitors 
towards them?297 
 
The corporate strategy of the IP stemmed from its distinct organizational 
capabilities, however, and it's managers considered carefully technology, production, and 
relocation. They were determined to seize the advantages opened by technological 
innovation in the kraft pulp and paper processes, and therefore IP continued to embody 
the dynamic forces driving structural change in the North American pulp and paper 
industry. While the whole American paper industry cried to suspend such forces through 
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cooperation, IP announced a record sized kraft pulp and paper mill to be built at Panama 
City, Florida, by 1931. In addition, the Brown Paper Company accounted installation of 
two new kraft paper machines, too.298 
Voicing the outrage, and astonishment of the pulp and paper industry, the editorial 
of the Paper Industry asked: “What’s the big idea? That’s the question that the whole 
astounded paper trade is asking. Why will any corporation promote huge additional kraft 
paper tonnage in the face of known forty per cent over-production? Look at the price 
situation!”299 
The “big idea” of Cullen and his associates was a radical departure in the 
chemical recovery cycle that enabled new scale economies. The economic and 
technological core of the Panama City mill was the first continuous chemical recovery 
plant. The recovery cycle consisted of known and established components, most notably 
of rotary furnaces and the Swenson and Murray evaporators, but its process design was 
pioneering. Benefiting from a decade of learning by doing, IP was capable of engineering 
and constructing a fully continuous recovery cycle that supplied the required chemicals to 
kraft digesters, thus reaching record throughput at the mill. Yet the mill deployed a 
number of recovery furnaces, as the individual size of each rotaries was limited. In this 
sense, the organization of IP's continuous recovery cycle presented substantial 
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improvement in the rotary technology, but not a radical technological departure that 
enabled significant new economies of scale300 
The Panama City mill represented a technologically new stage in IP’s economies 
of scale-strategy. Vertical integration characterized these efforts, and by 1931 the 
company had acquired over 1.25 million acres of Southern timberland. Scale economies 
in the pulp wood supply depended on the introduction of sustainable yield management 
into the South, and here too IP was able to draw on its prior experience in the Northern 
sulphite pulp and paper industry. The new network of scientific foresters engineered the 
Southern timber belt, and adapted importantly the biological ecology and manufacturing 
technology to each other on an unprecedented scale.301 
IP was not immune to problems caused by industry-wide over-capacity, and its 
managers struggled to figure out what was the “big idea” of the Panama City mill, too. In 
dramatic move, Mullen and his associates shifted its production from kraft paper into 
kraft paperboard, and during the last stages of construction the production process was 
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retooled. The Panama City mill capacity equaled 65 per cent of the national production of 
kraft board in 1928, and its profitability depended on its ability to capture markets from 
jute and sulphite board. In response to over-capacity, IP also integrated forward into 
specialty production and paper converting. The company installed an "enormous" 
converting plant of its fully owned subsidiary, Continental Bag & Paper Company, at the 
Mobile mill, and thereby prompted change in the paper bag industry. 302 The success of 
these tactics made the Southern Kraft Corporation the most profitable division of IP in 
the 1930’s.303 
The first wave of the Southern strategy of IP was timed to meet the competition 
by incumbent kraft firms in the South and Wisconsin, and its tactic was to bring North 
American kraft paper and board prices under pressure. In the South its success was 
evident. Early pioneers of the kraft process had erected 20 small or medium size mills 
across the Southern pine belt by 1920, but a decade later the investment rush had 
decreased the number to 17, as new record size vertically integrated mills simply wiped 
out the older mills. Controlling one third of the Southern mills, IP became the dominant 
firm in the kraft industry in the U.S.304 
The organization of the Southern kraft industry underwent a deep transformation, 
then, whereas the old organization of the Lake States kraft industry persisted. In 1932, 
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Wisconsin had about half a dozen companies that manufactured kraft pulp or paper, and 
the leading firms attempted to increase economies of scale. Tomahawk Kraft Paper 
Company, Thilmany Pulp and Paper Company, and Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Company 
all followed the lead of Everest’s Marathon Mills group. Everest maneuvered skillfully 
with vertical integration, product innovation, and industrial relocation to off- set the 
effects of the IP.305 
The Southern mass production gave rise to a sustained, coordinated defensive 
strategy of the Northern kraft manufacturers. In late 1931, the managers of leading Lake 
States firms met to discuss, again, how to respond to the recent actions of IP. They agreed 
to meet the new lower prices announced by IP, but not to go below. Northern managers 
acknowledged that plain price cooperation could not turn around the forces of unfolding 
industrial change, and such conferences offered most importantly a venue to discuss 
strategies that potentially could. In order to sustain and improve the competitiveness of 
Northern kraft industry, deep strategic choices in the production and products had to be 
made.306 
Attempts to achieve economies of scale were central for the Wisconsin kraft 
firms’ defensive strategy, and this was successfully achieved in capital, marketing, 
management, freight, and production. Surprisingly, a central element of the improved 
competitiveness of the Wisconsin and other Lake States kraft industry was strategic, 
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moderate vertical disintegration. In many cases mills could purchase Scandinavian 
sulphate pulp below the cost of their own or Southern production. More important was 
the question of quality, however. Scandinavian pulp was considered the best kraft pulp 
available, and enabled Northern kraft mills to shift capacity into specialty production. In 
quality specialty kraft product markets, such as envelopes and premium packages, the 
lesser quality Southern kraft was not a competitor.307 
The pre-existing capabilities of the Wisconsin paper industry enabled renewed 
emphasis on specialty production, because the production of most kraft specialties 
required its mixing with different kind of pulps. In Wisconsin a great variety of different 
pulps were manufactured within a relatively small region, creating economies of scale for 
such specialty papers. The vice president of Everest’s Tomahawk Kraft Paper Company, 
Sven B. Bugge, managed the development and product differentiation of such brand 
envelopes as the “Somo Envelope Kraft” and “Mailwell Envelope Kraft.” Their specific 
characteristics depended on the use of right mix of kraft and sulphite pulp.308 Similarly 
certain container boards required a mix of specific kraft and groundwood pulp, as did 
paper used in the manufacture of waxed cartons.309 Another example was the 
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development of patented absorptive board. The consumer goods giant Procter & Gamble 
used it in packaging soap as it prevented the wrapping paper becoming too moist.310  
Monroe A. Wertheimer, manager of Kaukauna, Wisconsin, kraft firm Thilmany 
Pulp & Paper Company, explained the advantages of this production strategy plainly: 
“We are furnishing indirectly to several accounts a mixed grad of paper which pays us a 
profit through all of our ramifications, and with which Southern Kraft cannot compete, as 
this paper is made out of mixed old papers, and/or ground wood and/or Kraft or sulphite 
of the poorest quality, such as our own screenings and the very cheapest Sulphite we can 
purchase.”311 
Wertheimer was probably the strongest proponent of contracting pulp, and in 
particular Swedish kraft pulp. He argued that it enabled him to off-set Southern 
competition with lower prices and higher quality. Wertheimer had traveled in Sweden, 
and knew personally the leading Swedish pulp and paper managers. At an extreme in 
1930, he even proposed to Everest a complete withdrawal from vertically integrated kraft 
pulp and paper production. 
While some disintegration did occur in the Lake States and New England, 
Wisconsin paper managers differed sharply on the issue. Everest, Clarence Schoo, and 
Harry Wollenberg were skeptical of depending on imported Swedish kraft pulp, and 
emphasized that the Swedish kraft industry was rather concentrated. They expected the 
price of imported kraft pulp to be susceptible to price hikes, and therefore dismissed 
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many of Wertheimer’s claims.312 Clarence Schoo put it clearly: “I don’t think the idea of 
shutting off Southern kraft production by the purchase of kraft pulp has any more 
logic."313 
The emerging emphasis on specialty kraft paper production deepened the 
differences between regional pulp and paper industries, and in particular the Pacific mills 
began to emulate the Wisconsin experiences. Dismissing horizontal cooperation and 
combinations as unreliable methods to achieve price stability, Harry Wollenberg 
presented new plans for the single product –kraft paperboard- Longview mill in 
Washington in 1930: 
 
My ambition for our company is to diversify and integrate it. Diversification will 
come if and when we have a Fourdrinier machine and include the manufacture of 
Sulphite Pulp and bleaching of pulp. This is a program which I think might well 
come through increasing our own converting activities and through strengthening 
our jobber hook-up on the Pacific Coast.314 
 
For Wollenberg specialization was coupled with increased vertical integration. 
Persistent over-capacity and downward spiraling prices prompted managers to create 
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specialty products that had less competition than mass volume standardized paper grades. 
Wollenberg planned to imitate the industrial organization typical for the leading 
Wisconsin paper centers, where geographically concentrated diverse production 
technology established advantages in specialty production. In contrast, Southern 
production technology was homogenous and released economies of scale only in the 
mass production of kraft pulp, wrapping paper, and paperboard.315 
The emergence of Southern mass production of kraft pulp and paper between 
1925 and 1931 recast competitive forces in the North American pulp and paper industry. 
The dramatic effects in the sulphate pulp and paper industry alone were evident in the 
speed by which the highly concentrated Southern kraft industry captured a dominant 
share of national markets. The revolutionary transformation of the North American 
sulphate industry precipitated broader structural change in the entire pulp and paper 
industry. Technological learning in the kraft pulp and paper industries in the 1920’s 
produced breathtaking economies of scale in the eyes of the contemporaries, and yet 
many engineers felt that the full potential of the sulphate process was yet to be released. 
The persistence of the Great Depression, and the new political economy created in 
the early 1930’s suspended the appeal and realization of such technological dreams, 
however. North American kraft pulp and paper managers agreed that the main problems 
of the industry was over-capacity, and technological learning in the industry was re-
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focused upon standardization, as it provided the fundamental mechanisms for regulation 
and price scheduling called for under the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
 
Technology of Coordination: Standardization of Kraft Paper, 1929-1935 
Standardization offered managers a flexible mechanism of cooperation that could 
be adapted to rapidly changing conditions of the kraft pulp and paper industry. At the 
early stages of the Southern kraft industry standardization was predominantly a vehicle to 
achieve uniform quality of the Southe rn kraft in order to have it accepted in national 
markets, and as such represented the single reason for the establishment of the Southern 
Kraft Pulp and Paper Association in the early 1920's. In the kraft paperboard industry 
standardization served a similar purpose beginning in the late 1920’s, but the issue was 
more complex because of the government regulation of paper boxes.316 
Paperboard was predominantly converted into paper shipping containers, and fell 
therefore under the railroad regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (hereafter 
ICC). Official specifications for different types of paper containers were published as the 
Rule 41 of the Consolidated Freight Classification, and deviating paper containers were 
subject to penalty in the form of increased freight rates. The ICC prepared these standards 
in cooperation with the railroads and paper industry. Most regulatory standards for paper 
containers had been constructed in the 1910’s, when all paper boxes were manufactured 
from jute, straw, sulphite or newsboard. Managers in the expanding kraft paperboard 
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industry recognized that a reform of the regulatory standards for paperboard was essential 
to create demand for its products.317 
 
Table 5-5. Standard Qualities and Prices of Jute, Cylinder Kraft, and 
Fourdrinier Kraft Paperboard in 1929 
 
 Jute board Cylinder kraft board Fourdrinier kraft board 
Caliber (Thickness) 0.16 b0.16 0.16 
Test (strength) 100 100 100 
Weight  70 56 48 
Price per ton $52.50 $65.62 $76.65 
Price per Sq. Ft. $1.84 $1.84 $1.84 
 
Source: Table of Differentials. Jute and Kraft Liner Boards. 11 Nov. 1929. The 
Paperboard Industries Association. DCE Papers, Box #67, Folder #14. 
 
The problem for manufacturers of kraft paperboard was that the established 
standards coupled narrow classes of weight and strength. A comparison of the different 
paperboards in Table 5-5. demonstrates that Fourdrinier kraft paperboard weighed 45 per 
cent less than jute board with identical strength. The two paperboards cost the same for 
the converter manufacturing paper boxes, but the end user could be expected to prefer the 
lighter kraft paperboard box because it potentially lowered the freight costs. In 1929, the 
standards favored the jute boards over the Fourdrinier kraft, maintaining barriers of entry 
for mass production kraft paperboard firms, such as the IP, which were cutting the price 
of kraft paperboard.318 
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Upon publicly disclosing the record size Panama City Fourdrinier kraft board 
mill, IP attempted to revise the paperboard standards. The company applied to the 
Classification Committee of the Paperboard Industries Association for a ruling that would 
permit the use of 0.14 caliber board with 174# Mullen strength test boxes instead of 0.16 
caliber board, while maintaining the weight of the board. The proposal was an attempt to 
gain access to lucrative, but regulated markets. If approved by the Paperboard Industries 
Association, it would have to be negotiated with the railroads and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, too.319 
The proposal manifested the complexities of regulated paper box markets. IP's 
competitors suspected that it employed the proposal as a ploy to introduce specific water 
finished board that would potentially capture markets from the incumbent board 
manufacturers. Nevertheless, many of the Association members acknowledged that 
unfolding structural change in the industry was manifest in the application, and expected 
inevitable change in the regulatory standards. Some advocated the wholesale abolition of 
paper container standards on the grounds that no such specifications existed for wooden 
boxes. Yet, for the time being, the committee members chose to resist IP’s application, 
but this was likely only intended to slow down the inevitable. Schoo detailed this logic in 
a letter to Wollenberg:320 
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Naturally, the association is lending no support to this and is discouraging it [IP's 
application]… such boxes for a great many commodities will be equally as good 
or better than the present specifications, and I am further of the opinion that if 
some large shipper would put enough of such boxes in use, pay whatever penalty 
is assessed against them for the time being, and established over a period of time 
that claims for loss and damage have not been increased, they could then take the 
case before the Interstate Commerce Commission and compel the railroads to 
provide a classification for such containers… I have always felt that the 
classification restrictions have been a boom to the container industry. Whether or 
not they make for the greatest possible economy in the packing and transportation 
of merchandise is another question. I am inclined to think, however, that a 
deviation from arbitrary standards for economic purposes when sponsored by 
individual shippers will be the next trend in this industry, and when it is worked 
out by the individual shippers on a sound basis, it will be hard to combat. For 
instance, it will be difficult for anyone to hold out against a large shipper of 
cigarettes who can demonstrate that he can deliver his goods to destination safely 
in a package which costs him less than the specification standards, particularly 
when it is compensated by features of strength, which the standard container 
lacks.321 
 
The critical role of regulatory standards for creation of kraft paperboard markets 
forced IP to modify its aggressive dominant- firm strategy. The very nature of the process 
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whereby shipping container standards were constructed required the consent of the paper 
industry. Richard J. Cullen, the president of Southern Kraft division of IP, adopted a 
more conciliatory attitude towards his competitors upon the completion of the Panama 
City mill. Due to this change, the leading kraft firms were able to establish the Kraft 
Institute in 1931, which finally rewarded the Northern kraft mills’ efforts to persuade IP 
to join national cooperation on prices and production. 322 
The Kraft Institute membership comprised about 70 per cent of the U.S. kraft pulp 
and paper industry. The new conciliatory tone of the industry was evident in its 
organization: Richard Cullen was appointed as the president, and Clark Everest the vice-
president and chairman. At the time of the establishment of Kraft Institute, however, 
rapidly worsening economic conditions changed importantly the function of paper 
standards.323 
In 1931, capacity utilization in the whole pulp and paper industry dived similarly 
to the kraft paper industry, and every manager in the business predicted worse conditions 
for the next year. This fostered a particular kind of innovation to prevent market breaking 
tactics by individual firms. Any experienced paper maker knew how the cost of pulp and 
quality of paper were related, and therefore firms attempted to gain market share by 
introducing imitations with lower quality and price. Rigid quality standards could prevent 
this. Ironically, IP had entered cooperation with other kraft firms in order to create 
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markets for its innovative products, but the Kraft Institute and its officers struggled to 
suspend the effects of innovation. 324 
These principles guided the several cooperative conferences organized by the 
Kraft Institute. Speaking specifically on kraft bag and sack papers, institute’s secretary 
Oliver M. Porter detailed the general principles of paper standards in 1932: 
 
Study of existing trade conditions by the Kraft Institute clearly indicates that 
stable market conditions, which are of high importance in the present disturbed 
state of American industry, necessitate the strict maintenance of standard 
specifications… The best authorities agree that practices which involve deviation 
from standards…amount to nothing less than price-cutting – a practice so 
injurious to good business, that it should not be tolerated by any manufacturer.325 
 
The Kraft Institute’s standardization efforts were situated in the context of record 
low utilization of production capacity, and the desperate attempt of the industry to 
maintain prices. The Kraft Institute organized several conferences for the industry and its 
customers to work out “standard specifications” that prevented firms’ ability to break 
markets with sub-standard quality products. For Porter, then, standards offered a potential 
mechanism to “freeze” innovation that created new markets by substituting existing 
products with poorer and cheaper imitations. 
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The Kraft Institute cooperation paved the way for voluntarily industry-wide 
cooperation on prices and capacity. The “management engineer” firm Stevenson, Jordan 
& Harrison begun to implement a program to curtail over-production in the kraft paper 
industry on 23rd October, 1933.326 Such voluntary cooperation campaigns anticipated 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which was an 
experiment to turn around the deepening Great Depression through industrial self-
regulation. The central approach of the established National Recovery Administration 
(hereafter NRA) was to derive industry specific codes that specified price floors and 
production quotas, and the plan relaxed antitrust laws for the participating firms and 
industries. The NRA regulation was administrated in practice by the industry specific 
Code Authorities, staffed with people from the industry to be regulated. The NRA 
required participating firms to file publicly prices for their products, as well as disclose 
production and delivery statistics. This made sense only if products were reasonably 
standardized, and information from different mills was compatible.327 
In many ways the paper industry presented a tremendous challenge for such a 
coordination attempt. There existed hundreds, if not thousands, of different kinds of 
paper grades, not to mention converted paper products. The first task of the NRA Paper 
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Industry Authority was to construct standards that covered the industry, and establish the 
fundamental mechanism for price and production controls. The Paper Industry Authority 
appointed the Committee on Production and Classification to produce a grade allocation 
to lay a foundation for the price scheduling and production controls.328 
The inherent complexity and messiness of the paper business made the 
classification system appear arbitrary. The committee established four grades under the 
Kraft Paper Division of the Paper Industry Authority, namely “wrapping and converting 
Machine Finished” and “wrapping and converting Machine Glazed.” Sulphate board was 
divided into the sub-grades of “Corrugating”, “Test”, and “Sulphate Specialties not 
otherwise classified”, and placed under the Sulphate Pulp and Board Division. Many 
other kraft and sulphate paper grades were placed under the regulation of the additional 
20 pulp and paper industry specific divisions.329 
The quest for standardization followed from the pivotal importance of “uniform 
and accurate cost accounting” for the open price filing practice. This motivated the 
general chairman of the Operating Division of TAPPI, Frederic C. Clark, to suggest the 
wholesale replacement of trade names with scientific standards. He claimed the over 65 
commercial brands of kraft paper could be rationalized into only few standard grades 
with his four-digit classification system that was compatible with automatic tabulating 
machines. Allowing the easy aggregation of sub-classes into firm or industry specific 
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production statistics, such standardization embodied a very potent mechanism of 
centralized coordination. 330 
These rationalistic dreams were frustrated by the dynamic forces of competition 
that emerged from long term structural change in the North American pulp and paper 
industry. In the case of the kraft paper industry, the NRA revived the deep rivalry 
between Northern and Southern firms. The Southe rn kraft firms attempted to create a 
two-tier classification system, in which the lower quality Southern kraft paper could 
maintain its pricing advantage. Northern and Pacific mills aggressively opposed this in 
the summer 1933, and insisted on a single category standardization. Marvin Preston, 
manager of the Wisconsin Thilmany Pulp and Paper Company, explained to Everest that 
if all kraft paper could be specified within one price and quality category, nobody would 
buy the lower quality Southern kraft for the price they could obtain good quality 
Northern. 331 
Predictably, the Southern mills of IP, Brown Paper Company, and West Virginia 
Pulp and Paper Company continued to cut prices under these conditions in 1933. The 
NRA codes provided only voluntarily guidelines, but promised a relaxation of antitrust 
laws for the participating firms. Therefore the Northern and Pacific kraft mill managers 
could only observe and complain to each other of the market-breaking tactics of their 
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Southern rivals. The Code authorities, on the other hand, regarded such moves as a 
serious violation. 332 
The kraft industry’s failure to agree on standards released competitive forces that 
questioned the legitimacy of NRA. In September 1935, NRA officials charged the 
grocery bag division of the paper bag code with “wholesale violation” of the code by 
continuously cutting prices. In October, Executive Authority of Kraft Paper Division met 
to discuss problems with the code, such as the alleged violations by Westvaco and Brown 
Paper Company. As the code violations persisted, the code authorities and industry 
leaders organized an open meeting at which all kraft firms could discuss constructively 
the problems. Such attempts to induce cooperation and suspend competition proved 
fruitless, however, and the open price filing was suspended in the kraft paper industry in 
January 1935.333 
The kraft paper industry resumed the earlier Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison 
managed curtailment program immediately.334 The continued collection and processing 
of cost and production information on standardized kraft paper grades laid the basis for 
the charges of violation of antitrust laws, and eventually the Department of Justice sued 
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practically all U.S. kraft firms in 1939. The defendants produced over 90 per cent of all 
U.S. kraft paper, and agreed to a consent decree next year.335 
The experience of standardization in the kraft paper industry between 1929 and 
1935 demonstrated to leading firms the pitfalls of cooperative managerial coordination. 
Selfish interests enticed individual mills to break away from collaborative efforts, and, on 
the other hand, the rule of majority potentially threatened the economic viability of the 
minority. 
The cooperative movement, epitomized in the NRA kraft paper codes, 
significantly shifted the focus of technological learning to standardization. Processing of 
information on costs and production occupied much of managerial efforts during the 
NRA. Moreover, the rigid regulation directed firms to focus on the improvement of 
existing kraft process technology, and pay less attention to potentially radical 
technological departures that would have retired old machinery and required investment 
into new mills. 
 
Standardization and Diffusion of the Chemical Recovery Technology, 1934-1940 
Between 1934 and 1940, the North American kraft pulp and paper industry 
experienced another rapid phase of expansion, mostly in the South. This structural change 
was critically facilitated by new stationary chemical recovery units that offered new scale 
economies and abolished quickly competing designs. Two large U.S. boiler 
manufacturers, Babcock & Wilcox Company (henceforth B&W) and Combustion 
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Engineering, Inc. (henceforth C-E), controlled central patents on the new recovery unit, 
and commercialized full-scale turn-key installations. The rapid diffusion of new superior 
chemical recovery technology throughout the kraft pulp and paper industry ended 
regional technological differences and effectively standardized the technology. This 
eroded the competitive strategy of the Lake States kraft industry, and gave significant 
advantage to the Southern industry. 
The efficiency of chemical recovery in the kraft pulp process was significantly 
improved when B&W and C-E, the world’s leading boiler technology firms, entered the 
business simultaneously around 1934. They had specialized capabilities for the 
improvement of the kraft recovery furnaces, particularly knowledge of behavior of heat, 
that the incumbent machinery suppliers and the pulp and paper industry lacked.336 
B&W entered the chemical recovery unit business by collaborating with the 
leading builder of stationary recovery furnaces. In 1934, George H. Tomlinson began to 
install a new recovery unit at Windsor Mills, Quebec, of the Canada Paper Company, 
which had absorbed his employer Howard Smith Paper Company in 1929. Unable to 
solve technical problems inherent to the application of boilers to the operation of 
stationary chemical recovery furnace, which Tomlinson considered critical, he contracted 
the B&W for a solution. 337 
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B&W was not a newcomer in the pulp industry. An earlier collaboration with the 
Wisconsin Kimberly-Clark Corporation had resulted in a pioneering heat circulation 
system for pulp processes. In the early 1930’s, the two firms collaborated to improve the 
heat economy of sulphite pulping process, and introduced the "Babcock & Wilcox-
Kimberly-Clark Circulating and Indirect Heating System for the Sulphite Pulping 
Process." B&W introduced in pulp processes centralized control mechanisms that were 
commonplace in boiler technology, and also helped pulp engineers develop improved 
understanding of the behavior of heat. The cooperative effort produced undeniable and 
considerable savings for sulphite pulp mills, and established the boiler firm a name within 
the pulp and paper industry. 338 
Such widely publicized and allegedly successful cooperation did not escape the 
notice of people attempting to improve kraft pulping processes. In particular the kraft 
pulp engineers began to focus increasingly on heat economy. Like so many trade and 
engineering journals, the Paper Industry published specialized technical reviews on how 
to improve the utilization of waste heat in the kraft process. L. F. Bunde, a Wisconsin 
engineer, detailed in his two-part article the fruits of collaborating with an anonymous 
boiler manufacturer - probably B&W- on heat economy of pulp processes at his 
Wisconsin Rapids kraft mill in 1933. Such examples demonstrated the potential benefits 
pulp firms could derive from cooperating with boiler firms that had knowledge of 
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technologies of heat. For the B&W engineers the collaboration with pulp and paper firms 
provided an opportunity to learn the pulping and chemical recycle technology. 339 
Adopting a consistent and inclusive approach to the recovery cycle at the Canada 
Paper Company mill, B&W engineers worked to improve every phase of the projected 75 
ton capacity unit. The unit embodied much of new equipment, such as “turbo-charger” 
and “super-heater,” resulting in 2100 degree Fahrenheit temperature in the furnace. Black 
liquor was sprayed into the furnace with an improved spray nozzle. The design improved 
economies of the recovery cycle by increasing the reuse of generated heat (over 90 per 
cent was employed usefully) and by reducing labor. A single person could operate the 
unit, while an additional person tended water and blew the tubes –a staffing enough to 
operate up to three units. A major advantage of the Babcock & Wilcox-Tomlinson 
Process, commercialized as the B&W unit, was that it could be scaled up significantly.340 
Learning the sulphate recovery technology during the experimental work in 1934, 
the B&W decided to diversify into the stationary chemical recovery unit business. The 
entry of a leading boiler manufacturing company marked the beginning of new phase in 
the organization of technological learning in the kraft recovery cycle. B&W ignored the 
earlier personal disagreements between H. Tomlinson and Wagner that had continued 
since 1929, and integrated their respective discoveries on the chemical stationary 
recovery furnace techno logy. The boiler manufacturer purchased the key stationary 
recovery furnace from the C. L. W. Patents Corporation, which was Wagner's holding 
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company for the patent applied in 1925 and eventually granted in 1930, as well as some 
other ones, too.341 B&W obtained also Wagner’s complementary patent from 1936 that 
had been applied in 1930.342 In 1935, controlling owner of the B&W, Leslie Wilcoxson, 
applied with George Tomlinson for a patent for improvements in the original Tomlinson 
stationary recovery furnace patent that had been applied in 1932, and granted in 1937.343 
Subsequently additional patents completed the efforts of B&W to establish broad 
intellectual property rights for its new line of products.344 
Charles Wagner was a capable patent strategist and had constructed his original 
patent very meticulously to deserve a broad interpretation in courts. This intent was 
manifest in a patent review of alkali recovery technology he published in Paper Trade 
Journal in 1932.345 In the article Wagner listed only 19 U.S. patents on the subject –and 
of course enjoyed a moment of free publicity in the aftermath of the recent dispute with 
Tomlinson. Earlier patent reviews of sulphate process had confirmed that patents covered 
relatively weakly the technology. Both Wagner and Tomlinson had claimed broad 
intellectual property rights for the stationary chemical recovery furnace, but failed to 
diffuse it widely in the kraft industry. B&W had organizational capabilities to improve 
critically the technology, consolidate respective patent portfolios of Wagner and 
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Tomlinson, as well as diffuse the new technology effectively within the kraft pulp and 
paper industry. 346 
The entry of an established boiler manufacturer enabled the realization of 
technological dream of self-sustaining chemical recovery cycle, already present in Carl 
Dahl’s patent application in the 1880’s. Wagner had further detailed the basic principles 
of a continuous and self-sustained chemical recovery process, and as such laid the basis 
for potential patent monopoly in 1925. His fundamental patent, U.S. Patent No. 
1,771,829, was defined as an extension of the Le Blanc soda process and described in 
great mechanical and chemical detail. The core of the patent was a method of spraying 
atomized liquors into extremely hot vertical furnace, and a method of burning waste 
liquor that used auxiliary heat only little for preheating of the furnace. Yet Wagner and 
others in the industry had lacked the necessary knowledge of the boiler technology to 
realize this on a commercially viable basis.347 
Specific technological capabilities in the heat economy of pulp processes opened 
an avenue for B&W to succeed where Dahl and Wagner had not, and the company 
guarded aggressively its knowledge assets. Intellectual property rights occupied a central 
role in the entry strategy of B&W, and although the company eventually litigated only 
one case of infringement, its aggressive style probably impeded imitation. In Babcock & 
Wilcox Company v. North Carolina Pulp and Paper Company the defendant was alleged 
of imitating the Wagner spray recovery unit. The New York contract engineering firm 
Day & Zimmerman, Inc., had designed and built a kraft chemical recovery unit at a kraft 
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mill in Plymouth, North Carolina for the North Carolina Pulp and Paper Company. The 
defendant argued that Wagner’s two patents were invalid, and therefore no infringement 
could occur. When the North Carolina Pulp and Paper Company failed to demonstrate 
substantial prior art, the judge upheld the Wagner patents with rather broad interpretation. 
The decision secured B&W substantial business, no less because expert witnesses had 
argued that its equipment established a saving that equaled 20 per cent of the total cost of 
sulphate pulp.348 
The success of B&W’s chemical recovery unit aborted quickly prolonged efforts 
by others to improve the rotary chemical recovery furnaces. Between 1934 and 1936, the 
rotary recovery furnace technology peaked in a collaborative project between the 
Combustion Engineering, Inc., and the leading manufacturer of rotary recovery furnaces, 
Wisconsin’s D. J. Murray Manufacturing Company. The latter firm was contracted by the 
Wisconsin Hummell-Ross Fibre Company to aid in its relocation in the South. Murray 
Company recognized that it did not know how to improve the arrangement of waste-heat 
boiler and design the extensive cooling of smelter, yet it identified them as critical for the 
success of kraft pulp operations. The company contracted C-E to carry out the required 
research and design, and jointly they installed a chemical recovery unit with a rotary 
smelter furnace, including almost complete water-cooling at a kraft mill in Hopewell, 
Virginia, in 1934. The design reduced drastically the labor intensive maintenance work, 
and similarly improved the heat economy of the process, and enabled increased size. 
Whereas traditional rotary recovery units typically had 25 ton capacity, the improved 
Murray-Waern, as it was called, was built with 50 and 75 ton capacities between 1934 
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and 1936. Technological learning in the rotary recovery furnace peaked with the Murray-
Waern design, as the success of the B&W recovery unit made it obsolete.349 
The B&W installations of the stationary spray recovery unit exposed quickly the 
fundamental differences in economies of scale between it and the rotary recovery 
furnace. In 1936, the largest installations of the C-E improved Murray-Waern rotary 
recovery furnace and the Babcock & Wilcox-Tomlinson stationary furnace both equaled 
75 ton capacity. The two designs shared much of basic technology, such as boiler and 
spray solutions, but differed fundamentally in their solution to the heart of the process, 
the furnace. The record size of the units showcased the limits of the respective 
technologies, as Thomas M. Grace has put it: 
 
The deciding factor between rotary and spray units was the ability to scale up 
spray furnace designs to large units. The rotary reached maximum size at a 
capacity of 100/tons a day. It was not practical to increase the size of the rotary 
beyond this since the drying power of a rotary increases slowly with size. This 
limitation on size for the rotary coupled with the rapid expansion of the kraft pulp 
industry in the South proved the death knell of the rotary. 350 
 
Admitting the superiority of the stationary spray recovery unit, C-E abandoned its 
rotary furnace design and launched an extensive effort to imitate the B&W unit. Between 
1936 and 1938, Fay H. Rosencrants managed for the firm the development of a spray 
                                                                                                                                                 
F. Supp. 215 (1940). 
349 de Lorenzi, Combustion Engineering , Ch. 28, 12-13. 
 196 
type recovery unit, the so called C-E Recovery Unit that did not infringe the B&W 
patents. Much of the required learning and experimentation occurred at the kraft mill of 
Chesapeake Paper Company, whose director Elis Olsson was a long time friend of the 
president of C-E, Joseph V. Santry. The cooperative research and development project 
erected a spray type unit with the record capacity of 250 daily tons in 1939.351 
The patent of C-E defined its merits explicitly against the original 1930 Wagner 
patent, as well as against “the so-called Tomlinson method.”352 The patent claimed a 
novel arrangement of continuous water cooling system, but was specifically an attempt to 
circumvent the Babcock & Wilcox monopoly on furnace design that allowed 
tremendously improved economies of scale. In successfully doing so, the patent also 
marked the merging of long waves of technological learning in the rotary and stationary 
furnace schools.353 
The decision by C-E to enter spray unit business effectively retired rotary 
chemical recovery furnaces. An C-E textbook from this period plainly stated that only 
four spray-type units were necessary for a projected 600-ton Southern mill, instead of six 
rotary ones. Rapid diffusion of new technology facilitated new investments, and boosted 
the daily Southern kraft production from 3,275 tons in 1935 to 9,128 in 1940, capturing 
over 80 per cent of total U.S. capacity. 354 
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In 1936, Everest counted seven large new Southern mills under construction or 
just about to begin production, totaling new capacity of more than one million tons of 
kraft papers. Among the installations were two 100,000 ton per day capacity mills of 
incumbent IP and Westvaco. New entrants included forward integrating bag and box 
makers Union Bag & Paper Company and Container Corporation. Two projected mills of 
Mead Corporation marked that old papermaker's diversification into kraft, whereas the 
Crossett Paper Company entered pulp and paper from lumber. The new mills doubled the 
annual Southern kraft paper production to almost 2 million tons within a year. 355 
The construction of so many Southern mills badly worried the Wisconsin kraft 
firms.356 Analyzing detailed statistics on the regional relocation of the kraft industry, J. 
W. Kieckhefer, president of a Milwaukee paper box firm, emphasized the effects on 
Wisconsin: “Several members of the National paperboard Association have been giving 
much of their time and though to developing a plan bringing in to the industry the large 
new Southern production in an intelligent manner… The problem is a serious one 
especially because of the large dislocation of Northern tonnage.”357 
Relocational dynamics developed renewed momentum during the 1940's and 
1950's, and Lake State firms faced increasingly intensifying competition from the 
Southern firms. These dynamics were underpinned by technological innovation, and its 
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rapid diffusion catapulted the sulphate industry to the largest branch of the pulp and paper 
industry. 
 
Technology and Strategies of Growth in the Sulphate Pulp and Paper Industry, 
1940-1960 
Rapid diffusion of innovation prompted the leading North American pulp and 
paper firms to adopt aggressive strategies of growth in the kraft pulp and paper industry 
between 1940 and 1958. As a result, the sulphate industry became by far the largest and 
dominant branch of the pulp and paper industry. Investment in new sulphate pulp 
capacity was facilitated by the stabilization of the spray chemical recovery unit and two 
other important process innovations. Multi-stage bleaching enabled the production of 
white kraft and sulphate papers, and the continuous cooking kraft digesting process 
released new scale economies. This convergence of relatively distinct sustained waves of 
technological learning created an oxymoron that integrated mass production with product 
differentiation. In practice, improvements in sulphate bleaching technology widened 
radically the range of sulphate paper products that had a sustained price advantage over 
sulphite papers. These innovations prompted almost complete forward integration of the 
North American sulphate pulp industry. Between 1928 and 1939, 87 per cent of all 
sulphate pulp was manufactured by firms for their own use, but by 1947 the share had 
increased to 96 per cent -a level where it stabilized.358 
This restructuring of the North American pulp and paper industry began with the 
rapid diffusion of spray chemical recovery unit. Upon learning of the innovation, the 
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incumbent firms with older rotary recovery furnaces re-evaluated their manufacturing 
technology. In the early 1940’s, the engineering department of Westvaco reviewed 
monthly the equipment of its mills, and the engineers increasingly reported problems 
with the rotary recovery units. The engineering department’s monthly report in January 
1944 required immediate and extensive repair or substitution of rotaries at the 
Williamsburg mill. Rotary recovery units, at Tyrone, Piedmont, and Covington mills, 
usually supplied by the Dorr Company, were also in bad shape. At the last of these mills, 
C-E was already at work to replace the rotary units with spray type units. The efforts of 
Westvaco to modernize its chemical recovery units demonstrated how experienced kraft 
pulp mill engineers regarded the spray-type unit also as a remedy to the inherent 
maintenance problems of the rotary units.359 
The C-E recovery unit underpinned the post-World War II expansion of the 
Chesapeake Paper Company, too. After the war the firm installed two C-E recovery units 
that totaled 250 ton daily capacity. Demonstrative of the potential scale economies of 
spray unit is that the third unit, installed in 1958, had the capacity to reclaim chemicals 
from 500 tons of pulp per day. Thus the radical technological departures in the chemical 
recovery technology had propelled the sulfate pulp and paper industry into the largest 
sector in the pulp and paper industry. 360 
Improvements in the bleaching of pulp constituted the second wave of 
technological learning that facilitated the tremendous expansion of the sulphate pulp 
industry. The basic principles of pulp bleaching and the chemical agent, elemental 
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chlorine, had been described in 1912, but the process was not adapted on a commercially 
viable basis for kraft and other sulphate pulps until the mid-1930's. Exposure to chlorine 
improved the brightness of dark kraft pulp, but also radically decreased its strength, its 
most important characteristic. Early bleaching methods applied expensive chemical 
agents in one stage to pulp, and the process involved a trade between whiteness and 
strength of fibers. In the early 1920’s, papermakers learned to reduce the cost of 
chemicals by using a two-stage hypochlorite bleaching method. Experimenting with the 
method, papermakers soon learned that it could be applied to kraft, but not sulphite pulp 
because of the character of its fibers. Repeated exposure to hypochlorite destroyed the 
sulphite pulp fibers so completely that it could not be fed smoothly into the 
papermachine. In contrast, kraft pulp consisted of much stronger fibers and emerged from 
the multi-stage bleaching with good quality for the papermachine. Thus, the "multi-stage 
bleaching" eliminated the trade between whiteness of sulphate pulp and its fiber 
strength. 361 
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Table 5-6. Production of Bleached Sulphate Pulp in the U.S., 1931-1958 (tons 
of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Year Production Per Cent Growth 
1931      50,000  
1939    500,000 1,000 
1947 1,100,000    220 
1958 4,000,000    370 
 
Sources: Manufacturers 1919, 559; Census of Manufactures 1933. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office 1936, 267; Census of Manufactures 1947, 318; Census 
of Manufactures 1958. Part I,. 26A-12.  
 
The pioneering discovery and learning on the multi-stage process occurred 
simultaneously and independently in the North America and Europe. The leading 
Swedish pulp and paper firm, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, and the pioneer of 
stationary kraft recovery furnace, Brown Company, developed in the 1930’s the 
processes of multistage bleaching of kraft pulps. Wisconsin’s Nekoosa-Edwards Paper 
Company built a pioneering large scale pulp bleaching installation that used chlorine in 
1930, and the firm’s experiments with chlorine dioxide were soon adapted to other soda 
and kraft pulp mills in the North America.362 
The production of bleached sulphate pulp increased 80,000-fold in the U.S. 
between 1931 and 1958, and almost 100,000-fold if one includes the semibleached pulp, 
too, as demonstrated in the tables 12 and 13. The industry averaged 8 per cent annual 
growth of production over quarter of century. Such growth rates increased steadily the 
share of bleached pulp from the total sulphate production. In 1931, bleached pulp 
accounted only five per cent of the annua l total sulphate pulp production of almost one 
million tons, in 1939 one sixth, in 1947 more than one fifth of the annual 
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production. 363By 1958, bleached pulp accounted for one third of all sulphate pulp 
production, and 40 per cent if one includes the semibleached pulps, too. In part this 
structural change was caused by World War II. The war destroyed much of European 
industrial capacity, and increased the price of European sulphate pulp, prompting North 
American firms to enter its production. On the other hand, technological innovation 
underpinned this change importantly. Bleached sulphate pulps enabled kraft paper firms 
to substitute a wide range of white sulphite pulp papers with cheaper imitations and 
product innovations. As a result, the share of sulphate pulp from the total U.S. pulp 
production increased from 42 per cent in 1939 to 45 in 1947, and to 59 by 1958 (Table 5-
1.).364 
Organization of technological learning that enabled rapid diffusion of innovation 
explains this extraordinary growth to a great degree. During the 1930’s, specialized 
supplier firms developed the multi-stage bleaching technique into continuous bleaching 
system. The leading firms, U.S.-based Hooker Electrochemical Company, Improved 
Paper Machinery Company, and Swedish Kamyr Company, controlled the technology 
through patents and specialized organizational capabilities. Their efforts improved the 
consistency of bleaching systems, and they sold aggressively turn-key solutions 
throughout the global kraft pulp and paper industry. 365 
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Table 5-7. U.S. Production of Sulphate Pulp by Grade in 1958 and Total Production 
of Wood Pulp (Tons of 2,000 Lbs.) 
 
Grade  Production Per Cent of Total Sulphate 
tonnage 
Bleached 4,022,901 33 % 
Semibleached 707,974 6 % 
Unbleached for paper 2,972,783 24 % 
Unbleached for board 4,613,719 37% 
Total Sulphate Pulp  12,137,377 100 % 
Total Wood Pulp  20,932,808  
 
Source: Census of Manufactures 1958. Part I,. 26A-12. 
 
The Southern firms embraced opportunities for product diversification as opened 
by bleaching, and rapidly shifted capacity from standardized mass product grades into 
more specialized ones. Bleached Southern kraft had been introduced at an experimental 
scale in the early 1910’s, and one mill commenced commercial production in the late 
1920’s. Multi-stage bleaching was introduced in the large Southern kraft mills first 
during the 1930's.366 
The pioneering large-scale installation of multi-stage bleaching by IP at its Moss 
Point, Alabama, mill constituted a defining learning experience for the firm and the 
industry. In 1932, the Great Depression had forced the company to shut down the Moss 
Point mill without plans to resume operations. Two years later, IP opened the mill as a 
site to experiment with the bleaching of kraft pulp and production of white kraft papers 
on a commercial scale. Learning from this pioneering experiment, the company retooled 
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around 1940 kraft processes at its two Louisiana and Camden mills, and the Mobile, 
Alabama, mill followed soon. 367 
The emergence of Southern bleached kraft production dealt another blow to 
Northern U.S. paper firms, which reconsidered again their competitive strategies. Everest 
and his managers worked intensely on the future corporate strategy of Marathon 
Corporation and its subsidiaries beginning 1944, when they perceived that World War II 
would soon be over. They considered a wide array of different technologies and products 
for the future corporate strategy of Marathon, but I will here focus exclusively on how 
they regarded sulphate pulp and papers. Citing the depletion of pulp wood resources in 
the Lake States region, Marathon managers pursued a partial, moderate, disintegration of 
production processes. Though its Wisconsin kraft pulp mill had been a central element of 
the corporation since the 1910’s, now its managers decided to relocate sulphate 
production capacity to Canada.368 
Marathon built a new-state-of-the-art bleached sulphate mill at Peninsula in the 
Province of Ontario. The roughly $9 million investment created a mill with 250 ton daily 
capacity bleached sulphate pulp that was relatively easily shipped to Marathon paper 
mills in the U.S. Lake States.369 
The managers of Marathon pursued simultaneously a careful program of forward 
integration into paper converting, and they assigned increasing importance on product 
innovation in bleached sulphate papers. The Marathon Post-War Planning Committee 
                                                 
367 International Paper Company After Fifty Years , 66-67. 
368 Edgar Ricker & Company, Marathon Corporation. History and Business. 1 Aug. 1944. DCE Papers, 
Box #278, Folder #4. 
369 Marathon Corporation. History and Business. 
 205 
stated the aim of company’s investment in “research on the utilization of our new kraft 
pulp in our products”: “Considerable work is also going to be required to determine the 
best method of utilization in our products of the bleached Kraft pulp which is going to be 
available from Peninsula. There are many places where direct substitutions for sulphite 
pulp cannot be made and extensive studies on pulp blends will be required.”370 
Marathon’s expansion of the kraft pulp production was prompted by new 
bleaching methods that allowed the replacement of sulphite pulp with cheaper bleached 
kraft pulp. This required systematic product innovation, though, and Everest argued that 
with research and deve lopment work bleached sulphate pulp could be used to make 
traditional sulphite paper products, such as napkins. The idea would have been dismissed 
as absurd perhaps only few years earlier, because every papermaker identified dark color, 
hard strength, and odor with kraft papers, and such characteristics formed stark contrast 
to the sanitized marketing ideal of napkins: white, soft, and odorless. Yet Everest 
proposed a research and development program that specifically imitated the Kimberly-
Clark Corporation’s pioneering and best selling Kleenex tissues.371 
In 1945, Marathon’s monthly tissue production equaled 14,000meters, and 
accounted for the third largest group of papers within the company. 372 This share was 
rapidly increasing, and Marathon managers focused on forward integration into tissue 
conversion. They allotted more resources into research and development of the napkins, 
in part in an effort to be able to continue to sell napkins at a premium after the expiration 
                                                 
370 Post-War Planning Committee Meeting. 14 Dec. 1944. DCE Papers, Box #279, Folder #5. 
371 Post-War Planning Committee Meeting. 14 Dec. 1944. 
372 Post-War Planning Committee Meeting, 6-7 Sept. 1945. DCE Papers, Box #279, Folder #5. 
 206 
of patents on particularly successful type of dispenser napkins.373 The company also 
appointed a specific committee to study and plan the growth of its converting division. 374 
Specialized bleached kraft paper and board products accounted for a large share 
of the Marathon Corporation’s post-war success. The company's sales increased from $43 
million in 1946 to $112 in 1951, while earnings tripled to $18 million during the same 
period. This accomplishment reflected the favorable dynamics of the whole North 
American kraft industry. 375 
All the leading North American sulphate pulp and paper manufacturers adopted 
aggressive strategies of growth during the 1950’s, as their managers responded to the 
same dynamic forces that had prompted the reorganization of the Marathon Corporation. 
The rush to grow required tremendous amounts of new capital, and the pulp and paper 
companies flooded Wall Street with bond and stock offerings. The securities firm Smith, 
Barney, & Company issued a special report on the industry, stating boldly that the pulp 
and paper industry was the third fastest growing major U.S. industry, trailing only 
aluminum and natural gas in the mid-1950’s.376 
Most of the growth occurred in sulphate pulp and paper, evident in the Table 5-1., 
which demonstrates how absolute growth of the sulphate production between 1947 and 
1958 dwarfed the declining sulphite pulp production and modestly increasing 
groundwood pulp production. Smith, Barney & Company’s analysis of the leading North 
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American firms detailed how individual companies navigated in the midst of this 
unfolding structural change. 
The strategies of growth adopted by the leading pulp and paper firms converged 
radically, as if they had emerged from a single mind. In 1954, IP entered kraft production 
in Canada by acquiring the local operations of Brown Paper Company for $40 million. 
Within two years, the company built an integrated kraft pulp and paper mill in Canada 
with annual capacity of 115,000 tons, as well as 100,000 ton machine in Mobile, 
Alabama. In 1957, the company opened 165,000 bleached kraft pulp and board mill in 
Pine Bluff, Arkansas.377 
Other leading firms followed similar strategies of growth. Mead Corporation 
operated kraft board mills in Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina that totaled 625 ton 
daily capacity, and had several joint ventures in the kraft business. Mead operated with 
Container Corporation two paperboard companies in Georgia, with combined daily 
capacity of 1,400 tons, and with Scott Paper Company, a leading tissue paper 
manufacturer, a 500 ton daily capacity bleached sulphate pulp mill in Brunswick, 
Georgia. Mead looked to grow, too, and undertook aggressive modernization and 
expansion programs during the post-war years. It doubled its sulphate linerboard capacity 
in 1954 with a mill in Rome, Georgia, and spent between 1951 and 1955 about $40 
million in plant equipment.378 
The world’s largest producer of paper bags and paper containers, Union Bag and 
Paper Company, had operated a single large sulphate pulp and paper mill in Savannah, 
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Georgia, since 1936. This mill was also modernized and expanded significantly. Between 
1951 and 1955, investing over $50 millions the company increased daily capacity of the 
mill to 1,800 tons of paper and board, and to 2,000 by 1956. Simultaneously the company 
acquired Camp Manufacturing Company, a fully integrated producer of bleached and 
unbleached sulphate pulp, paper, and board. The Union Bag-Camp Paper Company 
planned to increase the Camp mill’s production capacity from 375 daily tons to 600 by 
1959.379 
Smaller firms followed the giants, such as the Riegel Paper Corporation. Bleached 
kraft pulp accounted only for 22 per cent of its total sales of $50 million in 1955, and 
company management wanted to expand that business. Planning to increase its sales in 
board used for food packaging, the company announced the building of a 300 ton daily 
capacity bleached kraft pulp mill at its main site at North Carolina in 1955. The list of 
companies growing through investment in latest innovations in sulphate pulp process in 
the early 1950's is simply too long to be exhausted here, as it included practically all the 
big firms. 380 
Sulphate pulp technology represented the Holy Grail for the North American pulp 
and paper industry to a large degree because of the availability of innovations that 
enabled improved productivity and product diversification. The organization of 
technological learning in sulphate pulp and paper process had been radically transformed 
since 1940. Specialized machinery supplier firms formed a relatively stable and 
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consolidated industry that increasingly assumed control of technological knowledge of 
sulphate pulping, and thereby dominated the process of innovation. 
The North American expansion of kraft pulp production in the 1950’s was 
importantly facilitated by a Swedish innovation, the Kamyr continuous kraft cooking 
system. Complementing the continuous chemical recovery cycle, continuous chemical 
bleaching, and continuous Fourdrinier papermaking machine, continuous sulphate 
cooking presented the ultimate realization of totally continuous sulphate mill. Until its 
introduction, kraft pulp cooking was characterized by batch production. Large pulp mills 
employed typically a number of large digesters that required maintenance after each 
cook. The continuous cooking system, by nature, eliminated such labor and improved the 
throughput of the kraft process. Johan Richter had pioneered the experimentation with 
continuous cooking of kraft pulp with a 5 ton daily capacity pilot plant in Karlsborg, 
Sweden in 1938. His efforts were discontinued by the outbreak of the World War II, and 
resumed at a small kraft mill in Fengersfors, Sweden. Soon the Kamyr Company 
assumed responsibility for the research and development work at Fengersfors mill, and 
scaled up the digester to 50 ton per day capacity. 381 
One basic element of the pioneering Kamyr continuous kraft cooking system, as it 
was called, was a downflow digester with high-pressure feeder. The system enabled 
potentially significant new scale economies, and between 1948 and 1951 Kamyr installed 
four other systems around the world. Learning from these projects, the Kamyr engineers 
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installed the record size 100 metric ton* daily capacity system at Wifstavarfs, Sweden, in 
1952. During the next years the Finnish Joutseno Pulp Company acquired two 120 ton 
units. Kamyr Company scaled up the capacity of the digester system, and reached the 
capacity of 350 daily tons by 1955.382 
The Kamyr continuous kraft cooking system quickly attracted also the attention of 
North American pulp and paper firms. Canadian North Western Pulp & Power Company 
acquired the first North American Kamyr installations by ordering two 250 daily ton kraft 
systems in 1955. The same year IP installed a 150 ton kraft unit at Camden, Arkansas, 
Gulf States Paper Company built a 350 ton kraft unit at Demopolis, Alabama, and 
Weyerhaeuser Timber Company added a 150 ton kraft unit at Longview, Washington. 
The U.S. mills alone totaled annual capacity of half a million short tons (2,000 lbs.). 
World-wide Kamyr installed 50 continuous cooking systems between 1948 and 1959, and 
its remarkable scale economies had sizeable effect on the North American pulp and paper 
industry. 383 
Kamyr Company was a particularly appealing choice of for kraft pulp firms, 
because it was capable of supplying complete large-scale plants on turn-key principle. 
The company had introduced the so-called Kamyr high–density alkali bleaching towers 
for multi-stage bleaching of kraft pulp, and other process innovations that completed its 
offerings of kraft process technology. The company successfully captured a rapidly 
growing share of the pulp and paper equipment business, and reached monopoly position 
                                                 
* Henceforth I use metric tons unless stated otherwise. 
382 Rydholm, Continuous Pulping Processes, 4. 
383 Rydholm, Continuous Pulping Processes, 4-5. 
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in some segments, such as the continuous cooking system. For managers of large-scale 
pulp and paper firms that looked to expand, such as the third largest U.S. corporation, St. 
Regis Paper Company, Kamyr was a predictable choice.384 
St. Regis pursued an aggressive growth strategy in the early 1950’s, achieving 65 
per cent increase in its sales between 1953 and 1956, reaching annual sales of $330 that 
year. The Kraft Pulp and Paper Division of St. Regis had been in particular hit by the 
war, as its four kraft paper mills in the Eastern U.S. mixed kraft pulp from its own mill in 
Tacoma, Washington, and Scandinavia. In 1946, the company initiated a Southern kraft 
strategy by acquiring the Florida Pulp and Paper Company, thereby assuming the 
employment of James H. Allen, who had been the closest associate of Richard J. Cullen 
at IP, and built and operated several kraft mills throughout the South. Allen assumed 
responsibility for the kraft operations of St. Regis, and became eventually the vice-
president of the company. Allen looked to acquire Southern kraft pulp and paper capacity 
to supply St. Regis’ already strong converting plants.385 
In 1949, the slump in demand for multi-wall bags prompted St. Regis to embark 
on a product diversification program in its kraft division, and to reorganize its supply of 
pulp. In 1954, the company announced plans for bleached sulphate pulp mill at Alberta, 
Canada, with a daily capacity exceeding 400,000 tons. The provincial Government of 
                                                 
384 Rydholm, Pulping Processes, 878-881; For a complete list of the largest U.S. pulp and paper firms by 
annual sales in 1953, 1955, and 1956, see: Smith, History of Papermaking, 539. In 1953 International Paper 
Company had the largest annual sales with over $673 millions, second Crown Zellerbach Company $287 
millions, St. Regis o$200 millions, and seventh largest, Westvaco $117 millions. Marathon Corporation 
ranked eleventh with its sales of $112 millions. 
385 Amigo and Neuffer, Beyond the Adirondacks, 100-101. 
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Alberta guaranteed a steady supply of white spruce and lodgepole pine. St. Regis also 
contracted with the Kamyr Company for state of the art technology for the mill.386 
St. Regis’ new mill demonstrated also how Sweden had captured the lead in the 
sulphate process technology. The new mill utilized the Kamyr continuous process that 
consisted of six-stage bleaching with chlorine dioxide, producing allegedly the brightest 
kraft pulp without any weakening of strength. It also marked the stabilization of the three 
basic technologies of modern mass sulphate pulp and paper production: The spray 
chemical recovery unit, continuous sulphate cooking process, and multi-stage bleaching. 
These technologies were controlled by specialized equipment supplier firms, such as the 
Kamyr Company and C-E, that did not wish to enter pulp and paper production. With this 
development a long wave of technological learning in the sulphate pulping reached a 
culmination point.387 
Stabilization meant increased systematization of technological learning, 
epitomized in the disciplined style of research and development, and control of 
knowledge by the leading equipment suppliers. Kamyr, B&W and C-E employed large 
staffs of specialized engineers and patent portfolios in order to maintain a sustained, and 
controlled wave of technological learning. This effort also reinforced the boundary 
between the communities of papermakers and equipment suppliers, signified by a 
sharpening contrast of their respective organizational capabilities. 
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387 For an explicit statement of the impact of the stabilization of chemical recovery, multi-stage bleaching, 
and continuous cooking technologies on the world pulp and paper industry, see: United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization, World Pulp and Paper Resources and Prospects. New York: UN and FAO 
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Conclusions  
The evolution of the North American sulphate pulp and paper industry was 
characterized by dramatic growth and over-capacity, and punctuated by radical 
technological departures that offered new scale economies. Some striking observations 
are obvious. The early development of the North American kraft industry differed 
radically from that of all the other major pulp and paper segments, where entrepreneurs 
and managers coupled tight control of innovation with aggressive strategies of growth. A 
striking feature is the comparatively slow pace by which North American mills adopted 
the kraft pulp process, and this lag explains to a great degree why systematic research and 
development of the process was practically absent in the North America until the mid-
1920’s. 
The organization of operational and technological clusters in the kraft industry co-
evolved with the competitive structure of the North American pulp and paper industry. 
Small and medium-sized firms in the New England and Lake States were first to adopt 
widely the kraft process. These mills adapted the basic manufacturing technologies to 
their limited operations and failed to consider alternatives with larger economies of scale 
potential. The division of chemical recove ry technology into two distinct schools, rotary 
and stationary recovery furnace, demonstrated the effects of organization of the Lake 
States kraft industry on innovation between 1915 and 1936. The rotary recovery furnace 
was the traditional technology with inherently limited economies of scale, whereas the 
stationary recovery furnace was radical technological departure invented in the early 
1910's that enabled substantial new economies of scale. 
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Comprehensive regional systems of innovation advanced the rotary recovery 
furnace technology in the Lake States, where independent kraft firms were too small to 
carry out substantial research and development work. The public research and 
development network diffused rotary furnace innovations quickly, and thus provided for 
that technology’s sustained competitiveness. The stationary chemical recovery furnace, in 
contrast, was advanced in relative secrecy by a few people without large-scale research 
capabilities, and fell under their broad patent monopolies. These factors impeded its 
diffusion, slowed down the rate of innovation, and the design did not become 
commercially viable until much later under very different circumstances. 
The effect of this organizational structure on technological learning is more 
obvious, when one considers the massive investment into new Southern mass production 
capacity by the largest pulp and paper enterprises, such as the International Paper 
Company, during the late 1920's. Intuitively one would expect the emergence of mass 
production of kraft pulp and paper to have accelerated innovation in stationary recovery 
furnace. Although the large scale Southern mills of IP did involve the implementation of 
many pioneering mass production technologies by 1931, they depended on publicly 
available rotary recovery technology.  
Critical improvements in the stationary recovery furnace resulted from efforts to 
improve productivity, in particular the heat economy, of basic pulping processes in 
Wisconsin during the Great Depression. Collaboration between pulp and paper firms and 
a leading boiler manufacturer, Babcock & Wilcox, enabled the latter an entry into 
chemical recovery unit industry. The entry strategy of B&W was characterized by 
acquisition of central intellectual property rights on the technology, as well as of 
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commercializing of full-scale kraft recovery units on turn-key principle. Only another 
leading boiler manufacturer, the Combustion Engineering, Inc., succeeded in entering the 
market with viable imitation. 
B&W and C-E practically took over the research and development work on the 
chemical recovery units, and diffused the technology rapidly throughout the North 
American pulp and paper industry. This facilitated investment into new capacity, but the 
expansion of the sulphate pulp and paper industry was accelerated by two other 
inventions, too. Specialized machinery suppliers developed continuous multi-stage 
bleaching that enabled product diversification for the kraft pulp and paper mills, and they 
successfully captured markets from more expensive white sulphite papers. In addition, 
the Swedish Kamyr Company developed the continuous sulphate cooking system that 
enabled new economies of scale. The specialized machinery suppliers controlled these 
technologies through intellectual property rights, and diffused aggressively the 
innovations throughout the global pulp and paper industry. 
The combination of rapid diffusion of innovation and strong intellectual property 
rights had deep impacts on the organization of technological learning in the kraft pulp 
and paper industry, where technological and operational clusters diverged. The 
community of papermakers became highly distinct from those that supplied the basic 
manufacturing technologies. Under these circumstances, technological innovation 
accelerated and increased the capital intensity of the kraft pulp mills, and as William 
Lazonick has demonstrated in the case of the British Cotton industry, this type of 
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technological change favored large-scale, vertically integrated firms.388 Changed 
circumstances that required large scale organizational capabilities sounded also the death 
knell even for the largest firms that specialized only into kraft pulp and paper. During the 
pulp and paper industry merger wave in 1950’s and 1960’s, the leading kraft firms were 
consolidated into divisions of giant multi-product forests firms. 
 
                                                 
388 William Lazonick, “Industrial Organization and Technological Change: The Decline of the British 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
VERTICAL LINKAGES OF LEARNING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MACHINE COATED PAPER, 1930-1960 
 
 
 
Printing firms engage in collaborative research and development with their 
suppliers and customers, even while they resist vertical integration. A sustained wave of 
such collaborative technological learning between 1930 and 1960 produced the radical 
technological departures that laid foundation for the modern mass printing industry. A 
fundamental element of this transformation of American printing industry was the 
development of new types of machine coated papers that released the full potential of 
modern electric mass printing equipment. A non-existent product in 1930, the market for 
machine coated papers totaled the annual value of over half a billion dollars by 1963. An 
evolving collaborative effort of printing, publishing, and paper firms to innovate 
underpinned this development.389 
Such organization of innovation continues to be critical for the sustained global 
competitiveness of the U.S. printing industry, but involves the problem of opportunism. 
As demonstrated by Susan Helper et al, pragmatic technological collaboration by a 
                                                 
389 1963 Census of Manufacturers. Industry Statistics, Pulp, Paper and Board Mills, Table 6A. 
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complex network of firms requires managers to resolve how the gains of new knowledge 
are distributed.390 Collaborative technological learning is vulnerable for opportunism, but 
such behavior may be controlled by mechanisms such as intellectual property rights, long 
term relationships, public policies, and culture. In 1989, the MIT industrial commission 
blamed lagging competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing industries exactly to inability to 
foster this type of collaborative vertical linkages of learning. 391 
Indeed, ability to foster vertical linkages of technological learning underpins the 
influential theory of competitiveness proposed by Michael E. Porter. Porter emphasized 
the importance of technological learning between related firms as a key to industrial and 
national competitiveness. His study of the competitiveness of the German printing press 
industry details how firms in printing machinery, paper, and printing industry can 
potentially benefit from sustained cooperation. 392 While academics agree on the role of 
innovation for sustained competitiveness of firms, industries, and regions, there is 
considerable debate about the optimum form of organization to induce innovation. 393  
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Following Porter, scholars have examined how and to what extent firms should 
cooperate while pursuing innovation. David Teece and others have suggested that firms 
capitalize on rapid technological change best by streamlining their internal organization 
and by avoiding inter- firm strategizing.394 William Lazonick has supported this view by 
arguing that large vertically integrated firms have stronger incentives and thus 
capabilities to facilitate technological change than small and disintegrated firms.395 In 
contrast, Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin have argued that networking offers the best 
corporate strategy against the uncertainties presented by technological change.396 Paul 
Robertson and Richard Langlois have suggested that the ability of firms to adopt 
vertically integrated or networked research and development organizations varies across 
environments, and depend critically on the scope of innovation and the relative maturity 
of the industries involved.397 David Mowery has argued that the organization of R&D 
capabilities in the 20th Century U.S. has occurred simultaneously with the shaping of the 
boundaries of firms.398 The debate on innovation, structure of the firm, and organization 
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of industry is indeed capturing momentum currently and - despite a recent attempt for a 
new synthesis is far from a settled issue.399 
Accurate understanding of the dynamics of technological learning in the printing 
and allied industries is of central importance for policy makers and industry leaders who 
wish to foster innovation based growth. This study analyses the dynamics of 
collaborative innovation during the formative decades of the modern mass printing 
industry between 1930 and 1960 by focusing on the development of machine coated 
papers. The study highlights technological, legal, and economic fundamentals of firms’ 
strategic behavior during critical periods of industry transition. 
 
Technological Relationships between the Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 
The printing, publishing, and paper industries established a complex industrial 
organization whose technological core is the printing process. Modern printing is a 
delicate and complex technological system that integrates a number of distinct bodies of 
technological knowledge, and therefore innovation requires substantial cooperation of 
firms in different industries. The foundation stone of the printing process are the printing 
presses themselves, but their performance is directly dependent on the characteristics of 
ink and paper. Cooperation emerges from the need to synchronize the operation of these 
different technologies in the printing process. In addition, the rate and direction of 
inventive activity was shaped forcefully by the publishing industry. Publishing firms seek 
competitive advantage by introducing innovative publishing products that require 
                                                 
399 Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies. Toward a 
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modification and improvement of the manufacturing processes of publications. These 
technological relationships assumed their modern shape in the late nineteenth century, 
and preconditioned the dynamics of innovation in the machine-coated paper in the 
twentieth century. 400 
The central technological feature of the transformation of the printing and 
publishing industry in the 1920’s and early 1930’s was the introduction of capital 
intensive custom-built web rotary magazine presses that mass-produced color magazines 
and catalogues with unprecedented economies of scale. These giant machines of the 
printing industry represented the third major stage in the evolution of the printing 
technology. The early twentieth century printing industry comprised three basic 
technologies that can be divided by the time of their origin and scale of production. The 
platen print presses embodied the oldest technology. These machines were mechanically 
simple and affordable, consumed paper in sheets, and were typically employed in small 
“neighborhood” shops for custom jobs. The cylinder presses represented the next 
generation in terms of scale of production, and were more technologically challenging 
and expensive. Cylinder presses could consume paper in sheets or rolls, and were 
employed for jobs large enough to realize economies of scale. The final stage of 
technological change was embodied in the rotary printing presses. These were the heavy 
weights in the world printing equipment and were employed to mass print newspapers, 
magazines, and catalogues. Only their application in magazine and catalogue printing is 
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Printing Presses. History and Development from the Fifteenth Century to Modern Times. Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1973; For historical review and description of printing technology in the 
mid-twentieth century, see: Victor Strauss, The Printing Industry. An Introduction to its Many Branches, 
Processes and Products. New York: R. R. Bowker Company 1967. 
 222 
examined here. Large web fed magazine rotary presses were always custom built at the 
large printing plants, and the use of large rolls of paper was an important element of their 
economy. 
Relative cheap and visually challenging mechanical color printing had been 
pioneered in the early nineteenth century, but the business remained dominated by small 
specialty production printing shops limited to batch production. The real mass production 
of magazines and catalogues in color was precipitated by the introduction of magazine 
web rotary printing presses by the leading printing machinery firms, most notably the R. 
Hoe Company. Web rotary printing presses were first introduced into newspaper 
publishing in the mid-nineteenth century, but these machines never printed in color. 
Magazine and catalogue printing presented further technological challenges, because the 
visual perfection, color printing, and folding process were central elements of product 
innovation. The first designated magazine rotary printing press was introduced in 1890, 
and two years later the first four-color rotary printing press was introduced. These 
machines marked a radical technological departure in the magazine and catalogue 
printing technology, but enabled only relatively modest boosts in the scale of production. 
After decades of active learning in printing technology, the industry was at the threshold 
of true color mass printing in the early 1930’s.401 
The printing industry contracted all its printing machinery from specialized 
suppliers, and had limited capabilities in the technology. This boundary resulted in part 
from the aggressive strategy of the leading printing machinery firms to control critical 
technologies with patent portfolios. Richard Hoe created perhaps the most successful and 
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technologically advanced printing press firm, but was never credited as original inventor. 
Instead Hoe took over patents from others whenever he could and often patented 
improvements upon others’ imperfect inventions. The successful control of technology 
by R. Hoe Company and some others wiped out many of the sma ller firms. By the late 
nineteenth century a handful of large equipment builders dominated the web-fed rotary 
printing press industry. Innovation in the rotary printing was driven by technological 
ideal of mass production. As in the newspaper printing press technology, managers 
utilizing expensive rotary magazine presses were driven to achieve as high output as 
possible.402 
The effects of technological change on the organization of the early twentieth 
century printing industry were dramatic. Managers of the printing industry recognized 
economies of speed and scale as key elements for success, and developed mechanisms to 
monitor and employ different technologies important for the printing process. The 
rationale and urgency of such response followed from the potential of innovation for 
established firms and industries. One industry analyst echoed wide concerns in 1933 
about the effects of the new magazine web rotary printing presses: “Two million 
magazine or mail-order catalogues are now printed with no more difficulty than were 
three or four thousand a quarter of a century ago.”403 Yet the transition into mass 
production of color magazines and catalogues was at its infancy in terms of business and 
technological knowledge at the time. 
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Innovation in the large custom-built web rotary printing presses spearheaded 
structural change in the whole printing and publishing industry. The giant machines 
replaced craft and batch production of quality color printing with mass production, and 
caused everybody in the business to exclaim about over-capacity. The other side of mass 
production was increased automation that triggered worries about "technological 
unemployment.” R. Hoe Company and its rivals competed to build bigger, faster, and 
more fully automatically controlled machines that could also do more demanding quality 
jobs. During the 1920’s the press manufacturers perfected the changing of paper rolls 
while the press was running, and many other similar improvements that facilitated 
economies of scale and cut labor costs followed.404 
Technological innovation in the manufacturing processes prompted organizational 
innovation by the leading publishing firms. Historian Theodore Pederson has showed 
how the new mass production technologies caused the largest American publishing 
houses to centralize printing operations. During the 1920’s, publishing houses such as 
Hearst Publications and the McCall Company relocated their printing operations from the 
New York area to Chicago in an attempt to cut costs. The vibrant Chicago-area printing 
industry was dominated by the plants of four national industry leaders, the Cuneo Press, 
R. R. Donnelley and Sons, W. F. Hall Printing Company and the Kable Brothers. These 
firms pioneered the investments in the capital- intensive magazine rotary printing presses 
that narrowed the gap between deadline and publication. Speedy publication ensured 
fresh editorial content and was an important sales factor. This carried the separation of 
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the magazine production from editorial staff, which often remained in New York. 
Specifically, the relocation was an attempt to gain economies of scale in the national 
distribution costs by shipping from the heartland, but offered other advantages too. Most 
importantly, the printing firms were a critical component in what was perhaps the world’s 
largest community of printing technology experts. Skilled printing craftsmen, 
papermakers, manufacturers of ink and printing equipment, and marketing-savvy 
businessmen mingled with each other in Chicago, and created an environment in which 
ideas and knowledge circulated smoothly.405 
For this community, new rotary printing technology held great potential. The 
high-speed color rotary printing presses delivered unprecedented visual appeal combined 
with low-cost, and thus catered to a large and expanding clientele in the magazine, 
advertising, and catalogue industries. Despite these lucrative prospects, the initial 
investments in the new technology by the leading printing houses fell short of providing 
quick returns. Efficient employment of the new process was repeatedly frustrated by 
technological problems. Magazine rotary presses were developed from newsprint presses 
that had released tremendous economies of scale in the newspaper industry since their 
introduction in the late nineteenth century, but the replication of this success with glossy 
color appeared almost impossible in the early 1930’s.406 
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Magazine and newsprint presses shared many technological features, but differed 
in two critical aspects. The most important difference was in the actual printing process. 
Newspapers were printed with single color ink that was dried by absorption in the paper. 
The leading printing houses aspired to print magazines and catalogues in color, and the 
process of printing was thus much more complex, involving the application of ink as well 
as its drying on the paper with specific machinery. The second major difference was in 
the folding of the final product. Newspaper folding was done without binding, and was 
fully mechanized in the late nineteenth century. The binding of magazine and catalogue 
printing jobs required labor intensive collating, folding, stitching, and pasting of covers 
on freshly printed and cut sheets. All this was done by hand in the early 1930’s. The 
difficulties of running fast long runs of paper through the magazine printing presses 
further suspended economies of scale and speed. Printers complained that existing lines 
of paper did not fit the new printing presses and curled, clogged, or simply disintegrated 
in the machine.407 
The introduction of web rotary printing presses involved complex scientific and 
technological challenges. Catalogue and magazine printers naturally looked toward the 
newspaper printers as a model. The smooth operation of the mass printing process was 
facilitated by technological routines shared by publishers, printers, and ink and paper 
suppliers. These inter- industry routines had been created upon the introduction of the 
newsprint rotary presses in the late nineteenth century. Newspaper publishers acquired 
the printing machines from specialized suppliers, and then prompted the ink and paper 
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suppliers to adapt their products to the new technology. Ink manufacturers developed 
new liquid inks that fit the fast printing, and the paper firms perfected a new kind of 
paper, the “roll newsprint.” American paper makers developed a specific sulphite-
groundwood cellulose mix to produce strong paper that did not clog the fast mass printing 
process. Newsprint was uncoated paper and its fiber composition allowed fast drying of 
the ink through absorption in the paper. It was delivered in standard size rolls that 
allowed the continuous printing of long runs instead of the traditional sheets. The 
introduction of magazine web-rotary printing presses presented similar need of concerted 
innovation, but the adaptation of involved technologies was a much more complex 
project than its nineteenth century predecessor.408 
The magazine web rotary printing press technology thus presented a compelling 
window of opportunity for the managers of the printing industry, and yet they must have 
been conscious of the challenges involved in the investment and transition into to the new 
technology. The color printing presented high quality demands on paper, and even 
depended on the development of totally new kind of coated magazine papers that were 
specifically adapted to the delicate high-speed color rotary printing. Similar need of 
improvement was required in the printing inks. 
The introduction of new printing technology opened many frontiers of innovation 
unexpectedly. Printing managers were the first to realize this as their efforts to run the 
newly installed magazine rotary presses were frustrated by problems due to paper and 
ink. They turned to their suppliers for the necessary improvements, and came to trigger 
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the development of an extended organization of technological learning that evolved 
through the following decades.  
 
Promise of Revolutionary Printing Technology: Need for New Paper 
Printing firms’ experiences of running the newly installed magazine rotary presses 
were characterized by frustration in the early 1930’s. The management and workers of a 
leading American printing house, the W. F. Hall Printing Company, observed first hand 
how hopes of new economies of scale were ruined by paper that clogged the printing 
machine and distorted visual imprint. The company operated the world’s largest printing 
plant in Chicago, and printed annually 180 editions of catalogues and almost 190 million 
magazines. The president of the company, Frank R. Warren, grew increasingly worried 
because of problems in running the recently acquired presses. He assigned in 1932 a 
production engineer to study the problems in detail. The engineer identified paper as the 
major source of trouble, and detailed specifications and requirements of paper for the 
four-color rotary press printing to the Chicago office of Westvaco (henceforth Westvaco). 
Consuming tremendous quantities of specialized papers, the printing firm had leverage 
over its paper supplier. At the time Westvaco managers attempted to expand their firms’ 
traditional markets in the East Coast, and enter the competitive Chicago market 
traditionally supplied by the Mid-West paper firms. The success of this strategy rested 
with the director of the Chicago office of Westvaco, John R. Miller, whose experience in 
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this position accumulated much of the skills and knowledge that eventually leveled him 
to the chief strategist and vice-president of the company in the 1940’s.409 
The production engineer at Hall summarized the quality requirements under three 
major points in his letter to Miller. The first one effectively encapsulated the scientific 
and technological challenges presented by the rotary printing presses for the printing 
papers. The super- imposed colors and the speed of the press required Westvaco to pay 
more attention to the high level of ink absorption of paper and to take care that the both 
sides of the paper had identical properties, the engineer wrote. The correspondence 
expressed a typical belief for the printing industry that the technological and commercial 
success of the new printing techniques was measured in terms of visual perfection. 410 
The problems of ink absorption were further complicated by the engineer’s 
second point, under which he provided specifications for the density of paper. Ink 
absorption of paper was sacrificed as the density of the paper increased, which in turn 
improved the quality of surface and lay of the ink. Third, the engineer required paper to 
be wound in rolls with uniform tension, so as to reflect the delicacy of the high-speed 
color printing process that was too often disturbed by curling paper. Uniform squeeze of 
the paper during the printing process was fundamental for the accuracy of the printed 
impression. Because the flatness of the paper was determined mainly by the distribution 
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of moisture, it was coupled intimately with ink absorption capacity. The list of troubles 
demonstrated a belief that for solutions one needed to turn to chemistry. 411 
The last item of the engineer’s letter informed Miller of the challenge of making 
an entry into the Chicago markets. The production engineer referred as quality standard 
to samples from the St. Regis Paper Company, Kimberly-Clark Company, and 
Consolidated Water Power and Paper Company. The printing industry possessed a 
competitive paper supplier industry, in which firms eagerly attempted to win over 
accounts from each other. In a technologically stable world, where printing paper would 
be standardized, the supplier relationships would fit economists’ predictions of 
transaction costs, supplier switching costs, and bargaining power. However, faced with a 
radical technological change that presented complex challenges to develop new kind of 
inks and papers, the relationships between basic users and suppliers were subject to more 
strategic than cost considerations.412 
The problem of the Hall Printing Company was that it could not release the 
potential economies of scale of its new color mass printing machines without 
complementary innovation in printing papers. The printer was trapped between the 
complementary qualities of coated and uncoated papers. Coated papers enabled visually 
perfect printing, but offered no economies of scale because they could not be mass-
produced at competitive prices. Uncoated papers were plenty and cheap in rolls, but they 
did not have sufficient printing qualities. The detailed analysis of troubles with Westvaco 
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uncoated papers by the production engineer reflected this need for technological 
innovation. 
Frank Warren understood that the perfection of the offset high speed printing 
process required the development of a totally new kind of paper, and therefore the 
problem could not be done away with simply by switching the paper supplier. He 
believed the paper industry was reluctant to improve its products, and promptly assumed 
initiative in such a venture. Inevitably, such a strategy required the Hall Printing 
Company to develop new capabilities in paper chemistry. In the early 1930’s, Warren 
hired one of the leading paper chemists of his time, the technical director of the 
Government Printing Office, Byron L. Wehmhoff. He was assigned to solve the problems 
caused by lagging scientific and technological understanding of properties of catalogue 
and magazine papers, and to help maneuver Westvaco to improve. Wehmhoff began his 
career at the Hall Printing Company by analyzing existing solutions presented by 
Westvaco to the paper related problems with the printing process. 
Warren’s actions were part of much broader effort of printing and publishing 
industries to gain understanding and control of the technical change in printing processes 
in the early 1930’s. Traditionally the industry had relied on contracting all its machinery, 
and all chemical and paper supplies. As the sources of innovation resided outside the 
organization of the printing and publishing industry, the firms had acquired little 
capabilities in underlying technologies. The introduction of the rotary high-speed presses 
rapidly disturbed the balance of these historical technological relationships between users 
and suppliers, as the managers of the large volume printing firms identified the need to 
coordinate innovation in paper, ink, and machinery. Standardization offered a central 
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method to configure the different components of high-speed printing. Industry-wide 
cooperation on the chemistry of new printing processes was channeled via the Printing 
Industry Division of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. In late 1934, the 
printing industry formalized research cooperation into a Graphics Art Research Bureau, 
whose primary interests lay in the latest developments of offset and color rotogravure, 
photo-mechanics of color photography, synthetic resins, rubber, and other chemical areas. 
All these technologies were undergoing rapid change that potentially had dramatic effects 
on the economics of the printing industry, and the rationale of research cooperation was 
to understand and control this impact.413 
Wehmhoff’s function at the Hall Printing Company was to synchronize the 
different technologies involved in high-speed offset printing. He translated the problems 
of adapting the printing machinery, ink, and paper into the language of chemistry. In 
addition he systematized and improved the quality of research on paper at Hall Printing 
Company, but this work remained limited and confined by the existing organizational 
capabilities of the firm. It is very suggestive that almost all the work of Wehmhoff was 
directed at improving the uncoated paper in order to perfect the mass color printing, and 
that he and the firm management failed to begin research into the future potential of 
coated papers. This suggests that Warren hired Wehmhoff to solve immediate practical 
problems, rather than to engage the talented scientist in strategic long term research and 
development work.  
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In his correspondence with the Westvaco people, Frank Warren quoted at length 
the long chemical analyses and opinions Wehmhoff submitted to him. Warren needed 
Wehmoff’s expertise and credibility, because Westvaco continuously explained away 
quality problems in terms of highly specialized scientific and technological practices of 
paper testing. Warren and his employees simply lacked the capability and resources to 
negotiate with such arguments. Nevertheless, enough opinions were exchanged to reach 
an agreement that uniform quality of paper was the critical problem. This conclusion 
placed the testing practices squarely in the middle of the correspondence. Warren opened 
an important letter to John Miller in April 1934 by quoting at length Wehmhoff, who 
argued that specific tests used by Westvaco to determine the printing quality of paper 
were “of but little value in maintaining uniform quality.”414 Wehmhoff scrutinized in a 
judgmental tone a letter by Paul B. Lacy that detailed all the different testing practices 
Westvaco employed to standardize quality. The critical question for Wehmhoff was 
whether testing guaranteed the necessary standard quality of paper if performed at the 
paper mill or the printing plant. Westvaco’s Lacy was reluctant to accept testing at the 
customer plant as credible, and argued that there was no scientific basis for such 
arrangement. Wehmhoff lamented Lacy’s accompanying and belittling analysis of the 
testing capabilities of the Hall Printing Company by stating that they reflected a condition 
of the past, and not the recently improved testing laboratory. Wehmhoff reiterated the 
critical point of the letter: “The true value of any tester for determining printing quality of 
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paper cannot be made in a paper mill. The test must be correlated with actual printing 
results. This is what we are now beginning to do.”415 
Quite obviously, the relationship between the Hall Printing Company and its 
paper supplier was becoming increasingly tense. Acute problems with Westvaco papers 
at the printing plant produced a stream of telephone calls, wire telegrams, and letters. In 
early 1935 the vice-president of the Hall Printing Company blamed the poor and varying 
quality of Westvaco coated paper for serious troubles with printing processes. Hall used 
coated paper to include visually important inserts in the trendy Pictorial Review that was 
otherwise printed on uncoated paper. This reflected an industry practice to experiment 
with new technologies by dividing large jobs into smaller, technologically different, sub-
jobs. This allowed the printer to try out innovative techniques first on a, but required that 
the different sections were collated by hand and bound together. This time the tactic 
backfired because the Westvaco coated paper curled badly and the printer fell behind of 
the delivery of some two and half million copies of Pictorial Review. The paper did 
simply not rest flat during the high speed printing process. The only option was to slow 
down the machinery from the normal speed, although this meant inevitably falling behind 
the delivery date of March sixth. 416 
Westvaco attempted to respond to the worsening situation by placing its technical 
expert J. C. Reynolds at the printing plant, but instead of promptly acting on the problem, 
he criticized how the plant was operated. Although he admitted Westvaco had to make an 
attempt to get paper to lay flat during the printing process, Reynolds emphasized 
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problems in the printing machinery and plant organization: “The real trouble at the Hall 
plant is, there are too many fingers in the pie. They badly need a real printer to run their 
plant, and do away with a whole lot of scientific monkey-business, which slows up their 
operations.”417 
In May 1935, Peter Massey of the Hall Printing Company concluded that the 
problems with the printing process had reached proportions that threatened the viability 
of the whole business. Frustrated by the regular channels of communication with 
Westvaco, he wrote directly to the paper firm’s vice president, David L. Luke, Jr. The 
Luke family controlled Westvaco, and David Luke was destined to assume the 
presidency and was already de facto acting as such. Massey complained that problems 
with the quality of Westvaco paper cost a lot of money and were eroding the reputation of 
the Hall Printing Company. The letter contained an exhaustive review of problems with 
four months of deliveries of paper that impressed with scientific, technological, and 
economic details. The chief problem was the varying quality of different paper deliveries, 
which disturbed the delicate printing process. Westvaco people were oblivious of these 
problems, Massey argued:  
 
The actual paper cost on some of these items has been presented to your 
representative but no action has been taken and there is too much of tendency 
‘poobah’ and ‘poopoo’ such matters which finally results in considerable sales 
resistance throughout the organization. To check up on all of the various items 
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and determine just how they were allocated and disposed of, would, I am sure, be 
of mutual benefit.418 
 
Alarmed, David Luke, Jr. responded with promise of a swift change in attitude to 
the printer. At the time Luke was in the midst of crafting a new corporate strategy for 
Westvaco and all too aware of the problems threatening his company. Numerous memos 
had informed Luke and other top management of Westvaco that its traditional markets 
such as that for bag paper were shrinking. Increasingly, paper bags were converted from 
fancy kraft instead of kraft paper, thus allowing visually spectacular printing. This 
provided a new advantage to the integrated paper bag mills of the Advance Bag 
Company, Thilmany Paper Company, Northern Paper Mills, and others. These leading 
firms had hammered down the price on fancy kraft bags within a short time. Westvaco 
was steadily losing its former clientele in the disintegrated paper bag converting industry. 
Herman Orchard complained to Westvaco that his paper bag firm, the Orchard Paper 
Company, could not meet the competition by fully integrated bag mills. A Westvaco 
employee summarized the effects of the structural change for the company:419 
 
We believe West Virginia is facing a definitive problem, and sooner or later we 
must face the fact that we have got to put out papers of this kind or equip 
somebody to meet the self-contained mill competition. We have definitively lost 
business in this territory which was formerly on plain Kraft and which is now on 
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fancy Kraft. And without question, New York faces the same situation. The writer 
knows that a great many New York department stores are using these kind of 
papers exclusively. Mr. Orchard states that it has become increasingly difficult to 
take our paper, print it, and convert it and meet the self-contained mill 
competition. 420  
 
Herman Orchard hoped to erect a bag factory at the Westvaco paper mill in 
Covington and turn his company around, but David Luke and his associates had already 
decided to retreat from the depressed bag paper business in 1934. Instead of waiting for 
demand to pick up for their existing paper lines, the managers of Westvaco aspired to 
enter new markets with more promising prospects. They observed how their big clients, 
the leading printing and publishing houses underwent transformation that precipitated 
significant change in the structure of demand structure for printing papers. Their vision 
was very clear: the future trend was the coated magazine and catalogue papers. Their 
problem, too, was clear. Westvaco lacked organizational capabilities to develop such 
papers, and lagged far behind competitors, the Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Consolidated 
Water Power and Paper, and the Mead Corporation. Moreover, the company had wasted 
opportunities to learn and innovate with a large entrepreneurial customer, and actually 
frustrated the initiatives by Hall Printing Company. Now David Luke attempted to 
change this attitude and began an intense effort to imitate the practices of other 
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companies. Indeed, vertical cooperation between publishers, printers, and papermakers 
increased and accelerated innovation in the printing papers and processes in the 1930’s421 
 
Innovation in the Magazine Business: Demand for New Printing and Paper 
Technology 
The opportunities offered by innovation in the printing processes differed greatly 
for publishing, printing, paper, ink, and equipment supplier firms. In the 1930’s the most 
significant determinant of innovation in the mass printing processes was the emergence 
and success of new visual print culture that was characterized by photorealism. In his 
impressive study of American advertising culture, Jackson Lears has demonstrated how 
the new technologies of visual reproduction in the early twentieth century were coupled 
with mass production and circulation. The same emphasis on mass circulation applies to 
the structural change of the American publishing industry in the 1920’s and 1930’s. 
However, historians of visual print culture often fail to recognize that the early twentieth 
century “visual revolution” was underpinned by a complex wave of innovation in the 
printing processes. As is readily evident, mass production of visual prints continued to 
pose significant technological challenges in the 1930’s and required significant research 
and development work. The entrepreneurs who spearheaded the new American visual 
print culture in the early twentieth century recognized technological innovation in the 
printing machinery, ink, and paper as central for the realization of their strategy. 
Publisher’s demand for improved mass production of visually pleasing magazines and 
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catalogues dictated to a great degree the dynamics of innovation in the machine coated 
paper in the 1930’s422 
The American magazine and catalogue business underwent a structural change 
between 1920 and 1960 that was characterized by increased mass production and 
consolidation. Historian John Tebbell has argued that during the 1920’s a new format of 
mass circulation magazines began to replace the incumbent magazines established during 
the magazine revolution of late nineteenth century. In 1922, De Witt Wallace created the 
Reader’s Digest that evolved into the world’s most widely circulating magazine, and 
others followed the suit. Harold Ross established the New Yorker and in 1923 two recent 
Yale graduates, Henry R. Luce and Briton Hade launched the Time magazine. The new 
magazine format emphasized advertising revenue and placed a distinct emphasis upon the 
visual outlook that was accompanied by a witty and daring editorial style. Strong 
emphasis on visualization changed the mail-order and other catalogue business too. Yet 
advertising catalogue publishers had to care less about the politics of reading and looking, 
and could pursue economies of scale and speed more blatantly. Most successful of the 
new type of magazines secured often first mover advantages in brand recognition and 
distribution, and continued to tower over the magazine publishing industry for decades.423 
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The magazine industry was championed by entrepreneurial industry outsider 
Henry R. Luce, and his Time Inc. flourished by introducing new magazines and capturing 
business from incumbent publishing houses. Fuelled by the success of Time, Luce 
aggressively expanded his mass publishing business through innovative combination of 
editorship, visual design, and distribution. The Time Inc. started from nothing in the 
1920’s, and generated 1.3 million dollars in revenue in 1928. The success of the Time 
Inc. was based Henry Luce’s pioneering understanding of how technological innovation 
changed the production of printing. By requiring his printers to adopt the latest 
technology, Luce looked to simultaneously reduce the unit cost of magazine issue 
drastically and accomplish unprecedented visual design. In 1930, Time passed important 
milestones by printing for the first time a 60-page issue, followed by a 68-page issue, the 
first portrait in color on the cover, and its first maps. These innovations were enabled by 
the adoption of new printing technologies that began to reach critical economic threshold 
by the early 1930’s.424 
One harbinger of the structural change in the printing industry was the new thirty-
three story building of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company in the New York City that 
integrated all production phases of publishing and printing into a single plant in 1931. On 
the sixth floor were 25 new heavy printing presses that spearheaded the technological 
change in the industry. A battery of Hoe rotary magazine presses, Miehle cylinder 
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presses, web presses and few other ones were an integral part of the new design of the 
printing process that embraced mass-production. The manufacturing process of the 
company’s thirty-four periodicals and over 14 million annual other publications were 
divided into functional phases at different floors of the building. The urban print plant 
epitomized attempts of the leading printing and publishing firms to mechanize and 
streamline the manufacture of books and periodicals. The production of magazines and 
catalogues was a particular challenge because their different sections required distinct 
paper and printing techniques, and the final product had always to be assembled and 
folded with separate machines. Typically the cover sheets required fancy outlay and 
paper, whereas the inside pages were by comparison visually modest and thus more easy 
to print.425 
Fortune was another brainchild of Henry Luce and became synonymous with his 
success. The magazine spearheaded also the innovative photographic visual design of the 
mass circulation magazines that became more numerous in the late 1930’s. Luce and his 
staff began the planning of Fortune in 1928 to celebrate the decade long economic 
prosperity. They chose a visually unprecedented rich format to express this intention, as 
well as to generate a strong stream of advertising revenue. Instead of simply printing 
announcements by advertisers, the Fortune staff designed advertisements placed in it. 
The integration of advertising design and sale of promotional space reveals how the 
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editorial staff took an uncompromising approach to the visual design of the new 
magazine.426 
The grandiose design of the magazine involved costly printing, which was paid 
for with the unheard price of one dollar per issue when most magazines, such as the Time, 
sold for fifteen cents. Luce contracted Thomas M. Cleland, one of the America’s most 
distinguished typographers, to perfect the design of the magazine, and he chose to pursue 
a classic, elegant, and costly style. Cleland specified 18th century Baskerville as the body 
type and contracted the English Monotype Company to manufacture it. The text was 
printed in letterpress and illustrations reproduced using a sheet- fed gravure printing press 
on “wild wove antique” that eliminated the glare of usual coated papers. The cover sheet 
was almost as thick as cardboard and had to be gathered and sewn by hand.427 
Printing of the first issues of Fortune was a craft-based, labor intensive process. 
Only one printing plant in the United States, the Osborne Chromatic Gravure Company in 
East Orange, New Jersey, could print in the specified gravure style. The printing process 
involved a three-color, sheet- fed gravure press, then another press printed the monotone 
pictures, and each side of the sheet had to be run separately. The antique paper stock 
warped and shrank, forcing the printer to stop presses and make adjustments frequently. 
The production averaged eight thousand copies in one eight-hour shift. The ready pages 
were trucked to the Cuneo Eastern Press in Brooklyn, where letterpress, borders, text, and 
cover –that often required seven different runs- were printed.428  
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Such a printing process drained profits from Fortune, and the Time Inc. 
management rushed to examine ways to improve productivity. The publisher acquired 
specialized offset printing process –sadag gravure- with cutting edge German presses to 
manufacture Fortune, but the process was immediately “faced with seemingly unsolvable 
problems.” The printing firm now initiated cooperation between different suppliers. Time 
Inc. also contracted the Sorg Paper Company from Ohio to develop a more suitable paper 
for the offset printing process. Yet the quality of paper remained insufficient to satisfy 
toward conflicting demands of visual quality and mass production. As Fortune headed 
toes seemingly unavoidable failure, Luce and his associated initiated a new research and 
development project with one of the leading coated paper makers, the Champion Coated 
Paper Company. The crash program produced a new coated magazine paper that replaced 
the Sorg paper by 1932. The Champion paper was lighter, easier to fold, enabled high 
quality visual printing, and did not clog too easily the printing press. The new printing 
paper allowed the integration of the whole printing and binding process into the single 
plant of the Jersey City Printing Company in the same year.429 
Adoption of the latest mass color printing technology and cooperation with paper 
and ink suppliers formed the foundational of success for Fortune. In a bold and risky 
fashion Fortune had based its marketing strategy on the successful pairing of mass 
production and cutting edge visual design before this was technologically possible and 
economically feasible. In the magazine industry others looked at awe as Fortune 
skyrocketed in the midst of the Great Depression, increasing its subscriptions from 
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34,000 in 1930 to 139,000in 1936, as well as increasing its advertising revenue from 
427,000 dollars to almost two million in the same period. Henry Luce was able to 
coordinate a wave of technological innovation that restructured the publishing and 
printing industries, and the managers of Time Inc. continued to emulate the concept.430 
Time Inc. management monitored carefully technological change that potentially 
changed the ways magazines were produced. The experience with Time and Fortune had 
convinced Henry Luce of photojournalism as the emerging trend of the magazine 
business, and he encouraged experiments with it in his magazines. Another result of these 
routines was the diversification into the news film industry with the brand name March of 
Times. On Luce’s order the Time magazine published in 1933 its first major photographic 
feature, an eight-page layout on the London Economic Conference. Such experimentation 
was more easily carried out in Fortune since it was manufactured with more advanced 
printing technology. In an important way Fortune facilitated the development of 
American photojournalism, too. Its potential prompted the enterprising Henry Luce to 
formally propose in June 1936 his managers the introduction of a magazine that he 
planned to be:431 “A bigger and better collection of current photographs than is available 
in all the current magazines plus all the Sunday gravure supplements combined. 
Altogether about 200 photographs with full explanatory captions.”432 
The plan would be realized in 1936 with Life, the first mass circulating magazine 
built solely on the idea of photojournalism. The new magazine was planned in effect 
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around three revolutionary views of the magazine business. First, it employed the latest 
photograph and printing technology to achieve high quality photo printing at 
unprecedented unit price. Second, the pricing of the magazine was not based on the 
traditional model, according to which subscription and newsstand sales generated enough 
revenue to almost break-even and advertising revenue the profits. Instead, Luce reversed 
this pricing scheme. He argued that subscriptions should generate 1.3 million dollars of 
the planned 3 million dollars in revenues, and advertising the rest. The magazine was 
priced low at ten cents in attempt to maximize circulation. Third, the editorial design of 
the magazine reversed the functions of written text and visualization. In Life photographs 
conveyed the news, while written text was only an additional illustration, Luce and his 
associates argued.433 
Luce and his closest associate, Charles L. Stillman, were personally in charge of 
the design of the magazine. Life was prepared simultaneously and independently of the 
other pioneer of photojournalism, Look, which grew out from the rotogravure section of 
the Des Moines Register and Tribune newspaper. The two magazines differed in 
important respects, however. The decisive technological difference between the Life and 
Look was the approach to visual design. Look was printed on relatively cheap uncoated 
paper as its publishers emphasized less visual perfection. 434 Henry Luce, on the contrary, 
insisted on visual perfection and reserved 2.2 million dollars of the publication budget to 
paper and printing, whereas editorial expenses accounted only for 250 thousand dollars. 
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Despite of such investment, the most difficult task in the making of Life was to meet his 
requirement of “quality reproduction of photographs on coated paper”. 435 
Luce was aware of the paradox that the printing technology enabled his 
innovative magazine format, but problems with the printing papers potentially ruined 
economies of mass production. Coated paper was practically impossible to purchase in 
rolls in 1936, because typical visually high demanding magazines were printed on sheet-
fed presses in relatively small numbers. Champion Coated Paper Company could not 
supply Life with paper, and Time Inc. turned to the Mead Corporation that supplied Time 
with paper. Mead agreed to supply coated paper suitable for high quality printing in rolls, 
but at relatively high cost. Stillman examined the reasons for such a high price, and 
learned that the coating process used by Mead required each side of paper to be treated 
separately in one continuous operation. Worried about the paper supply, Stillman 
contracted with Mead for a research and development project focused on new coating 
method, which contributed to the introduction of the Mead Enameline coated paper.436 
The printing of Life showcased the challenges of the revolutionary magazine 
business format. It required extended cooperation between the publisher and the company 
it contracted for printing, the Chicago based R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company. 
Technological problems with the high speed magazine rotary printing process forced the 
publishers, printer, and the paper and ink suppliers to improvise innovative solutions that 
maintained profitability. Stillman decided to print the experimental “dummy” version of 
the magazine on two presses formerly used to produce mail-order catalogues at the 
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Donnelley plant in Chicago, but these machines had to be adapted to the new quick-
drying ink necessary for economic printing of photojournalism. Just two weeks before the 
deadline for the “dummy” issue, the printing plant staff informed Time Inc. management 
that continuing problems with the two presses would prevent a full delivery. New 
printing machinery was ordered immediately, but as a first-aid the company relied on 
additional costly rotogravure and sheet- fed presses.437 
Despite the extended experimentation with the printing process, production of the 
first real number of Life was far from true mass production of a sort necessary to realize 
Luce’s business plan. When four rotary presses at the Donnelley Chicago printing plant 
began to roll the magazine, it took an extra six hours to reach the desired quality of 
printing. The collating of the twelve sections of the magazine proved unexpectedly the 
critical bottleneck of the production process. Four teams of girls first collated the 
sections, which were then fed into machines that bound the magazine together. The slow 
progress of their work built a sense of emergency. Eventually Donnelly management 
shuffled labor from other jobs to process Life. Utilizing all available labor at the huge 
printing plant, the production averaged seven thousand copies an hour. This was a rate 
that ran 50,000 copies behind the schedule and desperately too slow to produce the full 
print of 466,000 copies of the first issue in November 1936.438 
Demand for Life exceeded all expectations. The first issue and many subsequent 
ones were sold out in record time. Printing technology simply lagged behind the mass 
magazine revolution pioneered by Henry Luce and his associates. Time Inc. management 
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was trapped between soaring circulation and printing problems. The company’s historian 
Robert Elson has asserted that it was impossible to produce more copies. The pre-
publication plans for Life called for the weekly production of 400,000 copies in 1936, and 
one million in 1939. With this pace of printing the machines ran constantly and were 
stopped only to change plates for the next issue. The printing process involved heat 
drying of the ink, and if the paper web in the high-speed press stopped –as it frequently 
did- it caught fire. The shortage of paper presented another problem for the mass 
production of magazines. Stillman had contracted Mead Corporation for 10 thousand tons 
of coated paper at the price of $98 per ton, but within six months of the first issue he 
projected a demand of 40,000 tons in 1940. Mead and other paper companies did not 
have the capacity to meet such a demand. The supply was so precarious that the 
production staff of Life leaned out their office windows and count if the freight cars 
arriving at the Donnelley printing plant were sufficient to keep the presses going.439 
Technological bottlenecks in the printing process presented the most serious 
problems for Luce’s revolutionary business plan. Over sixty per cent of expenses of 
associated with Life came from paper and printing. Luce had emphasized advertising 
revenue instead of subscription or newsstand sales, and therefore the cost of paper and 
printing. This was bad news for Luce, because he had fixed the price of advertising the 
time of contracting and was not tied into unexpectedly rising circulation. Luce responded 
to this by announcing in December 1936 the doubling of advertising prices in the 
beginning of the following February. However, many pre-publication contracts included 
the privilege of ordering additional space at the original rates. Luce was locked in a 
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situation where the soaring circulation and the increasing advertising deepened his 
losses.440 
Time Inc. managers were desperate to turn around the economics of miraculously 
successful Life, and therefore reconsidered the organization of the magazine’s 
manufacturing process. An attempt to improve the efficiency of the printing process was 
natural because it accounted for such a large share of the costs. Charles Stillman decided 
to persuade Life’s paper suppliers and printers into a new kind of relationship. He devised 
a plan that shared savings that resulted from improved productivity. Time Inc. had 
invested in total five millions in the introduction of Life within one year from the first 
issue. During the same period the plan induced three and a half million dollar in 
investment into new machines by the paper firms, and two million spent by printing firms 
on new equipment.441 
The search for improved efficiency prompted Stillman to learn more of the 
science and technology of paper making too, and he discovered that a number of firms 
were actively developing machine coated printing papers. Yet, such efforts were 
significantly impeded by the Great Depression, but this fact only gave an additional 
advantage to Stillman who searched for bargain priced innovation. Stillman discovered 
that the Consolidated Water Power & Paper Company owned critical patents by Peter J. 
Massey for the machine coating of paper. Massey was originally a printer with the A. F. 
Hall Printing Company in Chicago, where he had learned the offset printing technology. 
Massey devised a process to apply the offset printing method to the machine coating of 
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paper. The machine coater was installed on the paper machine of the Bryant Paper 
Machine in Kalamazoo, Michigan, at a cost of $150,000. This was probably the first 
machine coating paper machine in the U.S. Massey introduced his idea to the 
Consolidated, which installed it at its mill in Wisconsin Rapids. The cooperation of 
Massey and Consolidated produced improvements and more patents, and Consolidated’s 
annual production of machine coated paper skyrocketed from nothing in 1933 to almost 
five tons in 1935, and twenty-eight tons in 1937.442 
The technological features prompted Henry Luce to cherry pick Consolidated 
from a narrow pool of firms that could manufacture machine coated paper in the 1930’s. 
Others included incumbent book and printing paper firms. The Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation had developed and patented, in some collaboration with the Mead 
Corporation, a novel roll-coater known as the KCM roll coater. Gerald Muggleton at the 
Combined Locks Paper Company had developed the first double- and triple coating 
machine, but it proved only marginally successful in the long run. The KCM and 
Combined Locks coaters allowed only slow production speed, and required the use of an 
expensive mix incorporating groundwood and sulphite pulp. These technological features 
of manufacturing process increased the price, and therefore Time Inc. managers 
dismissed them as too costly. 443 
The Consolidated process, on the contrary, was relatively fast and produced cheap 
machine coated magazine paper. It used only cheap groundwood pulp whereas other 
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machine coated paper firms applied solely or large quantities of costly sulphite pulp. 
Competing papermakers complained that the groundwood paper did not adapt to high 
quality printing jobs. Consolidated enjoyed a tremendous success with the Time Inc., and 
eventually some 95 per cent of its mill capacity was tied into the production of 80,000 
tons of machine coated magazine paper in 1940. In fact, the success was based on the 
cooperative effort of the Time Inc. and Consolidated to improve the printing quality of 
the groundwood machine coated paper.444 
Charles L. Stillman contracted the Consolidated for a research and development 
program that attempted to perfect the drying of ink on the paper. Due to this research 
program the printing quality of the groundwood machine coated paper improved enough 
to prompt Stillman in May 1937 to contract Consolidated for over 40,000 tons a year with 
a long term commitment of 17 million dollar value - the largest contract Time Inc. had 
ever done. The program reduced the price of Consolidated machine coated paper from 
100 dollars per ton in 1937 to 88 dollars in 1940. Against the success of this cooperation, 
Stillman credited himself for the new kind of coated paper, and claimed that “Life was the 
midwife for long overdue children of other people’s inventive genius.” The bold 
statement reveals how a extraordinary phenomena Time Inc. was in the publishing 
industry in the 1930’s. The pace of innovation in the printing paper industry was slow in 
part because the magazine business was so depressed.445 
The urgency to perfect mass production of Life had created close relationships 
between the publisher and its paper suppliers. Yet, the publisher was careful not to trade 
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profitability for novelty, and began to foster a competitive pool of paper suppliers. In 
1939 Stillman contracted the Champion Paper and Fiber Company for a long-term 
delivery of paper made from Southern pine. The Champion management planned to build 
a new paper mill close to its Houston bleached-pulp mill. To finance the mill the 
Champion management asked Time Inc. to invest 1.75 million dollars in its 6-per cent 
Preferred stock. Stillman persuaded his board to invest one million dollars that was 
enough in his view to guarantee the continuation of the Champion plan. The maturation 
of machine coated printing paper technology allowed Time Inc. now “supplier 
switching”-tactics that controlled the price of paper.446 
The Champion plan signified a turning point in the relationship between Time 
Inc. and its paper suppliers. As the machine coated paper technology matured and 
stabilized, the publisher traded the feverish quest for innovation for efforts to standardize 
the magazine paper. This behavior reflected the awareness of Time Inc. management that 
the pool of potential suppliers was inherently limited, because machine coating of paper 
required very specific capabilities. Moreover, on the contrary of what Charles Stillman 
claimed, the leading paper firms developed actively machine coating technologies and 
had secured broad intellectual proprietary rights that potentially impeded competition. 
 
Controlling Innovation in the Magazine and Catalogue Paper Industry 
The developments in the magazine and catalogue industries during the 1920’s and 
1930’s presaged a significant structural change in demand. The leading pulp and paper 
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firms did not respond to these prospects with intensive programs of research and 
development, but chose to innovate in a very cautious style. Selected firms with 
experience in the manufacture of the book paper did develop machine coated paper 
technologies throughout the 1930’s, but even then they were always looking for partners 
to share costs. This approach characterized the cooperation between Time Inc. and the 
Mead Corporation, Champion Coated Paper Company, and Consolidated Water Power & 
Paper Company. 
The managers of the Westvaco were caught off guard when its fiercest 
competitors locked in a high volume publishing firm as a customer through cooperation 
and innovation, while their own organization continued to ignore and downplay identical 
opportunities. Westvaco was a pioneer book paper firm in the U.S. and had ever since 
been the leading firm in tonnage. Yet, in the early 1930’s innovation appeared to reduce 
the firm to obscurity. Alarmed, David Luke recognized the urgency of a sweeping 
organizational change at the company. By 1934 he contracted R. Hazen to analyze the 
ability of the firm to innovate and recommend improvements. Hazen maintained that a 
systematic research and development department was the most efficient method to arrive 
at the new products the company sought. The study urged managers of Westvaco to study 
seriously how other firms innovated, and establish a specific development department 
with competent staff.447 
 
                                                 
447 R. Hazen, Suggested Procedure For Finding New Products Or Uses. Sept. 15, 1934. Westvaco 
Collection #1781, Box #148, Packet #6. 
 254 
Table 6-1. U.S. Patents on Coating of Paper, 1930-1959 
 
Years Patents 
1930-1939   72 
1940-1949 102 
1950-1959 173 
 
Source: Jack Weiner and Jerry Byrne, Coating Equipment and Processes. 
Appleton: The Institute of Paper Chemistry 1962, 176-178. 
 
Falling behind in research and development in the 1930’s made Westvaco 
vulnerable to the increasing patent portfolios of its competitors. Other leading book paper 
firms raced to file and acquire patents on coating of paper in order to diversify, evolve 
into new markets, and prevent competitors from following. Westvaco, on the other hand, 
was just beginning to recognize the strategic value of systematic research and 
development, and product diversification. Hazen’s study was a first step in that 
direction. 448 
Westvaco was a late comer in the race, and trailed far behind the Kimberly-Clark 
Company, Mead Corporation, Champion Coated Paper Company, and the Consolidated 
Water Power & Paper Company. David Luke explored the patent agreements between 
these leading firms and innovators in November 1934, while secretly asking his aides 
secretly to investigate ways to invalidate patents held by the Mead Corporation. 449  
Luke’s efforts to enter the machine coated paper industry faced mounting 
obstacles when the Kimberly-Clark Company and Mead Corporation established a jointly 
owned KCM Company to pool their patents on the machine coated magazine papers. The 
two leading firms now openly cooperated in the development of papers for the high-
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speed rotogravure and offset printing presses, and Luke was pushed further aside in the 
competition. The pooling of patents potentially amplified already strong dynamics of 
concentration in the machine coated paper industry. The Temporary National Economic 
Committee estimated in 1937 that the four largest machine coated firms, Champion, 
Consolidated, Kimberly-Clark, and Mead, controlled some fifty percent of the markets in 
machine coated free from groundwood, and almost all of the machine coated paper 
containing groundwood.450 
Realizing the advance positions of his competitors, David Luke devised a dual 
strategy in order to succeed in the machine coated paper business. He led a sweeping 
organizational change within the West Virginia Pulp and Paper in order to foster its 
capability to innovate. Second, Luke began to maneuver with the patent situation. He 
entered prolonged license negations with the holders of the leading patens, while 
simultaneously trying to infringe and invalidate the very same patents. The pairing of 
patent contracting and development of new organizationa l capabilities were 
complementary tactics. 
The most dramatic move of Luke was to hire Byron L. Wehmhoff away from the 
A. F. Hall Printing Company in 1936 to create and develop testing, research, and 
development routines at Westvaco. At the book paper firm the renowned paper chemist 
continued to improve its existing line of uncoated magazine and catalogue papers for 
mass printing presses, but more important was his responsibility to enable the 
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diversification into machine coated papers. Wehmhoff began his career by examining 
monthly all the mills of the Westvaco, as well as by touring the customer printing plants. 
Based on these visits he compiled a detailed report that suggested scientific and 
technological improvements on the observed problems. Over time the tone of these 
reports became more strategic, as Wehmhoff recognized that the structural change in the 
printing industry was catching momentum.  
Wehmhoff compiled his first monthly report in January 1936. It was, like all the 
subsequent ones, addressed to John R. Miller and passed on to David Luke. Wehmhoff 
brought to Westvaco a unique combination of systematic scientific thinking and an ability 
to adopt the perspective of customer printing plants. He was charged to collect 
information on paper quality at all the company mills and to produce coherent and 
comprehensive responses to any potential problems or challenges. When rotogravure 
printing firm complained of the paper quality of Westvaco’s Tyrone mill production, 
Wehmhoff ordered chemical laboratory tests of the paper. Having read the test results, 
the paper chemist fixed the problems by increasing the absorbency of concerned paper.451 
At the Mechanicsville mill the problems were more numerous, but more 
important was his study of the comparative printing qualities of the Mead, Fraser, and 
Westvaco papers upon the request of a client. Westvaco paper lagged behind others, 
Wehmhoff concluded, and he outlined a program of improvements. A review of problems 
at the Piedmont, Williamsburg, and Covington mills followed, in which Wehmhoff 
analyzed in detail complaints by big customers, such as the Chicago Rotoprint, Cuneo 
Printing Company, Webb Publications Company, and Hall Printing Company. Again the 
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chemist responded with testing, and recommended changes in the production process. 
Wehmhoff was now in charge of research and development at Westvaco, and the lack of 
previous routines required him to create and introduce them at the mills.452 
These changes improved Luke’s ability to contract cutting edge machine coated 
paper technologies. In summer 1938 George W. Mead offered Luke a license agreement 
on the Bair Color Pan patent -held by the KCM Company- with price of two dollars per 
ton of machine coated paper, and among other conditions proposed the division of 
markets and fixing of prices within the limits of antitrust laws. The patent of Thomas E. 
Bair for the “color pan” described a way to add the coating mixture, typically chalk and 
dyes, through the guiding wire of the Fourdrinier machine, and was considered by the 
industry as one of the most important ones. Yet, the high fee and unclear status of the 
KCM patents prompted Luke to explore the issue further. Luke suggested to his managers 
that the reason behind the licensing proposition was the attempt of Mead and the 
managers of Kimberly-Clark Company to end the patenting race:453 “Mr. Mead thought 
that it might be worthwhile to reconsider the value of the patents on the basis that it might 
be as well for several of us who are doing a fair amount of development work to 
cooperate a bit in this direction.”454 
Mead’s proposition may very well be interpreted as an attempt to pool the critical 
technologies in order to gain control of the emerging markets. The KCM Corporation was 
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a nucleus of such pool, and entry of new firms would have strengthened it. Westvaco and 
similar firms had to consider carefully the bid for entry into the cartel, and this required a 
broad examination of the whole machine coating technology. Luke asked Mead for more 
time to consider the proposal, and stud ied whether Wehmhoff’s research and 
development work on machine coated papers would have offered another option. Mead 
grew impatient with Westvaco and stated that if Westvaco refused to cooperate on the 
matter, he would demand licensing fees or sue the company for patent infringement. 
Luke was vulnerable to such demands because his company knowingly infringed the Bair 
patent. He began to draft a defense with other managers.455 
Westvaco began immediately to replace the Bair Color Pan at its mills with an 
alternative solution defined in an expired patent granted to a George Wheelwright, a 
notable Wisconsin paper manufacturer.456 The Wheelwright machine coating method was 
first installed at the company’s Southern mills at Tyrone and Piedmont, and Luke began 
to cons ider a tactic that would not alienate Mead and push Westvaco “too far from the 
party.” A few years later, however, the Mead Corporation would take over the 
Wheelwright Paper Company. Meanwhile, Luke deepened exchange of information with 
the Consolidated Paper Company, which was pioneering experiments on light-weight 
coated papers, and in a final turn prepared to contract patents from Peter J. Massey. 457 
                                                                                                                                                 
454 David L. Luke to E. S. Hooker, June 29th, 1938. Westvaco Collection #1781, Box #110, Packet #20. 
455 David L. Luke to E. S. Hooker, June 29th, 1938; David L. Luke to George W. Mead, June 30, 1938. 
Westvaco Collection #1781, Box #110, Packet #20. 
456 David L. Luke to E. S. Hooker, 30 June, 1938. Westvaco Collection #1781, Box #110, Packet #20. 
457 David L. Luke to Paul B. Lacy, 30June , 1938. Westvaco Collection #1781, Box #110, Packet #20. 
 259 
The all groundwood pulp machine coated paper produced with the Massey 
method had a great record with the Consolidated, and some of the leading Chicago 
printing firms. The problem for Luke was that the Westvaco had followed since its 
incorporation the strategy of fully integrated production of book papers based on sulphite 
pulp. The retooling of Massey process into sulphite process was difficult, as was the 
switching of sulphite mills into the production of groundwood pulp paper.458 
Luke took time to examine the Massey patents carefully. He concluded that they 
were a good bargain because the inventor was desperate to pay inheritance taxes. The 
inventor explained to Luke that his license negotiations had been fruitless with the 
Kimberly-Clark and Mead for various reasons and therefore offered an exclusive license 
for Westvaco at a fee of one dollar per coated paper ton. The Massey patents were an 
interesting option for Luke who tried to catch up with rivals, but we do not know if 
Westvaco actually took a license. In any case, we may be sure that Massey didn’t 
mention the central reason for his urgent need to license the patents. Massey machine 
coated patents were commonly believed to be strong and fundamental. In fact they were 
weak and Kimberly-Clark opted to infringe them instead of paying licenses. It could do 
so because it believed that by litigating Massey risked courts to invalidate the patents, as 
eventually happened in 1952.459 
The alternative to contracting innovations from outside sources was to develop 
new products independently. The responsibility for innovation at Westvaco rested with 
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Byron L. Wehmhoff. Despite of all the improvements the company had made during the 
1930’s, Wehmhoff had an alarming message to convey from the customers to his 
managers in December 1938: 
 
All our principal competitors have good machine coated papers now on the 
market, and the sales department has no doubt been asked the same question as 
put up to me at Donnelley’s recently: ‘When is West Virginia coming to life and 
going to produce a good machine coated sheet?’ I see more and more of this paper 
in printing plants every month. Some of it replacing Marva sheets, and others on 
jobs we might have got if there had been no machine coated competition. I do not 
want to be a ‘crepe-hanger’ but we are falling behind the procession in respect to 
machine coated papers, and I have seen nothing at the mills that would indicate 
we are much ahead of where we were two years ago. In the meantime the use of 
this kind of paper is growing rapidly and our competitors have something to 
offer.460 
 
The last item Wehmhoff mentioned referred to the new wave of technological 
innovation in the printing industry that was rapidly changing the demand structure for 
magazine, catalogue, and printing papers. The large printing firms, such as the Cuneo 
Press, Donnelley and Hall Printing Company, were changing the way they applied ink on 
the paper. This change was to a great degree triggered by the introduction of new kinds of 
inks, in particular the so called heat-set ink that was particularly developed for the web 
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presses. The installation of the new heat-set ink process and its operation was relatively 
costly, and beyond the reach of others than the largest firms.461 
The new technology was an integral part of Henry Luce’s revolutionary business 
concept of photojournalism. The first printing of the Life in 1936 had employed new 
quick-drying ink that required the design and construction of new type of a printing press. 
Experts estimated that it took one year to engineer and build such a machine, but instead 
of waiting Luce pushed for another crash program. Management at the Donnelley 
printing plant installed improvised gas-fired heaters on the printing presses in order to 
accelerate the drying of ink. Two years later, however, specialized machinery suppliers 
provided routinely such heat-dryers, Wehmhoff reported.462 
Heat-set inks improved the printing process by simplifying the delicate drying 
phase. Drying of the ink affected greatly the quality of print, and was influenced by the 
relative humidity of the printing room, amount of acid in the press fountain water, and by 
the qualities of paper. Ink dried faster on the uncoated than on coated paper. Also, the 
higher the pH of the coating on paper, the better the ink dried. Heat-set inks simplified 
this drying process because they didn’t involve oxidation, and thus they were not at all 
affected by relative humidity, press moisture, the pH of the press fountain water or the 
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characteristics of paper. Only the largest printing firms could afford the high capital 
intensity of the heat-set ink process.463 
According to Wehmhoff, the cold-set ink under development by the International 
Printing Ink Company had potentially similar effect on the printing industry. Cold-set ink 
could be applied to both sheet-fed and web-presses. The cold-set ink was distributed in 
solid form but kept liquid during the printing process by electrically heating the ink 
fountains, oil rollers and plate cylinders. The cold-set ink dried immediately at room 
temperature, and thus simplified the drying process significantly too. Its operation and 
installation was much lower than that of the heat-set ink. Because it was also adaptable to 
sheet- fed presses, the cold-set ink was probably going to spread rapidly within smaller 
printing firms too, Wehmhoff argued. He predicted a quick change in the demand 
structure of Westvaco papers:464 
 
The widening use of heat-set inks and the probable wider use of the cold-set inks 
would indicate that the use of carbonate papers like Marva, has reached, if not 
passed the zenith. These absorbent papers were the answer to high speed quality 
publication work on web presses as long as inks were all of the oil base type 
formerly used. Since these new inks can be dried between the first and second 
impressions, the absorbent qualities of carbonate filled papers are no longer of 
supreme importance when such inks are used.465 
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Employing the new ink-setting methods, the W. F. Hall Printing Company had 
been able to print four colors on machine coated paper with presses originally designed 
for use with halftone newsprint paper, which was an uncoated high-absorbent paper 
grade. Wehmhoff argued that the new inks caused printing firms to replace high 
absorbent papers with machine coated ones. Westvaco had to quickly respond to this 
change and begin systematic research and development of new machine coated papers, 
the chemist urged. Wehmhoff had, in fact, already begun such work by visiting the 
leading printing press firm Miehle Press Company in Chicago. The company owned 
numerous important patents on machine coating, and Wehmhoff had inspected the 
patents so David L. Luke could proceed in patent negotiations.466 
These efforts culminated with the introduction of new machine coated magazine 
paper. In January 1939, John Miller and David Luke, Jr. demonstrated the new Westvaco 
paper to Charles L. Stillman of the Time Inc., who was considering it potentially for Life 
magazine. Apart from differences in its wire and felt side, the Westvaco paper was good 
quality and light, Stillman concluded. Many of the mass circulation magazines, including 
Time magazine, had decided to shift into such machine coated papers, he told the paper 
managers. He also stated that the Champion Coated Paper Company, Consolidated Paper 
Company, Mead Corporation, and the International Paper Company all were actively 
developing these new machine coated papers, and that he already possessed sufficient 
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sources of innovation and supply. Nevertheless he agreed to arrange trial prints on 
Westvaco, whose prices were below competitor’s.467 
Westvaco magazine papers continued to lag behind others, but its people had 
renewed belief in their capacity to produce the critical breakthrough. In such a faith a 
manager informed Luke that temporary improvements in coated papers had been done to 
satisfy the American Home magazine and the Hearst Publications, “until we can produce 
a real Machine Coated cheaply.”468 As Luke decided to embark on intensified program of 
innovation, the issue was rather to perfect mass printing than to introduce new product. 
Perfection of the new printing technique required the orchestration of innovation between 
the printer and the ink and paper suppliers. Analyzing the problems with the drying of 
printing inks on different Westvaco papers in the Chicago area, Wehmhoff argued that 
the solution did not lie with improvements in the paper but in ink. The ink suppliers must 
alter their ink to fit the paper, he wrote.469 
These relationships proved critical when Westvaco management decided to 
intensify its development of improved machine coated papers. In an effort to emerge as 
leader in quality, Wehmhoff shuttled between printing companies and the Westvaco 
paper mills, and compared his products with those of Kimberly-Clark. The 
superintendent of the Kable Brothers printing plant detailed him in September 1940 the 
difference, as did the catalogue printers at the Sears Roebuck & Company. “We try to 
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make a ground wood roto sheet as good as Kimberly Clark Rotoplate,” Wehmhoff 
defined the meaning of these visits.470 
Kimberly-Clark had set the benchmark with the introduction of its light machine 
coated paper “Fallscoat”. The company innovated very much in identical way as 
Westvaco. That is, Kimberly-Clark fostered vertical linkages of learning across the 
different industries and firms engaged in the publishing and printing process. In such a 
vein, the company introduced its new light machine coated roto paper for catalogue 
printing for experimental purposes in the early 1940’s.471 
Wehmhoff’s complained that available chemical and mechanical test practices did 
not yield realistic enough practical results. When trying to analyze how one’s products 
fared against a competitor’s, the manufacturer of machine coated paper was forced to rely 
on information obtained at the printing plants. Only a knowledgeable and experienced 
printer could point out the difference of printing on the papers of Westvaco, Mead, 
Consolidated, and Kimberly-Clark. Wehmhoff tapped such information at the Chicago 
printing plants of Cuneo, where the plant managers explained how different papers fit the 
printing of Life magazine. Underlining the importance of this relationship, the Westvaco 
supplied the Cuneo plant with experimental rolls of paper in order to learn whether the 
research and development work was going anywhere.472 
Such practices reveal that the Time Inc. indeed enjoyed a competitive pool of 
innovative suppliers of paper for its mass circulating magazines. Tactics employed by 
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Charles Stillman and Henry Luce had certainly fostered the emergence of competitive 
machine coated paper market, but their efforts were backed by the political economy too. 
In theory horizontal cartels would have allowed the book paper firms a strong grip of the 
customers and a mechanism to control the emerging markets, but this proved impossible 
for two political and legal reasons. The book paper firms had established a national 
industry association in the 1933. During the National Recovery Administration the 
association maintained price floors and production quotas for traditional paper grades. 
Such practices were continued in the industry even after the National Recovery 
Administration was dissolved in 1935. The Federal Trade Commission attempted to root 
such schemes from the book paper industry by examining the industry in late 1930’s, and 
ordered the industry to adhere to antitrust laws. However, in the machine coated industry 
the innovative firms could get around the regulatory authorities by pooling patents. A 
cartel organized around rapidly moving technology was difficult to build, as the problems 
of cooperation between Massey, Mead, and Westvaco demonstrated, and was potentially 
illegal too. Byron Wehmhoff himself warned that the Sherman antitrust act prevented 
Westvaco from pooling research and development resources with the other leading 
machine coated paper makers.473 
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Reluctant Vertical Integration: User-Supplier Relationships during the Great 
Depression 
Attempts by the pulp and paper firms to create new markets for new products 
overlapped with the challenge to maintain old markets in the 1930’s and 1940’s. The 
publishing business was turbulent and the death of a big magazine hurt badly its printer 
and paper supplier. The Time Inc. was an exception in generally depressed industry. The 
attempt to maximize the consumption of magazine paper and utilization of printing plants 
induced paper makers and printers to extend financial ties to publishing firms. The 
practice was so commonplace in the 1930’s and 1940’s that it was almost the rule.  
In extreme cases paper makers financed the establishment of a new magazine. In 
1932 Westvaco gave financial aid to William H. Eaton so he could lease and revitalize 
American Home magazine. It was more typical that the printer and the paper firm 
extended credit to a failing magazine in the hope of eventual turnaround. Usually this 
path led the creditors to assume increasing operational responsibility of the publishing 
house, and in extreme cases its ownership. This was the case in 1932, when the Cuneo 
Press and International Paper Company took over Screenland Magazine Incorporated and 
installed a new management. Suppliers integrated reluctantly forward into publishing 
business, and did so only with a ready plan of divestment. Typically management 
installed by the printing and paper creditors received preferred stock as compensation, 
and if successful could assume the ownership over time. In 1934, William R. Hearst, 
perhaps the leading publisher of his time, purchased Pictorial Review from its printer and 
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paper suppliers under an arrangement that allowed him to write off its back debts unless 
it showed a profit.474 
Despite of new opportunities during the 1930’s the leading firms continued to be 
plagued by sluggish demand and heavy investments in new printing technologies. As a 
result many accrued burgeoning debt to their suppliers, and most notably to the paper 
firms. Thus paper managers faced a serious strategic dilemma. Should they continue to 
supply struggling printing and publishing firms and hope they would pay off the debts 
with better times? How should specialized machine-coated paper firms respond to the 
demand of innovation by their indebted cus tomers? In the minds of the managers of the 
pulp and paper firms these two questions were intertwined, because the indebtedness of 
the large publishing houses set off a domino effect throughout the industrial organization 
that was engaged in the production of magazines. 
In the competitive magazine industry success and failure could occur rapidly and 
unexpectedly. The publishing empire of the William Randolph Hearst exemplified the 
industry trend. After a period of great growth, Hearst Publications faced deepening 
financial problems in during the 1930’s. The problems began with the newspapers and 
the company accrued burgeoning debt to the Canadian newsprint firms. By 1937 the firm 
was in a crisis, and the reputation of Hearst as publisher and businessman began to suffer. 
These problems allowed Richard Berlin, the closest associate of Hearst, to gain 
increasing power in the company, and he assumed the responsibility to deal with 
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creditors. Berlin pleaded with John Cuneo, the printer, for breathing space to bring 
business around.475 
The troubles of Hearst worsened, and by 1939 the publisher struggled at the brink 
of dissolution because of its failing finances as David Nasaw had demonstrated.476 The 
company owned millions to its creditors and negotiated intensely to solve the problems. 
The Hearst Corporation owed almost $16 million alone to Westvaco and the Oxford 
Paper Company. The managers of these two firms assumed major responsibility for 
correcting the situation. By March 1939 the Hearst Corporation agreed to divest its 
magazine business for the value of $23 million. However, from this only $15 million 
could be allotted to the paper companies. As the negotiations about the future of the 
Hearst magazines between the creditors and Richard Berlin ensued in the early 1939, the 
question of future relations between the Hearst Publications and its major paper suppliers 
became pivotal. 477 
The problem was that the magazines were profitable, but not when charged with 
the indebtedness of the parent company. The paper companies depended on the continued 
operation of the magazines, because they constituted key customers. Charlie Gordon of 
the Oxford Paper Company entertained the idea of taking over the Hearst magazines, but 
failed to convince David L. Luke, Jr., to join the plan. Most paper managers shared the 
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attitude of Luke, who did not want venture into businesses he did not know. 478 The entire 
publishing industry suffered from the problems exemplified by the Hearst Publications, 
and the printing and paper industries suffered with it. The president of Kimberly-Clark 
Company, F. J. Sensenbrenner, cooperated with the Cuneo Press and Westvaco in order 
to bring around the large Chicago McFadden Publications Company. 479 
The financial troubles of the publishing firms forced paper and printing firms to 
gain increasing operational control of the magazines they were supplying and serving. 
The management of Westvaco cooperated closely with Cuneo Press while trying to bring 
around the troubled MacFadden Publications. Almost no operational decision was done 
in the magazines or the publishing house without the consent of creditors. The president 
of MacFadden publications, Orr J. Elder, detailed routinely the accounts and operational 
issues at his magazines to the Vice President of Cuneo Press, who in turn circulated the 
information to Westvaco. The problem was that the creditors mistrusted business and 
editorial capabilities of Bernarr MacFadden, the founder of the MacFadden 
publications.480 
A powerful personality that worshipped physical culture and a writer of over 100 
books on the subject, MacFadden had begun his career in publishing with magazines on 
physical culture. The acquisition and founding of new magazines that blended physical 
culture, erotic, popular culture and politics into a mix of early form of tabloid magazines 
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boosted his business. With the onset of the Great Depression, the financial troubles began 
to plague the successful entrepreneur who increasingly had to surrender operational and 
editorial control to his creditors.481 
The flagship of the MacFadden publications was the Liberty magazine with a 
circulation beyond one and half millions, and the creditors engaged into its time-
consuming micro-management.482. The MacFadden Publications owned in total one and 
half million dollars to Kimberly-Clark, Westvaco, Cuneo Press, Art Color Printing, and 
few others. According to the historian Theodore Pederson, the desperate creditor-
suppliers injected millions to keep the Liberty alive for several years in the 1940’s.483 
Thomas, David, and Adam Luke were drawn into such micro-management of number of 
smaller publishing firms, including the negotiations to merge the Financial Reporter and 
Commercial & Financial Chronicle of the WM. B. Dana & Company in 1941, and many 
others.484 
The troubles of the magazine industry worried the producers of magazine papers. 
However, the managers of the Kimberly-Clark, Mead, Westvaco and others kept an eye 
in the future and hope the best for their high volume clients. Paper firms engaged 
reluctantly into the management of the magazines, even while they abhorred vertical 
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integration. Although firms occasionally received stock or interest as a collateral or 
payment for credit, the firms always promptly divested such properties. 
Paradoxically, when the good times for mass magazines and mail-order 
catalogues arrived, firms in these industries had successfully turned the tables with the 
paper firms. Innovation in the machine coated paper had enabled a small group of paper 
firms to control emerging markets throughout the 1930’s, because the number of 
manufacturers was successfully kept at bay. The large publishing firms looked to increase 
the number of suppliers, and moved to stabilize magazine and catalogue machine coated 
papers instead of pushing for more innovation. They simply pulled out from the 
cooperative efforts to innovate further, and instead emphasized the need to create narrow 
standards for machine coated paper. Once established, such standards naturally unleashed 
competition and pulled the price of machine coated paper further down. The unexpected 
outbreak of the Second World War and the ensuing war time regulation of business 
suspended such attempts in the early 1940’s, however. 
 
Innovation in the War Economy, 1942-1947 
Government regulation during the Second Word War changed the incentives for 
innovation operating upon firms in the pulp and paper, printing, and publishing 
industries. Regulation of the labor, raw materials, energy, power, and prices established 
almost overnight a new political economy in which firms could not be sure how a return 
on investment in innovation would occur. Nevertheless, the war time shortages 
encouraged innovation in the machine coated papers, especially the development of new 
light weight magazine papers. This was primarily due to interrupted pulp supply from 
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Scandinavia, which created n increasing shortage of pulp in the paper industry. The 
leading paper makers recognized the transition into lighter paper grades as a way to 
produce paper from a given amount of pulp. As firms intensified the search for new 
magazine papers, they also facilitated broader phenomena of technological learning that 
came to pave the way for many innovations introduced after the deregulation. The 
wartime regulation disturbed the traditional relationships in the industria l network 
involved in mass printing too, because both material flows and prices were not 
determined by market forces. The unexpected suspension of competitive forces had a 
lasting impact on how firms in different industries regarded innovation. Paper, printing, 
and ink firms continued to emphasize cooperative innovation as a way to create new 
markets, but during the 1940’s the publishing industry withdrew almost completely from 
such collaboration. In part this was because innovation in magazine papers occur red 
without the entrepreneurial involvement of large customers, and in part because the 
publishing industry emphasized the competitive price of paper.485 
The United States entered the Second World War in December 1941, and the first 
measures to regulate pulp and paper production were introduced on January 1, 1942. The 
first regulatory orders were simple stop-gap measures to buy critical time to plan a more 
comprehensive regulatory program of the sixth largest manufacturing industry of the 
country. The regulatory philosophy of the War Production Board was to ensure the 
supply and smooth production of products deemed essential for the war effort, and in 
such a vein it issued limitation orders, so called “L-orders”. The initial L-120 was aimed 
at reducing waste and improving efficiency in the pulp and paper industry, as were the 
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subsequent fourteen other orders directed at specific pulp and paper grades. The 
American Paper and Pulp Association estimated that the L-177 order for magazines and 
L-245 for books saved 1,250,000 tons of paper per annum. Subsequent War Production 
Board Limitation Order L-244 limited the magazine industry to 75 per cent of its 
previous consumption. In June 1942 Government published in the Priorities Regulation 
what became the Allocation Classification System for the pulp and paper industries, a law 
effective June 30, 1942. The system required pulp and paper firms to specify the end 
users of its products so that the War Production Board administration could approve the 
allocation of energy, labor, and resources.486 
 
Table 6-2. Estimated Consumption of Book Paper by Magazines in the 
United States, 1925-1944. (Tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Year Consumption 
1925 354,000 
1930 524,300 
1935 418,400 
1940 656,700 
1941 704,400 
1942 730,800 
1943 635,500 
1944 545,500 
 
Source: Report of the Econometric Institute. Prepared for the Book Paper 
Manufacturers Association. No. 4 –February 1, 1946, Appendix Table D.  
 
These regulations shifted unexpectedly the balance of bargaining power between 
the paper makers and their customers. While the priority regulations eased the cut-throat 
competition in the paper business, most of the time it was the publishers who benefited 
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from the new war-time political economy. Under the War Production Board and Office of 
Price Administration regulation the production of paper was matched with the estimated 
circulation of magazines, and any potential price increases were regulated or prevented. 
Moreover the publishers, as a powerful wartime propaganda arm of the government, had 
renewed lobbying leverage over the regulators. Managers in the magazine paper industry 
could only watch in awe when the Time-Life group lobbied the War Production Board in 
1943 to lower tariffs for paper from Canada, an act directly undermining the competitive 
position of U.S. firms.487 
The regulation reduced drastically the demand for the machine coated paper just 
as the pioneering paper firms were preparing for its full scale mass production, and 
hoping to profit after investing a decade into research and development. The first reliable 
statistics for production of machine coated paper begin from the year 1942, when its 
production totaled 322,000 tons. A year later production had fallen to 308,000 tons. 
Production of machine coated paper continued to decrease and remain low as long as the 
war regulation limited demand for it. The war-time regulation evidently disturbed the 
paper business, but in rule the paper managers believed in rapid growth of demand after 
future deregulation. This prediction was shared in rule by all the leading paper 
companies, and their managers crafted careful post-war corporate strategies of growth 
and diversification. Rapid technological innovation underpinned these efforts.488 
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Managers of Westvaco watched closely how the War Production Board curtailed 
demand for magazine and catalogue papers, and how these customers shifted in large 
numbers to lighter papers. At the request of the Book Paper Association, the Econometric 
Institute estimated this shift be so wide-spread that the 1944 consumption of 545,000 tons 
of paper by magazines would have totaled over 900,000 tons in the heavier pre-war paper 
grades.489 This transition into lighter magazine papers presented difficult scientific and 
technological challenges for the paper and printing firms. Lighter papers required stiffer 
coating, and this in turn had an impact on printing imprint. The continuous improvement 
of paper by the printing and ink firms was the prerequisite for the increased consumption 
of paper. Thus, in the midst of the war economy, innovation assumed central role for the 
future strategic plans of Westvaco.490 In a rare involvement into the management of his 
company, the patriarch of the Luke family, William G. Luke, expressed the view his view 
on the plans in the spring 1943: 
 
We must bear in mind the money we are spending and are to spend on research, 
as this will have an influence on all the paper outlined in your report, especially in 
the Pulp Mill end of our business, and the outcome of all this research may mean 
not only betterment of the papers we are making to-day, but also new uses for 
pulp and paper and new kinds of papers that we do not think of to-day… We are 
in a changing world, and those who don’t change with it are out of picture, and 
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especially does this apply to people in any manufacturing business, such as we are 
in.491 
 
John R. Miller assumed the leading role of strategic planning at Westvaco, and in 
May he circulated a template of his post-war plans for Westvaco. Miller was convinced 
that war-time regulation had heavily suppressed the competitive forces in the pulp and 
paper industry. He forecast that an intense competition for markets would follow the 
eventual de-regulation. Westvaco had to regroup its production lines to match the new 
structure of demand that would emerge and prepare its production facilities to respond 
quickly to the new competitive environment. Miller was convinced that machine coated 
papers were the single most important production line for the future expansion of the 
company. He commented broadly on the situation of Westvaco: 
 
It is felt that we have more work to do in development; or, to put it another way, 
expanding our production of Machine Coated than anything else which is in 
evidence at the present time. We have No. 5 and No. 2 machines at Piedmont 
equipped to make Machine Coated, and our policy has been to push slowly our 
Machine Coated on these machines until we get straightened in our quality… it is 
felt strongly that our production on this grade should be increased at the earliest 
possible moment after the war.492 
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Investment in research and development was essential pre-requisite for such a 
corporate strategy. Although Miller learned from the printers of magazines and 
catalogues that his products set the benchmark in quality for the industry, he emphasized 
further quality improvements as a base for the future expansion of the firm. Machine 
coating technology allowed Westvaco potentially to diversify into other paper markets, 
too, but in 1943 Miller had only vague ideas what these could be. He entertained paper 
cups as a potentially viable application of machine coating capabilities. Yet, this choice 
did not converge with his other major strategic choice, the Southern kraft. Westvaco 
managers thus shared a belief that the machine coating technology could be potentially 
applied to a number of paper grades, but failed to specify them in detail. Yet, the 
management believed that the strong research and development capabilities of Westvaco 
would produce commercial applications. Driven by this conviction management agreed 
to purchase a new paper machine for the production of machine coated paper in August. 
It took almost five years before Westvaco eventually was able to apply its machine 
coating capabilities to new major paper grades.493 
Managers at Westvaco crafted their expansion plans of the machine coated paper 
production with a keen eye on markets. The company’s main problem was inability to 
respond to rapidly growing demand for new paper grades. The head of the Chicago sales 
office, J. C. Reynolds, informed Miller that Life magazine people were courting several 
machine coated paper suppliers for the cheapest price for a very large tonnage. The 
demand by smaller firms was picking up too, but Westvaco was not able to respond to the 
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demand for new printing papers.494 Reynolds wrote in September 1943: “Practically all of 
our customers will want Machine Coated from us at the earliest possible moment, and we 
must point all our efforts to this end…We are pressed daily to take Machine Coated 
orders at good prices, but do not have the production to do so. We have lost a lot of 
business because we could not furnish Machine Coated.”495 
Inability to supply large quantities of machine coated caused Westvaco to lose 
business with Kable Brothers to the Consolidated Paper Company, Reynolds complained. 
Westvaco could not even meet the orders from existing customers. This fact was further 
insinuated by information that Westvaco’s customers, such as American Home and some 
Hearst magazines, wanted to shift from uncoated to machine coated, too. American Home 
was forced to follow the printing and publishing trend if they wanted to meet competition 
by Better Homes and Gardens, Reynolds argued. The demand for machine coated paper 
was surging even under the war-time regulations, and Westvaco managers became more 
and more convinced of its future potential. 496 
In response to these concerns, a small research and development program was 
launched in 1942. Within a year, this research and development program on new offset 
paper had become the vehicle of corporate strategy for John R. Miller and David Luke. 
Bromwell Ault, the president of International Printing Ink that was the leader among ink 
suppliers, had suggested to Luke that their two firms collaborate in development of new 
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high-speed offset and lithography printing process. Management at Westvaco was rather 
enthusiastic of the proposal.497 
Though Westvaco managers would later admit that this program had failed in its 
goal to produce a new line of offset paper products, they credited for saving the company. 
The “three cornered” research and development project fostered organizational 
capabilities that sustained company’s leadership in the machine coated papers and 
allowed successful diversification into new lines of machine coated paper products. The 
program was originally defined as the development of press- ink-blanket-combination for 
high speed four color offset work, a technology that would cater to medium size 
catalogue printing jobs that required higher quality than, say, the mass printing of Life 
allowed. The pulp shortage and the increasing over-seas editions of mass magazines 
redefined the program towards the development of light-weight printing paper in 1943. 
William Huck, the chief development and research engineer of R. R. Hoe & Company, 
told Wehmhoff in late 1943 that the South-American edition of Time magazine presaged 
the future of publication printing. Time Inc. printed the edition in the U.S. with four-color 
web offset presses on light magazine paper, and saved tremendously in the postage costs 
compared with the older heavier paper grads. Based on his correspondence with Huck, 
Wehmhoff argued to top management of Westvaco that the whole offset development 
program needed to be redefined.498 
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The overseas editions of Time signaled to paper managers where the printing and 
publishing industries were heading. Yet the potential business was easily lost because of 
competing innovations and the sheer difficulty of producing economically and 
technologically viable light weight magazine paper. Publishers could as well produce 
printing plates in the U.S., and simply ship them by air mail overseas and print there. 
Wehmhoff, Luke and Miller realized that unless they produced real savings in the air 
mail of magazines quickly, other industries and firms would seize the opportunities. Luke 
and Miller authorized new resources for Wehmhoff to pursue innovation in cooperation 
with the International Printing Ink and the R. R. Hoe, but the partners faced particular 
technological challenges.499 
Web offset printing with light papers was a costly and unreliable process in 
January 1944, and presented three threshold problems. First, light weight paper wrinkled 
easily in the machine and distorted the printing imprint. Second, light paper was so thin it 
was practically transparent, so that the color imprint on one side of the paper distorted the 
other side. Third, light paper was a premium paper and more expensive than traditional 
runs of magazine and catalogue paper. The cooperative research and development 
program in 1944 had to overcome these three specific problems before a new line of 
business with the publishing industry would open. The task of reducing cost of the paper 
proved the most difficult of the three challenges. 500 
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The perfection of the light offset paper printing process required extensive 
cooperation between the printing machinery, ink, and paper suppliers. Wehmhoff 
assumed again a central role and coordinated the learning at different sites. Mechanical 
improvements at the Westvaco paper mills resulted eventually more uniform winding of 
the paper rolls. The transparency of the light offset papers required the development of 
more water-proof coating for the paper, and it’s synchronization with the color inks and 
the heat-set dryer. 
Working systematically and persistently, Wehmhoff was able to produce visible 
improvements in the color web offset printing with light papers within a short time. 
Although Wehmhoff produced a technological breakthrough, he was unable to assess the 
economic viability of the new product, because the wartime regulation prevented 
Westvaco from moving into full-scale production. 501 
The coordination of technological learning between the leading firms in three 
industries exposed the venture to struggles typical to large organizations. Such quibbles 
were fuelled further by the fact that costs were much more difficult to control than the 
scientific and technological problems. Early in 1944, the program ran into problems 
caused by the internal power struggle at the International Printing Ink, and the War 
Production Board priority regulations. Nevertheless, Byron Wehmhoff insisted on the 
project together with people from the R. R. Hoe & Company. In July 1944 Wehmhoff 
argued that the program had instead of succeeding in its original mission to develop new 
offset paper only proved that it was a critical vehicle of technological learning for 
Westvaco. Reviewing the research and development program he wrote to David L. Luke: 
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This press will print standard quality offset papers, but unfortunately such papers 
are more expensive than letterpress papers used for similar printing jobs. It was 
obvious that we would have to develop lower cost offset papers both uncoated 
and machine coated, if the whole combination was to be offered to the printing 
industry as a competitor for letterpress. It is also obvious that such paper 
development could come only after the press was mechanically correct, and inks 
had been developed to some extent.502 
 
The lack of technological improvement in the offset printing machinery did not 
allow the development of economically viable offset paper, then. Instead of developing a 
specific product for specific markets as originally intended, Wehmhoff had come to 
realize that he should manage the development a pool of generic knowledge on coated 
papers that would allow West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company to produce a diversified 
family of innovative coated paper products. The program assumed now a strategic 
character, and Westvaco management placed the predicted new organizational 
capabilities in the heart of their post-war corporate strategy. 
John Miller coordinated the strategy planning at Westvaco, and in April 1944 he 
stratified the machine coated markets from the vantage point of the unique capabilities of 
his company. The competitive mass magazine field should be catered to with low cost 
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machine coated paper, whereas higher quality machine coated papers should be offered to 
the trade catalogue market composed of smaller printing runs. Here was also the plot: the 
right employment of Westvaco’s capabilities would tie competitors into the magazine 
field, where long term prospects for profits were low, and allow it to capture a 
disproportionately large share of the quality machine coated markets. Westvaco should 
urgently expand and improve efficient production of magazine papers in order to meet 
the margin destroying competition, which Miller believed would follow armistice. This 
would engage most of Westvaco’s competitors with fewer machines suitable for 
production of machine coated paper, and allow the company to capture markets in the 
higher quality machine coated papers that had much better margin of profit too. Miller 
and Luke authorized increased resources for Wehmhoff, who predicted better quality 
products and more cost efficient production processes.503 
Typical of the whole industry, the strategy of Westvaco emphasized research and 
development cooperation between the ink, printing and paper industries and largely 
excluded publishers. In an active economy where prices were frozen to pre-war levels, 
every manager understood that the eventual armistice would create booming price 
pressures and acted on that assumption. Concerned with their strategic interests, the high 
volume publishing houses were weary of the leading magazine paper firms’ strategies of 
market segmentation, didn’t cooperate in extended research and development projects 
with firms in supplier industries, and eventually initiated a large counter move when the 
war appeared to be over. 
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Managers in the publishing industry recognized very well that the price of the 
magazine and catalogue paper depended on the organization of that industry. Large 
publishing houses integrated backward into paper production in an effort to control prices 
and supply. Already during the war Time Inc. acquired the Hennepin Paper Company in 
Minnesota. In March 1945, it purchased the paper mills of the Bryant Paper Company in 
Kalamazoo, Michigan, and in October 1945, it took over the Maine Seaboard Paper 
Company. Time Inc. contracted with the St. Regis Paper Company to manage these mills, 
which also eventually purchased the mills in 1946. As a condition of the sales, Time Inc. 
negotiated an advantageous long-term contract with St. Regis. Time Inc. also acquired 
increasing interest in the Champion Paper and Fiber Company, which supplied much of 
the paper for Life. Other publishers followed suit. McGraw-Hill and Chilton Publishing 
Company jointly acquired the Newton Falls Paper Mill In an extreme case of backward 
integration, the Curtis Publishing Company acquired extensive lumber tracts in addition 
to paper mills. Publishers entering the machine coated paper industry were typically 
frustrated, however, by the heavy capital requirements and difficulties of successfully 
running such mills.504 
Attempts by the publishing industry to gain improved bargaining power with the 
paper and printing industries was facilitated by a post-war shift in the political economy. 
In 1945, the Federal Trade Commission resumed its 1939 antitrust scrutiny of the book 
paper industry. Based on its six-year-old hearings and evidence the commission issued a 
Cease and Desist Order. Legal experts of the book paper industry reviewed the 1939 case 
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and argued that the order was not warranted by evidence, and encouraged a petition to the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.505  
The court’s ruling in Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Commission sustained 
the Cease and Desist Order, but vacated it in the case of Consolidated Water Power and 
Paper Company that pursued a price-cutting strategy with its patented groundwood 
machine coated papers. This interpretation emphasized that significant and real 
innovation intensified competition, and defined importantly how firms could avoid 
antitrust by innovating, then. 506 
The 1945 Cease and Desist Order was only a part of much larger post-war 
government scrutiny of the pulp and paper industry. The several investigations and 
decrees intensified the competitive environment in the paper industry. Antitrust shaped 
importantly the post-war organization of the pulp and paper industry, but technological 
innovation was the central dynamic force for the evolution of the printing paper industry. 
The leading printing paper firms had secured a control over the alternative machine 
coating technologies, and effectively erected barriers of entry for others. Byron 
Wehmhoff, reviewing Westvaco capabilities in 1947, argued that the company was in 
good position to benefit from the definitive shift into machine coated paper in letterpress 
printing, where only pulps and comics continued to be printed on uncoated paper. 
Machine coated will increasingly replace uncoated in rotogravure printing of magazine 
                                                                                                                                                 
Competitive Press. Senate Committee Print No. 18. 2 Jan., 1947. GOP: Washington 1947, 10; Wood, 
Curtis Magazines, 172-3. 
505 Clarence A. Clough to Sheppard Dillingham, Re: Cease and Desist Order, 17 July, 1945. Westvaco 
Collection #1781, Box #19, Packet #2. 
506 Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F. 2d. 600 (1948); Simon N. Whitney, Antitrust 
Policies. American Experience in Twenty Industries. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund 1958, 346-
 287 
and mail order catalogues too, he continued. Westvaco should proceed to develop distinct 
products in these categories, but not too many as it would sacrifice economies of scale 
from production. He also argued that the offset-paper market was unattractive for the 
company so long as the offset printing machinery was not improved, and it was currently 
impossible to produce a satisfactory paper at reasonable price. Other leading print paper 
firms shared Wehmhoff’s vision and built their corporate strategies on the machine 
coating technologies they controlled.507 
 
Demise of Patent Control: Expansion and Segmentation of the Machine Coated 
Paper Industry, 1945-1960 
The leading book paper firms faced a new strategic challenge between 1945 and 
1960, when the markets for the machine coated paper expanded and new specialized lines 
of business emerged to complement the standardized high-volume, low quality printing 
papers. Technological change in machine coating and printing technologies triggered 
demand for coated kraft paper and paperboard in food and drink packaging, and the 
improvement of offset and office copy printing technologies increased demand for the 
high quality offset and copy paper. The ability of pulp and paper firms to diversify into 
new machine coated paper product lines, or to maintain leadership in old ones, depended 
on their pre-existing organizational capabilities because the production processes of the 
respective coated papers had significant technological differences. 
                                                                                                                                                 
350; Survival of the Free Competitive Press. 79th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Committee Print No. 18. 
Washington: Government Printing Office 1947.  
507 Byron L. Wehmhoff to L. W. Strattner, 4 Feb., 1947. Westvaco Collection #1781, Box #146, Packet #22. 
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Competitive magazine and printing papers and coated kraft and board were 
predominantly manufactured with the so-called on-machine coaters. With this method the 
coating operation was fully integrated in the back part of the Fourdrinier paper machine. 
High quality offset and office copy papers, on the other hand, were typically 
manufactured with the off-machine coater method, in which a finished roll of uncoated 
paper was fed through a coating machine set apart from the Fourdrinier machine. The 
tightly integrated on-machine coating process maximized throughput and economies of 
scale of a single type of coated paper because of the complexity of grade shifting. On the 
contrary, the disintegrated nature or the off-machine paper production allowed the paper 
mill a relatively flexible mode of production of an array of different kind of coated 
papers. The pulp and paper firms faced the choice between unforgiving but cheap mass 
production and a more flexible and expensive mode of production.  
Such a choice became available gradually for managers during a battle for the 
control of machine coating technology that unfolded between 1945 and 1955. The 
pioneering book paper firms, Kimberly-Clark, Mead, Consolidated, Champion, and 
Westvaco firmly controlled through patents the machine coating technologies during and 
immediately after the war, and this control allowed them to coordinate industrial change 
effectively. The booming demand for magazine and printing paper cried for more 
capacity, and all the leading firms had followed the wartime expansion strategy of 
Westvaco. Mead had acquired three other paper concerns and a power company between 
1941 and 1943, and Kimberly-Clark purchased vast new timber holdings. Consolidated 
Water Power & Paper Company acquired the last newsprint mill of Wisconsin in 1945 
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and retooled it into machine coated paper. Control of machine coating technology was 
critical for the viability of these expansion plans of these firms.508 
The on-machine patents allowed leading firms to reap the profits of booming 
demand fueled by mass magazine and mail-order catalogue industries. In 1950, W. F. 
Hall Printing Company alone printed 480 million magazines, 225 million catalogues, and 
132 pocket books. When the demand simply outgrew supply, the patents allowed 
Champion, Consolidated, Mead, and other firms to grant pricey machine coating licenses 
to competitors without sacrificing markets or depressing the price of paper. Typically the 
licensor had an iron grip on licensee, and the contracts included high cancellation 
penalties that equaled licensing fee through expiration of the patent. On-machine coating 
involved for a licensee costly installation, high license fees, and the strategic decision of 
tying the paper machine into single paper grade. A licensee had also no way to predict 
how many licensees would be eventually granted. All these considerations frustrated the 
attempts of the Mid-West Blandin Paper Company to enter the magazine and catalogue 
paper industry. The firm had long explored possibilities to diversify from its traditional 
newsprint production, and regarded on-machine coated paper as a viable option. As its 
managers learned the licensing conditions for the technology, they pulled back. Decisive 
for the Blandin managers was the fact that license agreements were not insured against 
potential, and indeed numerous patent infringement litigation. In case a court awarded 
                                                 
508 Survival of Free Competitive Press, 9-11; For illustrative and typical case, see: Donald L. Boese, 
Papermakers. The Blanding Paper Company and Grand Rapids, Minnesota. Grand Rapids, Minnesota: 
Charles K. Blanding Foundation 1984, 268-276. 
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damages for patent infringements, a licensee had to bear the costs on top of the license 
fee.509 
The likelihood of patent infringement litigation increased together with 
innovation, which accelerated during the 1940’s and 1950’s as demonstrated in the Table 
6-1. Leading firms, as well as outside inventors, scrambled for more patents in order to 
secure control of technology, markets, and of course profits in the increasingly 
competitive magazine paper business. Intensified innovation had a paradoxical effect on 
the organization of the industry. As the technological frontier expanded, accelerated, and 
involved a growing number of other technologies, it became too large and complex to be 
dominated by any narrow group of firms. This was exacerbated by the fact that the 
original and so-called “fundamental” machine coated patents granted expired. The 
Massey roll printer patents held by the Consolidated, the roll coater patents of the KCM 
Corporation, the Doctor blade coating patents of the Champion, as well as Westvaco roll 
printer coating patents expired by the early 1950’s. In response, these firms intensified 
research and development, and patented new machine coating innovations. Yet, these 
patents were usually interpreted by the courts as improvements of the original art of 
machine coating, and thus granted them narrow protection from competing inventions.510 
Eventually a patent infringement case disintegrated this carefully built managerial 
system of control. In 1947, Consolidated Water Power and Paper Company sued 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation for infringement of its 1933 Massey machine coating 
                                                 
509 Boase, Papermakers. 318-320. 
510 George L. Booth, “Why Blade Coating – A Review of Coating Processes,” in Blade Coating Seminar. 
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patents. Traditionally the industry and engineering community had regarded Massey's 
patents as fundamental breakthroughs, and shared the praise for the patent by the 
plaintiff:511 
 
Coating process invention was one of the greatest advances in the paper-making 
industry in that it taught an economical and efficient method of applying a 
mineral surface on a web of paper as it moved through a paper-making machine 
and thereby so reduced the cost of making paper for use in fine half-tone printing 
that it revolutionized both the paper-making and the printing industries.512 
 
Consolidated attempted to demonstrate the novelty of famous Massey patent by 
emphasizing the prizes and recognition awarded to the inventor, as well as detailing its 
large licensing fees and networks in the court. The defendant argued that no infringement 
had occurred, and no such case had been demonstrated after the inspections of its mills. 
Kimberly-Clark employed its own proprietary machine coating technologies that were 
independent from the Massey patent. The court agreed with the defendant, but a much 
more severe blow to Consolidated, and indeed the whole machine coated paper industry 
was still to come. Evidence put forth by the Kimberly-Clark Corporation during the trial 
                                                 
511 Consolidated Water Power & Paper Company et al v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 73 F. Supp. 936 
(1947); Peter J. Massey, U.S. Patent No. 1,932,368 (1933) 
512 Consolidated Water Power & Paper Company et al v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 107 F. Supp. 777 
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prompted the court to examine the novelty and validity of the Massey patent, and whether 
it should be entitled to a narrow or broad interpretation. 513 
The defendant showcased evidence on how weak the original patent application 
of Massey had been. He had filed the original application on May 19, 1930, and in 
January 1931 the Patent Office Examiner rejected the claims as being devoid of invention 
over prior art. Massey amended an application in June 1931, and began to negotiate about 
the claims that could be accepted by the Examiner. In January 1932, the Examiner 
rejected other twelve claims of the application as “lacking invention,” and wrote: “The 
applicant has merely combined elements all which are old in the art and which have been 
used in similar combinations, without producing more than the aggregate of old 
results.”514 
Following the rejection of his application, a personal interview between the 
Examiner, Massey, the vice president of Seamen Paper Company of Chicago, and a 
lawyer was arranged to discuss the patent and its claims. Based on this meeting Massey 
submitted a third amendment to his patent application, adding 10 new claims and 
increasing the total of claims into 21. In February 1933, the Examiner rejected again all 
claims, and Massey submitted a fourth amendment that made a claim specific to the 
elimination of water during the coating process. Based on this claim the patent was 
finally granted to Massey, who carefully hid the difficulties to secure the patent. As 
Kimberly-Clark detailed how vague case the Massey patent had originally been, the 
Wisconsin District Court ruled in 1952 that the Massey patent, which was already 
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expired, was neither original nor novel, and deserved the narrowest possible 
interpretation for protection from competing technologies.515 
In effect, the court established that there was no fundamental patent for the 
machine coating of paper. Instead all the valid claims of patents granted to Kimberly-
Clark, Mead, Westvaco, and others presented rather narrow improvements in the art of 
machine coating of paper. The whole community of pulp and paper trade had perceived 
that these patents covered the heavy machinery of the on-machine coating machines, but 
realized now overnight their mistake. A wave of roll on-machine coaters imitations, 
developed without publicity in the late 1940’s, were now patented and put to markets. St. 
Regis Paper Company patented in 1953 an on-machine roll coater developed in the late 
1940’s by Harry Faeber, as another one developed by William Zonner. These patents 
completed the entry of the third largest U.S. pulp and paper firm into the high volume 
magazine paper industry. 516 
Leading book paper firms had invested two decades on the on-machine coaters, 
and based their competitive strategy on aggressive control of technology. In 1952, they 
fell collectively to the prey of their own success, and they were forced to revisit these 
tactics. Incumbent large scale machine coated firms responded to the court decree by 
placing renewed emphasis on their existing organizational capabilities. If they could not 
erect barriers of entry with patents, they could do so by raising the bar on capital 
requirements. The court had duly noted this fact in 1952: 
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516 Booth, Why Blade Coating. 
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It is difficult for the court to conceive of an industry where opportunity for 
experimentation would be so costly and difficult. Huge plants may contain only 
three or four machines, each which extend almost the length of the building and 
operate as continuous integrated units wherein watery solution is introduced at 
one end and the finished product is rolled up at the other end. One machine will 
cost a million or more, and voluntary or involuntary shutdown of a machine is a 
costly matter.517 
 
Pioneers of the machine coated paper invested heavily in the on-machine coaters 
and production of competitive magazine and printing paper. The large capital 
requirements discouraged and prevented smaller paper mills from entering this line of 
paper business. By applying the coating directly on the paper in the Fourdrinier machine 
the incumbent large scale paper enterprises achieved tremendous economies of scale, and 
pulled down the price of the on-machine coated paper. However, this mode of 
manufacturing also tied the giant on-machine paper coater mills into single, low quality 
and competitive paper market, because the change of paper grade would have required 
slow and expensive retooling of the Fourdrinier machine. This was also the prime reason 
why Westvaco could not realize John Miller’s two-headed strategic plan of producing 
low quality and cheap coated paper simultaneously with high quality and more expensive 
one.518 
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In the case of Westvaco, the existing organizational capabilities reshaped the 
strategic visions of the management. The company had charged in 1942 the offset paper 
development program with the future product diversification, but realized some six years 
later that the program enjoyed a paradoxical success. The program failed to produce high 
quality offset paper on Westvaco’s on-machine coater Fourdrinier machines. On the other 
hand, Byron L. Wehmhoff had fostered the very capabilities necessary to maintain a 
leading position in the low quality magazine and catalogue printing papers. Moreover, the 
program fostered knowledge of chemistry, and allowed Westvaco to enter the extrusion 
coating of paper and board that was introduced in 1948. 
Extrusion coating applied polyethylene plastic on paper or board, and enabled the 
introduction of wide range of new products in general food and drink packaging and 
containers, such as new kind of milk bottles. Kenneth Arnold at St. Regis developed the 
extrusion of polyethylene of paper in the late 1940’s, when the company struggled to get 
around the on-machine coating patents of the leading magazine paper companies. Arnold 
had collaborated extensively with the Du Pont Company and potential customers, such as 
the Oscar Mayer Company, to perfect the production processes of paper, printing, and 
food packaging. Successful entrance into extrusion coating technology required strong 
capabilities in chemistry and mass production, and therefore firms such as St. Regis, 
Westvaco, and Crown Zellerbach pioneered the industry. 519 
Firms with smaller mills and less technological capabilities had to explore the 
potential of smaller market segments, and contract stabilized technology. The 
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Consolidated v. Kimberly-Clark decision had unleashed competitive forces in the 
machine-coating technology by making it relatively freely available. A number of 
inventors and firms looked to create markets for the off-machine coaters that were 
relatively inexpensive and allowed flexible production of high quality papers. In 1951, 
British Ronald Trist applied for U.S. patent for trailing blade coater that produced high 
quality coated papers. The patent was granted in 1955, and Trist assigned it to one of the 
leading paper machinery supplier in the U.S., the Rice-Barton Corporation, which began 
to improve and commercialize it. Another popular version of the off-machine blade 
coater was commercialized by the other leading U.S. paper machinery supplier, the Black 
Clawson Company, under the brand name Flexi-Blade. Off-machine coaters were now 
supplied by competitors not engaged in the manufacture of paper, and who looked to 
maximize sales without concern for possible over-capacity. 520 
Blade coaters were exactly that kind of off-machine coaters that allowed 
relatively small or medium-sized paper mills to successfully enter the high quality coated 
paper market. The Blandin Paper Company acknowledged the off-machine coating as 
viable diversification tactic in 1954. The company contracted Rice-Barton to install the 
first off-machine coater in the U.S. at its mill in 1956, where it was employed to produce 
coated offset paper. Early difficulties with the quality of coating and printing prompted 
the paper maker, machinery supplier, printer, and publishers to work together towards the 
perfection of the process, and thus repeated a familiar pattern of vertical linkages of 
learning. 521 
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521 Boese, Papermakers, 322-328. 
 297 
Printing and paper firms also scouted recent significant improvements in the 
offset and office copy technology that anticipated the emergence of new line of printing 
and paper business. Since the 1930’s, a number of individuals and companies were 
pursuing research and development in electrophotography and thermography that resulted 
in the introduction of office copy machines. Chester F. Carlson and Otto Kornei had 
invented Eletrophotography in 1938. Continuing the development work, Carlson patented 
with the Battelle Memorial Institute what was the other nucleus of the emerging office 
copy technology, and commercialized the first working applications. In 1948, the Haloid 
Company acquired a license on the Carlson process, and continued research and 
development name under new name, the Xerox Corporation. In 1950, Xerography, which 
involved offset technology, too, was commercialized first time with the Xerox Model D 
Copier. The RCA entered the office copy market in 1954 with its Electrofax-technology, 
and it granted quickly over 100 manufacturing licenses. The 3M Company introduced in 
the early 1950’s the Thermo-Fax copying system, based on the research of Dr. Carl S. 
Miller during the 1940’s. The system was the first reprographic system that required the 
use of only one sheet of coated paper. Introduction of new office copy machines created 
potentially large new markets of coated papers, but the chemical complexity and heat of 
reproduction required extensive improvements in the quality of coated papers. Innovation 
in copy paper, then, was the last step to guarantee the visual quality of printing picture 
and the technology’s commercial viability. 522 
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Pulp and paper and off-machine coating machinery supplier firms followed 
carefully developments in the office copy markets, and became quickly convinced of its 
future expansion. Potential markets for off-coating machinery in the U.S. was 
predominantly composed of newsprint mills that were increasingly squeezed by the 
Canadian competition in the 1950’s, and whose managers explored options to shift 
production capacity into more profitable paper grades. The second largest U.S. pulp and 
paper firm and predominant West-Coast newsprint producer, Crown Zellerbach Company 
(hereafter C-Z), built a very large coating mill in St. Francisville. Another important 
vehicle of production diversification for C-Z was the building of Newton Falls paper mill, 
a joint venture of Time, Inc., and C-Z.523 
Newton Falls paper mill showcased how the maturity of technology and narrow 
paper standards enabled large publishing houses a new grip on suppliers. Consequently 
the Newton Falls mill was the trailblazer of new mode of efficiency in coated paper 
production. In 1961, Ronald Trist installed the 118- inch wide and 2,500 feet per minute 
Black-Clawson Flexiblade off-machine coater that was supposed to give the company 
price advantage in high quality coated enamels, book, envelope, and book papers. The 
throughout automated mill housed two Flexiblade and one air-knife coaters, whose 
“flexible operation” allowed the production of different paper products. The new coaters 
allowed blade coating on one or two sides of the paper sheet, or the air-knife coated 
coating alone of one side of the sheet, which catered distinct market segments.524 
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Maturity of coating technology and its availability from specialized machinery 
suppliers prompted the managers of the last U.S. firm producing only newsprint, , the 
Great Northern Paper Company, to revisit their expansion and diversification plans in the 
1960’s. Since the early 1950’s, the Great Northern management had been desperate to 
meet increasing competition by Canadian newsprint mills. It had first responded by 
massive modernization and expansion plan of its newsprint mills in 1953. The 
investments proved ill advised almost immediately, and the management began to search 
for better strategy of productivity improvement.525 
Availability of the off-machine coating technology allowed the Great Northern to 
shift course of its suffering expansion plans. Great Northern decided to shift production 
capacity away from depressed newsprint and enter the specialty grade markets for quality 
coated papers in 1961. The company's new vice president, J. H. Heuer, had collaborated 
with Ronald Trist during the installation flexible coater at the Newton Falls paper mill, 
and brought with him considerable experience about the new technology. The 
construction of $6 million dollar coating plant at the huge Millinocket mill site was 
completed in 1963, and a massive off-machine coater was supplied by Black Clawson 
Company. The plant produced light weight quality coated paper at the astonishing speed 
of 3,500 feet per minute and total of 100,000 tons a year.526 
Industry experts questioned the move, because the market already suffered from 
over-capacity. The Blandin Paper, Champion Paper, Consolidated Papers, International 
Paper, Kimberly-Clark, Mead, Newton Falls Paper Mill, New York & Pennsylvania, 
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Oxford Paper, St. Francisville Paper, St. Regis, S. D. Warren, Westvaco, and C-Z already 
produced all kinds of coated papers in excess of demand. Yet the industry continued to 
build more capacity. During the 1960's, the U.S. subsidiary of Canadian newsprint giant 
Bowater constructed a blade coating mill in South Carolina. The entry of incumbent 
newsprint giants, such as Bowater and Great Northern, in machine coated paper was 
characterized by the belief of management that their firms had special skills to run high 
capacity mills exceptionally efficiently. 527 
 
Table 6-3. Annual Value and Production of Machine Coated Paper 
Production in the U.S., 1947-1963 (thousands of dollars and tons of 2,000 lbs.) 
 
Year Value Quantity  
1963 498,637 2,171,778 
1958 362,505 1,547,408 
1957 329,001 
1956 318,273 
1955 263,686 
1954 252,617 1,222,873 
1947 100,609    623,724 
 
Sources: Census of Manufactures 1954. Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office 1955, 26A-10; Census of Manufactures 1958. Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office 1960, 26A-15. 
 
The production of machine coated paper soared as a result of massive wave of 
investment in new manufacturing capacity during the 1950’s, as is evident from the Table 
6-3. The industry did not repeat the price decline of so many other paper industry 
segments, however, because the market for machine coated papers was fragmented in 
specialty products. While the annual production of machine coated paper increased two 
and half- fold between 1947, the annual value increased four-fold during the same period. 
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Yet, some segments experienced very difficult times, in particular the firms that produced 
standardized mass-circulation magazine papers. 
 
Conclusions  
Growth of the leading U.S. printing, publishing, and paper firms between 1930 
and 1960 depended critically on vertical linkages of technological learning. A basic 
reason for the extended duration of such collaborative efforts was the technologically 
modular nature of printing process, whose performance depended on the synchronization 
of printing machinery, ink, and paper technologies. Vertical linkages of learning between 
printing firms, their suppliers and customers, persisted under a great variety of economic 
and political conditions. This suggests that such organization of technological learning is 
essential element of the industry and its sustained competitiveness. 
Innovation in printing machinery and machine coated papers was rapidly 
accelerated by the publisher Henry Luce and his Time Inc. in the 1930’s. Luce realized 
his revolutionary mass circulation magazine business format by fostering vertical 
linkages of technological learning backwards to printing and paper firms. These 
collaborative crash programs of technological learning perfected the mass printing 
technology and new machine coated paper types. However, upon stabilizing these 
production technologies, Time Inc. decreased its participation in collaborative innovation, 
and emphasized competitive prices of standardized printing and paper. When the 
publishing giant recognized the need for lighter magazine paper, it devised again vertical 
linkages of learning with printers and paper makers. Such responsive and flexible 
strategy of collaboration of the publishing giant was enabled by the fact that it was not 
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vertically integrated into printing. Thus, the entrepreneurial opportunism of Henry Luce 
importantly triggered fundamental improvements in the printing processes and paper 
technologies. 
Collaboration between the printing industry and its ink, paper, and machinery 
suppliers was determined by shared technological processes of printing that required 
synchronization. This organization of technological learning discouraged risk-taking and 
radical technological departures, and induced rather incremental innovation. Moreover, 
technological knowledge was highly vulnerable for opportunism by firms that controlled 
or could gain control of the key intellectual property rights. On the other hand, the 
technological relationships inherent to the printing processes limited importantly such 
opportunism. 
This study suggests that public policies play an important role for the dynamics 
and structure of vertical linkages of learning, and especially antitrust policies. Efforts to 
control opportunities in vertical collaboration between paper and magazine firms induced 
horizontal collusion among the paper firms, and in this particular aspect antitrust policies 
may enhance the operation of vertical linkages of learning. 
The history of the development of machine coated paper demonstrates that the 
dynamics of collaborative innovation was paradoxically boosted and impeded by 
opportunism. Literature on industrial organizations and this study demonstrate that 
managers of collaborating firms need to resolve through formal and informal methods 
how the gains of new knowledge are distributed. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The evolution of the North American pulp and paper industry between 1860 and 
1960 was driven by successive waves of technological learning that spawned structural 
change. Such waves transformed and expanded the sulphite and sulphate pulp, envelope, 
paper container, paper bag, magazine and printing paper, coated paper, board, and many 
other pulp and paper industries between 1860 and 1960. These waves repeated a pattern 
of co-evolution of technology and industrial organization that enveloped dynamic forces 
of change, such as innovation, corporate strategies, industrial relocation, and policy. As 
distinct branches of the pulp and paper industry passed from the early nascent phase to 
full maturity, the sources of innovation, nature of technological change, strategy and 
structure of leading firms, and industrial organization underwent transformation. 
A narrow group of firms typically originated these waves of co-evolution of 
technological learning and industrial organization. Innovative firms created new markets 
through radical technological departures, and attempted to prevent imitation by 
employing strategically intellectual property rights. Standardization of products, 
maturation of technology, diffusion of innovation, expiration of intellectual property 
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rights, and policy undermined such barriers of entry over time, and prompted the leading 
incumbent firms to consider alternative competitive corporate strategies. Typically, the 
leading firms became resolved to consolidation of the industry and economies of scale, 
but in some cases they also made a renewed effort to diversify into new product lines by 
innovating. At the last stage of these waves, the attempts of the original innovators to 
maintain barriers of entry and prevent imitation lost their effectiveness, and firms lost 
their ability to differentiate themselves in terms of technological capabilities. 
The dynamic, overlapping evolution of the individual pulp and paper industries 
underpinned the structural change of the whole North American industry. As the 
significance of technological differentiation declined in the corporate strategy of leading 
firms, the managers emphasized strategies of scale and scope. This facilitated the creation 
of unprecedented large multi-product pulp and paper enterprises. This change is evident 
if one compares the organization of the industry around 1900 and 1960. 
Around 1900, the organization of the North American pulp and paper industry 
was characterized by relatively high degree of technological specialization, and the 
leading firms were different in terms of their product focus and organizational 
capabilities. The largest firm, International Paper Company, was predominantly a 
sulphite newsprint firm. Other leading companies were specialized, too. Westvaco was a 
bookpaper firm, Robert Gair Company a paper container firm, and Union Bag and Paper 
Company a paper bag firm.  
By the 1960’s, the leading pulp and paper firms had similar diversified, multi-
divisional organizational structure and capabilities. The IP owned substantial timberlands 
and manufactured groundwood, sulphate, and sulphite pulp. The company produced 
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practically every kind of paper, such as newsprint, book paper, machine coated papers, 
kraft board. It had also integrated forward into paper converting, and produced corrugated 
specialties, paper bags, and milk bottles among other specialty products. Industry’s 
second largest firm, Crown-Zellerbach, had identical organization and product scope, and 
so did the third largest one, St. Regis. Westvaco, Mead, Champion, and Consolidated had 
identical structure, too. Georgia Pacific, Weyerhaeuser, Boise-Cascade, and many others 
adopted similar structure within a decade. 
Cycles of American political economy punctuated this evolutionary path, and the 
period between 1890 and 1960 can be divided in successive sequels in regard how the 
government regulation influenced industry concentration. The pulp and paper industry 
experienced three intensive merger waves, between 1895 and 1904, in the 1920’s, and 
1950’s. During these waves the political economy was relatively favorable for industry 
consolidation, if compared to the late teens, Great Depression, and 1940’s, when 
regulation of production and prices freezed the competitive structure of the industry. 
 
Early Evolution of the Sulphite Pulp and Paper Industry 
The adoption of virgin timber as the main source of cellulose was the most 
significant change in the North American pulp and paper industry during the nineteenth 
century. Problems with the traditional sources of cellulose, such as cotton rags, and 
opportunities with alternative sources fueled a broad industry-wide wave of technological 
learning in the Europe and North America.  
Groundwood pulp was the radical technological departure that enabled 
papermakers for the first time to produce paper from only timber, but the technology 
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failed to produce the quick economic returns its inventors had dreamed to capture with 
their patent monopoly. German Heinrich Völter patented in the 1840’s path-breaking 
groundwood pulp machines, but the first attempts to employ the technology in North 
America were frustrated experiences. Groundwood pulp potentially enabled the 
production of paper at unprecedented low unit cost, but technological problems prevented 
economies of scale at the first North American groundwood pulp mills during the 1860’s. 
Moreover, the paper was relatively poor quality, yellow colored, and there was relatively 
little demand for it. The technology was mechanically simple, and in the absence of 
significant improvements, it became freely available after the expiration of central patents 
in the 1880’s. 
Groundwood pulp triggered dramatic change in the pulp and paper industry, 
however, because papermakers recognized that by mixing it with chemically treated pulp 
one could produce cheaply good quality white papers, which were the most consumed 
line of paper. American Benjamin Tilghman discovered the sulphite pulp process in the 
early 1860’s. Tilghman controlled a patent monopoly on his revolutionary pulp process, 
and entered the commercial production of sulphite pulp. However, he went bankrupt. 
Technological problems with the process frustrated the attempts of Tilghman and others 
to produce sulphite pulp on large scale. Industry leaders and engineers insisted on the 
economic potential of the sulphite process, and an intensive transatlantic patent race 
ensued. 
Discovered in the 1860’s, the sulphite process was developed slowly and 
painstakingly into a commercially viable mass production technology during the 1890’s. 
The sulphite process was a strategic innovation, however, because it critically 
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complemented other wood pulps. Application of sulphite pulp with ground wood pulp 
allowed firms to improve significantly the quality of paper, introduce a wide array of new 
products, such as sulphite newsprint and bookpaper, and simultaneously dramatically 
reduce the unit cost. This fueled industry-wide learning in the technology. 
In 1889, this long wave of technological learning in sulphite pulp technology 
culminated in a path-breaking patent filed by George F. Russell, whose discovery enabled 
for the first time the mass production of sulphite pulp. The research and development 
work was managed and coordinated by his brother, William A. Russell, who controlled a 
technologically leading North American wood pulp company. William Russell 
understood fully the economic potential of the revolutionary sulphite pulp method, and 
aspired to monopolize the technology. During the 1890’s, Russell acquired intellectual 
property rights on alternative sulphite technologies, and increased the value of his patents 
through active litigation policy. In 1897, an Appeals Court decision awarded him a 
monopoly on sulphite technology in the North America. 
This patent monopoly prompted Russell to promote the consolidation of leading 
New England mills into the International Paper Company that had almost monopoly 
control of the U.S. newsprint markets. The sulphite patent monopoly dominated the early 
corporate strategy of IP, and the company undertook extensive investment program in 
order to build vertically integrated sulphite pulp and newsprint mills. 
IP had secured its sulphite monopoly through innovation, imitation, extensive 
litigation, pooling of technology, and horizontal combination. Yet, following a broad-
based effort to discover a superior wood pulp process, the subsequent patent monopoly 
remained vulnerable to challenges, and the managers of the company recognized 
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extensive and inclusive licensing as a way to strengthen its patents. This afforded the 
managers of IP a mechanism to coordinate unfolding expansion and structural change in 
the pulp and paper industry, and prevent over-investment into new production capacity. 
IP created an extensive licensing network, and awarded over 200 licensees by 1903. The 
company favored vertically integrated, specialized firms that did not compete with IP’s 
newsprint operations. 
The combination of rapid diffusion of innovation and patent monopoly 
undermined the incentives for all U.S. pulp and paper firms to innovate in sulphite 
technologies. Such effects were amplified by antitrust policies, which had prevented the 
formation of newsprint giant that could have potentially competed with the IP. Antitrust 
also prompted IP to diversify production capacity from newsprint to other paper products 
in order to avoid legal challenges. Policy makers also abolished protective tariffs at a 
time when the U.S. newsprint industry was particularly vulnerable for such a change, and 
prompted the relocation of manufacturing capacity to Canada. The changed incentives 
quickly discouraged coordinated efforts to improve the basic sulphite pulping processes 
with radical technological departures. 
IP management responded to these challenges by crafting a new corporate 
strategy that was based on its dominant size. Most significantly, the role of innovation for 
corporate strategy was changed. The company did not produce again radical 
technological departures that had characterized its origins, but emphasized the constant 
incremental improvement of the efficiency of its existing operations, and constant 
expansion that was based on ability to produce paper at lower unit cost than other firms. 
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In short, the company stopped being a producer of its own manufacturing technology, 
and it managers valued the ability to adopt innovations developed by others. 
 
Technology and Cartels 
The development of the sulphite pulp industry exemplified challenges that faced 
all the pulp and paper industries, and culminated during a critical period of industry 
transition around 1900. The maturation of mass production technology during the late 
nineteenth century required the pioneering American pulp and paper firms to revise their 
corporate strategies and structures. The origins of large scale pulp and paper firms cannot 
simply be explained in terms of managerial coordination of production, transaction costs, 
or market control, but one has to consider the control of key intellectual property rights as 
a key determinant of successful combinations in the industry. 
Mergers between 1895 and 1904 that did not involve managerial control of key 
technologies typically fell prey to competitive pressures embodied in price decline, over-
capacity, easy of entry, as well as to legal challenges from the antitrust authorities. These 
problems explained the failure of the “writing paper trust”, “wall paper trust”, “board 
trust”, and some others. Cartels built on strong patent monopolies were difficult to 
sustain, too, as was evident in the case of the “newsboard trust.” Misguided licensing 
policy, failure to adopt tightly integrated corporate structure, and inability to prevent 
imitation undermined what had been a viable monopoly of annual value beyond one 
million dollars in 1900. 
Most horizontal pulp and paper combinations avoided these mistakes, however, as 
is evident from the example of the International Paper. In addition, monopoly companies 
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in the folding box, corrugated paperboard, envelope, drinking cup, and most no tably in 
the bag paper industries did so. Leading firms in these segments of the pulp and paper 
industry responded by consolidating into tightly integrated large-scale enterprises that 
towered over their competitors. Most importantly, their managers deployed large patent 
portfolios to erect barriers of entry. 
Specialty paper firms were particularly equipped to adopt such a strategy. 
Specialty production dominated the paper converting industry that purchased ready sheets 
and rolls of standard paper, and converted them into specialized paper products, such as 
bags, envelops, and boxes. The formation of the Union Bag and Paper Company in 1899 
is the best example of such cartel. The combination involved over 90 per cent of U.S. bag 
paper industry, and its major strategic asset was the one million dollar valued patent 
portfolio. The combination was an attempt to frustrate the entry of IP into the bag paper 
industry through the Continental Paper Company, and this tactic culminated in the 
extensive patent litigation case in the early 1900's. Strong patent portfolios laid the 
foundation for the corporate strategy of both Union and Continental, which together 
dwarfed the rest of the bag industry. 
The technological core of successful cartels is best explained by the fact that 
intellectual property rights enabled them to circumvent antitrust. Yet, institutional change 
in the early twentieth century America reduced this function of patents. In response to 
allegations of patent misuse by cartels, landmark court rulings and the Clayton Act 
established limits for firms’ ability to create monopolies through patents. 
 
 311 
Evolution of the Paper Container Industry 
The co-evolution of industrial organization and technological learning is striking 
in the North American paper container industry between 1870 and 1960. The modern 
paper container industry evolved from the invention of corrugated paper in the mid-
nineteenth century. Cooperation between two firms that controlled central patents 
impeded process and product innovation until the 1890’s, when the patents expired. This 
was followed by immediate entry of new firms, and intensified product and process 
innovation. The establishment of the paper box as standard railroad shipping container 
created vast new markets by 1915, and as a consequence, paperboard passed newsprint as 
the most consumed line of paper in the U.S.  
The leading firms, such as Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, attempted to erect 
barriers of entry by pooling product and machinery patents, but federal policies and 
technological innovation frustrated such efforts. Antitrust policies prompted the voluntary 
disintegration of some patent pools, but more important was the emergence of a 
competitive corrugated paper box machinery industry that supplied new entrants. The 
leading firms responded to these conditions by adopting aggressive strategies of growth, 
and the corrugated paper container industry experienced a merger wave during the 
1920’s. 
Mergers and acquisitions enabled managers another central response to the 
difficulty of sustaining control over specialty product markets. Large-scale vertically 
integrated national enterprises had several advantages over smaller rivals in markets for 
standardized paper containers, because of their ability to coordinate mass production. In 
addition, consolidation arrested the effects of imitation by smaller rivals. The large-scale 
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corrugated paper box firms could not control machinery technology, but made a 
successful effort to monopolize selected markets with patented product innovations. 
Industry-wide these tactics successfully created barriers of entry, and prevented the entry 
of competing firms until the late 1930’s.  
The paper container industry confronted specific and serious challenges in the late 
1930’s. Patents covering many specific product lines expired, and the leading firms were 
unable to obtain new intellectual property rights on basic paper boxes. Secondly, a 
landmark antitrust case abolished collusive practices from the industry. These two factors 
reinforced firms’ reliance on economies of scale, when the World War II propelled the 
demand for paper boxes. During the wartime mobilization, 80 per cent of military 
shipments were in standard paper containers. The new demand facilitated mass 
production technology in the basic standard products. 
Under these conditions, managers paid increasing attention to economies of scale 
and scope, but wartime regulation prevented industry consolidation. Subsequently, the 
industry experienced massive merger wave during the 1950’s, when the number of 
leading specialized corrugated paper container firms was reduced from fifty to fifteen 
firms. These large-scale vertically integrated enterprises had similar organizational 
capabilities and overlapping geographical operations. Thus, their managers’ ability to 
deploy strategies of differentiation was inherently constrained. This was evident when 
most of these firms were acquired by even larger multi-product forests products giants, 
and organized into one of many corporate divisions. 
The North American paper container industry had a long history of innovation, 
but since the 1950’s its organization did not foster radical technological departures. As 
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the organizational capabilities of firms converged, and they engaged primarily in 
competition in same markets, they became more likely to compete by improving 
production efficiency rather than through product differentiation. In contrast, radical 
technological departures propelled two export oriented European firms, Swedish Tetra-
Pak and English Smurfit-Stone, into global paper packaging giants by the late twentieth 
century. 
 
Evolution of the Sulphate Pulp and Paper Industry 
The most significant twentieth century development in the pulp and paper 
industry was the replacement of sulphite technology as the major pulping method by 
sulphate technology. The annual production of sulphate pulp increased over 232-fold 
from 53 tons to over 12,000 between 1914 and 1958. This growth accounted for most of 
the expansion of whole U.S. pulp and paper industry, as the share of sulphate pulp from 
the national annual production increased from about two per cent to almost 60 within the 
same period. The growth of the industry was based on technological characteristics of the 
sulphate process. It enabled the production of paper from cheap and abundant tree 
species, such as the Southern pine, that did not adapt to other wood pulp processes. In 
addition, the sulphate process was much cheaper than the sulphite pulp process, though it 
was long plagued by technological problems. Invented in 1850’s, the modern mass 
production technology of sulphate pulp was perfected first between 1930 and 1950. 
Technological breakthroughs punctuated the long-term growth of the sulphate 
industry, and distinct periods of industry transition exhibited different mechanisms and 
speeds of diffusion of innovation. In comparison to Europe, the industry had a relatively 
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slow start in the North America. There hardly existed any sustained effort to innovate in 
the basic technology by the leading U.S. pulp and paper firms. Ins tead firms such as IP, 
Westvaco, and St. Regis, chose to rely on specialized machinery suppliers. As a 
consequence, the industry became mired in enduring over- investment into new capacity 
and price depression. 
Strong regional differences and inter-regional competition patterned the North 
American sulphate industry during the first half of twentieth century. The first significant 
regional concentration of the sulphate industry in the North America was developed by 
relatively small Lake States firms during the 1920’s. The growth of the U.S. industry 
took off with the emergence of Southern mass production in the late 1920’s, which was 
pioneered by IP. The Lake States and Southern sulphate industries had very different 
organizational structure, technological capabilities, and factor endowments. Because the 
two regional industries competed in the same markets, the regional industrial 
organization influenced greatly how managers chose to cope with simultaneous 
expansion and over-capacity. 
The organization of operational and technological clusters in the kraft industry co-
evolved with the competitive structure of the North American pulp and paper industry. In 
the Lake States, small and medium-sized pulp and paper firms adapted the manufacturing 
technology to the size of their operations, and neglected potential economies of scale. 
This regional pattern of technological learning influenced deeply the development of 
chemical recovery technology in the sulphate pulp production. 
Since the nineteenth century, papermakers acknowledged that the recovery of 
chemicals and heat discharged from the sulphate digester could have potentially 
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revolutionary effects on economics of the process. Yet, despite this universal dream, the 
development of chemical recovery technology was heavily patterned by regional 
industrial organizations. Between 1915 and 1936, the technology was divided into two 
distinct schools in the U.S., the so-called rotary and stationary recovery furnace-schools. 
Rotary recovery furnace was the traditional, widely diffused technology, but its 
fundamental design inherently limited potential economies of scale. On the contrary, the 
stationary recovery furnace was a radical technological departure invented in the early 
1910's, and only few experimental commercial size installations were installed. However, 
its fundamental design enabled potentially tremendous economies of scale, pulp and 
paper engineers acknowledged. 
In the Lake States, where individual companies were too small to afford 
substantial research and development work, comprehensive regional systems of 
innovation advanced the rotary recovery furnace technology. In contrast, the stationary 
chemical recovery furnace was developed in relative secrecy by geographically scattered 
small or medium sized firms that held key patents. The limited size of these companies 
denied the engineers necessary resources for expensive research and development work, 
and also impeded the diffusion of technology. Consequently, the technology did not 
become commercially viable until large-scale firms took over the research and 
development work in the late 1930’s. 
The sulphate industry took off in the North America when the International Paper 
Company opened several large-scale Southern kraft pulp and paper mills. IP acquired the 
latest technology from its machinery suppliers in an effort to lower production costs, and 
fueled innovation in many technologies, but not stationary recovery furnaces. The 
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company did install the first continuous kraft chemical recovery cycle, and pioneered the 
mass production of kraft Fourdrinier board and multi-stage bleaching of sulphate pulp. 
The success of the Southern strategy of IP put the company on sound financial footing, 
and established it firmly as the world’s largest pulp and paper enterprise. 
The sulphate industry experienced a rapid wave of expansion when the 
organization of technological learning in the chemical recovery furnace was transformed. 
Collaboration between pulp and paper firms and a leading boiler manufacturer, Babcock 
& Wilcox, produced stationary chemical recovery unit with unprecedented economies of 
scale. Moreover, the collaboration enabled B&W entry into chemical recovery unit 
industry, and this changed quickly the way innovations diffused in the sulphate pulp 
industry. B&W strategy included the acquisition of central intellectual property rights on 
the technology from pulp and paper firms, and an effort to frustrate imitation through 
patent infringement litigation. Controlling a monopoly, B&W commercialized full-scale 
sulphate recovery units on the turnkey principle. Only one other specialized equipment 
supplier company, Combustion Engineering, Inc., managed to offer competing solutions 
to the pulp and paper industry during the 1940’s. 
B&W and C-E had large and experienced engineering staffs, and they quickly 
routinized research and development in the chemical recovery units. They 
commercialized large-scale installations, but two other innovations by specialized 
machinery suppliers also fueled investment in new sulphate pulp and paper capacity. 
Continuous multi-stage bleaching enabled product diversification for the kraft pulp and 
paper mills, as they could successfully capture markets from more expensive white 
sulphite papers. In addition, the Swedish Kamyr Company developed the continuous 
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sulphate cooking system that enabled new economies of scale. Specialized equipment 
suppliers developed and commercialized multi-stage bleaching and continuous sulphate 
cooking systems. These firms controlled their respective markets through large patent 
portfolios, and their large research and development staffs produced innovations 
systematically. 
The combination of rapid diffusion of innovation and strong intellectual property 
rights had deep impacts on the organization of technological learning in the sulphate pulp 
and paper industry, where technological and operational clusters diverged. Under these 
circumstances, technological innovation accelerated and increased the capital intensity of 
the pulp and paper mills. This sounded the death knell for the smaller sulphate firms, but 
also the largest specialized sulphate pulp and paper firms disappeared. During the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, the leading sulphate pulp and paper firms were consolidated into divisions of 
giant multi-product forests firms. 
 
Evolution of the Magazine and Machine Coated Paper Industries 
A sustained wave of collaborative technological learning between 1930 and 1960 
created the modern machine coated paper industry that supplies such diverse markets as 
food containers, office copy machines, and mass-circulation magazines. A non-existent 
product in 1930, the market for machine coated papers totaled half a billion dollars 
annually by 1963. An evolving collaborative effort of printing, publishing, and paper 
firms to innovate underpinned this deve lopment. 
In order to realize his revolutionary mass-circulation business strategy, publisher 
Henry Luce and his Time Inc. requested paper firms to produce new types of machine 
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coated papers in the early 1930’s. Luce fostered vertical linkages of technological 
learning backward to printing and paper firms, which perfected publisher’s vision of the 
new photojournalism. These collaborative crash programs of innovation perfected the 
mass printing technology and new machine coated paper types.  
The leading paper firms attempted to control these collaborative programs 
through patents, patent pools, and other collusive practices. This strategy stemmed from 
the belief that the Peter J. Massey and the Consolidated Water Power and Paper 
Company had obtained a key patent for the machine coated paper in 1933. A patent race 
ensued, during which Kimberly-Clark, Mead, Westvaco, and some smaller firms obtained 
several competing patents to manufacture machine coated paper consumed by mass-
circulation magazines. 
Patents enabled paper firms to frustrate the attempts of big publishing houses to 
expand the pool of paper suppliers. Entry into magazine paper production was 
discouraged because of the large and strong patent portfolios held by the leading 
magazine paper firms, and the active patent infringement litigation between them. 
Managers of firms that hoped to enter the production of machine coated paper, such as 
the Blandin Paper Company, knew that they had to obtain a patent license. However, 
expensive license agreements were not insured against potential infringement litigation. 
In addition, a potential licensee had no control of how many licenses would be eventually 
be granted. Upon learning these conditions, Blandin managers cancelled their 
diversification plans. 
Ironically, the strong intellectual property rights encouraged behaviour that 
eventually led the industry to shoot itself in the foot. In 1947, the Consolidated sued 
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Kimberly-Clark for infringing its Massey patents. Five years later, an appeals court 
agreed with Kimberly-Clark that no infringement had occurred, and ruled that the already 
expired patent by Massey was originally invalid. In fact, the court declared that there did 
not exist a so-called fundamental patent for the machine coating technology. 
Although most of the original patents obtained on machine coating of paper had 
expired during the 1940’s, the leading firms had obtained several new ones that were 
based on the assumption that the original ones were valid. The 1952 court ruling 
undermined this, and quickly a wave of alternative methods to manufacture machine 
coating papers flooded the markets. The third largest U.S. pulp and paper firm, St. Regis 
Paper Company, filed patents on several different type of machine coating technologies it 
had developed secretly during the 1940’s. Two leading American papermaking 
equipment suppliers, Rice-Barton Company and Black Clawson, became within short 
time the major source of innovation in machine coating technology. They acquired 
patents and hired specialized research and development staffs. Again, the rapid diffusion 
of manufacturing technology induced industry-wide over- investment into machine coated 
paper capacity. 
Yet an important difference in corporate strategy and manufacturing technology 
emerged between incumbent machine paper companies and new entrants. The incumbent 
machine coated paper companies, such as Westvaco and Mead, emphasized mass 
production of standardized magazine and printing papers. These companies chose to 
install capital intensive on-machine coating machines that could produce a single 
standard grade of paper, but did so at unprecedented low unit cost. New entrants installed 
typically so-called off-machine coating technology that allowed the flexible production of 
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different qualities of specialty paper, and was sold to the emerging office copy market 
and small quality printing jobbers. Most of new entrants were incumbent large-scale pulp 
and paper firms, such as Crown-Zellerbach and the Great Northern Paper Company, that 
attempted to diversify into another line of paper markets. 
 
The Dynamic Evolution of the North American Pulp and Paper Industry 
The dynamic co-evolution of organizational structures and technological learning 
in the North American pulp and paper industry between 1860 and 1960 is a story with 
mixed lessons. The multi-division forests products giants of the 1960’s ran large, capital 
and technology intensive operations, and acquired the most important technological 
innovations from specialized equipment suppliers. The leading pulp and paper firms had 
identical corporate strategies and structures, and competed in the same markets. The 
specialized equipment suppliers diffused latest technological innovations symmetrically 
throughout the industry. Under these circumstances, industry managers were locked into 
a strategy emphasizing economies of scale and scope. 
A few decades earlier, specialized pulp and paper firms controlled the underlying 
manufacturing technology in their respective industry segments, and were the leading 
source of most important innovations. This technological capability enabled firms to 
create new markets, and gain spectacular growth rates. 
Industry leaders and analysts insist today that the consumption of paper per capita 
is determined by the per capita gross national production. Affluent Americans consume 
most paper in the world, while Chinese consume little. Although the maxim is true, it also 
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betrays the idea that the industry could prosper through the creation of new markets with 
innovative processes and products, as it used to do. 
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